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1. Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2002).
INTRODUCTION
Six-year-old Jackie Doe dances suggestively in the bathroom
at camp, laughing as she touches herself and another girl in
private places. Concerned that Jackie’s behavior indicates a
premature sexual awareness, her counselor reports the incident
to the child abuse hotline. Child Protective Services (CPS)
assigns a caseworker to investigate the possibility that Jackie
has been sexually abused. Under state law, sexual abuse is both
a crime and a basis to remove the child from the custody of her
parents.
At the door of the Doe family home, the caseworker explains
to Jackie’s mother that she needs to come in, look around, and
see the child. At first, her mother refuses to allow the
caseworker in, but the caseworker insists. When Jackie’s mother
wonders if she should call a lawyer, the caseworker tells her
there is no need to consult with anyone. Jackie’s mother
reluctantly accedes. The caseworker says that she needs to take
pictures of Jackie’s body. Her mother, visibly shaken, again
expresses discomfort, but the caseworker tells her “Oh, don’t
worry. It’s more stressful for the parent than it is the child.”
And so Jackie’s mother helps Jackie to take off her clothes. The
caseworker asks Jackie to lie down on the bed and spread her
legs. Despite having no training in this specialized work, she
then “[takes] pictures of Jackie’s vagina and buttocks in a
closed position, and then instruct[s] [her mother] to spread
Jackie’s labia and buttocks, so that she [can] take pictures of
the genital and anal areas.”  For months afterwards, both1
Jackie and her mother suffer from nightmares, anxiety, and
depression.
Finding no basis to substantiate its concern that the child
may have been abused, the state closes its case file. Jackie’s
mother files suit alleging violations of her and her daughter’s
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights. In that
context, the caseworker’s supervisor allows that “she would not
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3. The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things
to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
have taken the pictures but opine[s] that the decision to do so
lay within [the caseworker’s] discretion.”2
This story is both recent and true. Child welfare investigations
tend to involve strip searches or genital examinations only when
the state suspects that a child has been the victim of serious
physical or sexual abuse; however, even mundane abuse and neglect
reports investigated by officials acting in good faith can result in
deeply intrusive state action that touches upon aspects of privacy
that the culture and law typically have considered fundamental.
State officials, including caseworkers and the police, annually
conduct about 2 million such investigations which generally involve
entry into and search of the family home, and interviews with and
physical examinations of the children whose welfare is in question.
In many cases the latter occur during school hours, so that parents
do not know about them and are unable to interfere. And, states
formally rely upon their officials’ ability to conduct investigations
unfettered by procedures designed to safeguard the privacy of the
family so they can exercise the maximum discretion possible in
this process. Specifically, although such investigations seek
evidence that could support both a criminal and civil charge, and
touch upon the Fourth Amendment’s most hallowed ground—the
personal residence and the person herself—states generally pursue
their approach as though there is a child abuse exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s presumptive requirements of a particularized
warrant and probable cause.3
The premise underlying this approach to the child maltreatment
problem is that privileging family and individual privacy risks
enormous damage to children who might be the victims of abuse or
neglect. Indeed, some have argued (including myself in a different
context) that it is precisely a strong cultural and legal concept of
privacy that allows maltreatment of vulnerable family members to
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4. See, e.g., DORIANE LAMBELET COLEMAN, FIXING COLUMBINE: THE CHALLENGE TO
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 6-9, 91-144 (2002) (arguing that American liberalism, particularly as
ensconced in the First Amendment’s free speech doctrine and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
doctrine of parental autonomy, enables adults to create harmful circumstances for children
and precludes law-based solutions to those circumstances); Judith G. McMullen, Privacy,
Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 569 (1992) (setting out
the thesis that “[a]ttempts to accommodate family autonomy and privacy interests have
significantly compromised the protection of our children”); Jim Puzzanghera, The Dilemmas
of Child Welfare: Protect Kids or Preserve Family?, NEWSDAY, Jan. 17, 1993, at 53 (referring
to a policy of protecting the rights of parents and keeping families together as being
“sometimes at the expense of children in danger”).
5. A particularized warrant is one which, according to the Amendment’s own terms,
“particularly describ[es] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also infra notes 136-38, 322-33 and accompanying text
(explaining that particularization is essential to assure that investigations are appropriately
fettered in scope, and concomitantly that the investigating officials cannot exercise undue
discretion in their conduct). Although the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the
probable cause test may have varied historically and is often said to mean different things
in different contexts, a survey of judges indicates that the threshold is substantially higher
than that necessary to meet the reasonable suspicion test, which states tend to apply to their
child maltreatment investigations, and which courts tend to apply in removal cases under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (describing these
occur.  As applied to child welfare programs, this argument4
suggests that where the government is unable to investigate reports
of the possibility that children are at risk, some children will
continue to suffer and even to die at the hands of their abusive
parents and guardians. A child welfare exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s presumptive requirements is believed to be essential
to protect these children.
Perhaps because many states agree with these arguments,
their practices have gone largely unimpeded by the courts: The
United States Supreme Court has yet to decide a case involving
the constitutionality of child maltreatment investigations, and in
particular, the Fourth Amendment’s applicability to those investi-
gations. Moreover, no state supreme court has addressed this issue
in a straightforward manner. The lower courts, including the
federal circuits and state appellate courts, only recently have
begun to hear relevant cases in large enough numbers to provide
a sense of how the issue is percolating. Notably, while all of the
federal circuits agree that the Fourth Amendment applies to state
maltreatment investigations, they are split on the essential
question whether it requires a particularized warrant and probable
cause,  or merely some version of the administrative or “special5
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points in detail). 
6. The United States Supreme Court has held that, except in “a few specially
established and well-delineated exceptions,” it is per se unreasonable for the government to
search or to seize in the absence of a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate on a finding of
probable cause. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Joining the traditional
consent and exigent circumstances exceptions, the special needs doctrine has developed as
a narrow but important exception to these conventional strictures. It applies when an
investigation’s primary programmatic purpose is civil and not law enforcement related.
Where it applies, the constitutionality of a search or seizure depends on the outcome of a
reasonableness balancing analysis. The exception has resulted in reductions in privacy
protections ranging from the elimination of both the particularized warrant and probable
cause standards, to the requirement of a warrant but on less than probable cause, that is,
on the grounds of no, mere, or reasonable suspicion. See infra notes 160-253 and
accompanying text (discussing in detail the special needs exception and its applicability to
child welfare investigations).
7. See infra notes 25-45 (providing this data).
8. Seventy one percent represents the percentage of cases investigated in which the
state ultimately did not substantiate the original report. I take the position in this Article
that, despite its beneficent intent, the state does more harm than good in many if not most
of these cases. A report may be unsubstantiated for two principal reasons: First, there may
have been no abuse or neglect to begin with, because the report was either fraudulent or
simply wrong. Second, there may have been some evidence of abuse or neglect, but not
enough to allow the relevant officials to substantiate the report. A portion of the cases in this
category likely involves maltreatment that goes undiscovered. There are data suggesting that
fifteen percent of all New York reports, or approximately 300,000 reports annually, are
intentionally false. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1384-88
(3d ed. 1998) (providing data from the New York Department of Social Services on
needs” exception to the traditional warrant preference.  Depending6
on how liberally it is applied, the special needs standard is effec-
tively the child welfare exception to the Fourth Amendment that
states seek to perpetuate, as it may permit warrantless intrusions
on the basis of no, mere, or reasonable suspicion.
The profound irony of this approach is that, in the name of saving
children from the harm that their parents and guardians are
thought to pose, states ultimately cause more harm to many more
children than they ever help. In 2002, for example, the states
conducted approximately 1.8 million investigations concerning
the welfare of nearly 3.2 million children. Only about 896,000, or
twenty-eight percent, of these children were ultimately found to be
victims of abuse or neglect.  Seventy-one percent, or roughly 2.37
million children were thus subjected to state mandated “thorough”
investigations involving at a minimum interviews, examinations,
and/or home visits, in circumstances where the state in the end
could not show that the children were unsafe and in need of rescue.8
418 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:413
intentionally false reports, including reports filed by spouses in contentious divorce and
custody situations). It has also been persuasively argued that a significant percentage of
investigated reports ultimately involve only poverty and not maltreatment. Douglas J.
Besharov, Child Abuse Realities: Over-Reporting Poverty, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 165, 183-88
(2000). On the other hand, the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect
Information suggests that close to 63,000 investigations annually, implicating approximately
100,000 children, yield some evidence of maltreatment, but in an amount insufficient to
substantiate the allegation under state law. NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, at 716-
1 tbls.2-5 (2004) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002], available at http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/programs/cb/publications/cm02/cm02.pdf. Other than these analyses, I have found
nothing that attempts to allocate the 71 percent of unsubstantiated cases among the two
explanations provided above. Thus, as between these two explanations, there simply is not
an adequate basis to say in which category most cases fall. Certainly, there is no basis to
conclude that any large percentage of these unsubstantiated cases involved children who
were, in fact, the victims of unproven maltreatment. The 71 percent figure is thus a rough
one. Nevertheless, as the only figure available, it does evidence that each year states
intervene in the lives of approximately 2.3 million children where the intervention is not
needed or where it fails to help a child at risk. One of my objectives is to challenge the
assumption implicit in the prevailing approach that these interventions are harmless for the
children involved.
9. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of the doctrine).
I claim in this Article that the Fourth Amendment is “unique” in this regard because the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, under which the subject of family privacy is typically
considered, do not usually provide “rights” to the children, but rather assume that their
“interests” will be adequately cared for by the adults responsible for their care. See COLEMAN,
supra note 4, at 100 (noting this point in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment’s doctrine
of parental autonomy). Moreover, in practice, the procedural protections afforded individuals
under the Fourth Amendment are likely stronger than under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (describing the quantum of evidence typically
required to meet the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard as opposed to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s reasonable suspicion standard). I use these distinctions, among
others, in a companion piece entitled Through the Prism of the Fourth Amendment: A New
Look at Family Privacy to develop the argument that the Fourth Amendment has important
Investigating these children is consistent with the states’ highly
precautionary strategy to remedy the nation’s maltreatment
problem. However, from the perspective of the investigated child,
the process is not so clearly meritorious. Indeed, despite the
authorities’ best intentions, the process can be harmful in two
related ways. First, the investigations undermine the fundamental
values of privacy, dignity, personal security, and mobility that are
protected by the Fourth Amendment. It is critical in this regard
that the Fourth Amendment uniquely has been interpreted to
recognize the child’s own individual interest in these values, by
guarding her right also to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures both inside and outside the family home.  Second, as the9
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and as yet unrecognized contributions to make to the continuing evolution of family privacy
theory. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Through the Prism of the Fourth Amendment: A New
Look at Family Privacy (work in progress, on file with author).
10. The range of emotional and psychological damage that can be caused by the
investigations process is discussed throughout this Article. However, the argument and
supporting cases and studies are featured in Parts I.C, III.B, and III.D.
11. See NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING LAWS 21-22 (2002)
[hereinafter CURRENT TRENDS] (discussing the dangers of both over- and under-reporting in
the mandatory reporting system currently in force throughout the country); CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at 716-17 tbls.2-5 (2004) (noting that of the
approximately 1.8 million child welfare investigations conducted annually, close to 63,000,
which implicate over 100,000 children, conclude that child abuse is “indicated” but that
“maltreatment [could not] be substantiated under state law or policy, [even though] there
was reason to suspect that the child may have been maltreated or was at risk of
maltreatment”).
12. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing illustrations of this view).
13. For example, North Carolina, one of the states with the highest annual incidence of
child maltreatment, requires “every person to report suspected maltreatment.” N.C. CHILD
ADVOCACY INST., NORTH CAROLINA CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES DATA CARD (2004). However,
“[i]t does not require citizens to provide any proof.” Id.; see also State v. Wilkerson, 247
S.E.2d 905, 907-08 (N.C. 1978) (case in which neighbors and friends witnessed repeated
incidents of father severely beating toddler, and only described those incidents after child
was killed after a beating); Leslie Boyd, DSS Can’t Investigate Abuse Allegations if It Is Not
Made Aware of the Situation, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at 1A (noting
importance of reporting suspected maltreatment, and setting out maltreatment definitions,
reasons for suspicion, and information about what a citizen might expect when filing a
report). 
introductory illustration intimates, depending upon the child and
the nature of the investigation, the process can cause emotional and
psychological damage ranging from temporary discomfort to
significant long-term harm.  10
If this strategy were a particularly effective tool in the battle
against child maltreatment, it might be more defensible. However,
even its proponents concede that because abuse and neglect are
underreported, many more victims exist than are known to the
system.  And they surmise that the investigations that do take11
place sometimes, or even often, fail to discover adequate evidence
of maltreatment in cases where children are in fact truly victims.12
Meanwhile, states largely ignore alternative approaches that could
enhance the success of their efforts. For example, states could do
more to increase societal awareness of the need to report child
abuse with relevant particularity, especially in localities and among
populations known to be reluctant to do so.  They could work to13
reconcile the current conflict among experts about how to define
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14. See NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., STATE STATUTE SERIES 2005: DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
3 (2005) [hereinafter DEFINITIONS], available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/
statutes/define.pdf  (stating that “[t]he standard for what constitutes an abusive act varies
among the States,” and states with broader definitions provide child protective services with
greater discretion in determining what constitutes abuse).
15. See COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 23-27, 56-66 (exploring the manifestations of the
epidemic of childhood emotional dysfunction in the U.S. and discussing the absence of
adequate parenting and childcare that is principally responsible for this epidemic).
16. See, e.g., JOHN BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 140 (Margery Fry ed.,
1970) (“Only if the caseworker is mature enough and trained enough to respect even bad
parents and to balance the less-evident long-term considerations against the manifest and
perhaps urgent short-term ones, will she help the parents themselves and do a good turn to
the child.”); GWENDOLYN L. HARRIS, N.J. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., TRANSFORMING CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN NEW JERSEY: DYFS TRANSFORMATION PLAN 3-4 (2003), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/Reports/DYFS%20Transformation%20Plan-03.pdf
(calling for increased resources and finding that the New Jersey Division of Youth and
Family Services “lacks the sufficient and required tools to support staff” in terms of access
to supervision, technology, equipment, training, and worker safety); Don’t Economize on
Saving Children, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 9, 2004, at 8A (calling for the appropriation of
funding for two child protection bills passed to reform Indiana’s child protective services
system, “a system with a policy of secrecy and an admitted history of underreporting child
deaths”); Jessica Guenzel, A Little Girl Lost: State Review Will Try to Determine Whether
Cracks in DSS System Led to Toddler’s Death, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 9, 2003, at A1
(reporting on the death of a two-year-old girl attributed in part to “high turnover rates,
unfilled positions and inadequate financing” negatively affecting the county’s social services
department); Susan K. Livio, Problems Multiplied for DYFS in 2003, STAR-LEDGER (New
Jersey), Dec. 28, 2003, at 1 (reporting that following the discovery of “the battered body of
a 7-year-old boy,” the New Jersey state government took steps to overhaul its “chronically
understaffed, underfunded Division of Youth and Family Services”); Jonathan Martin, Child-
Abuse Hotline Puts Callers on Hold, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at B1 (reporting that
because of understaffing and budget cuts a hotline “intended to more efficiently dispatch
state child-abuse investigators” had up to two-hour hold times and complaints unanswered
for a week).
abuse and neglect, to eliminate definitions that are so broad they
give officials on the ground unfettered discretion to define maltreat-
ment,  and to make sure that the definitions that remain include14
real instances of maltreatment that society currently prefers to
ignore.  Perhaps most importantly, they could do what is necessary15
to hire, train, and retain officials to work in the field who are given
an appropriately sized caseload, sufficient support, and clear
guidelines to reduce the extent of their discretion, so that they can
do their jobs with due care and precision, and with respect both for
the privacy of the family and for the health and safety of all of the
children who are subject to their programs and procedures.  These16
alternative strategies are not cheap and in some respects they
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17. This wonderful expression, which explains much about the state of childhood in the
liberal scheme, has been attributed to Professors Steven Shiffrin, whose article, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 647 (1980), appears to contain the expression’s first mention
in the legal literature, and Larry Alexander, whose article, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue:
Man and Manna in the Liberal State, 28 UCLA L. REV. 816, 855 (1981), was published
shortly after Shiffrin’s.
18. See COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 99-107 (exploring this idea).
19. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (discussing the draconian
removal policies of the Ancient Spartan state); State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 82-85 (Me. 1996)
(describing the removal of a young boy from the custody of his Afghani immigrant parents
because of biased conceptions about the nature of Afghani cultural practices and their
tendency to harm children); Nancy McDaniel & Nita C. Lescher, The History of Child
Protective Services, in HELPING IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A COMPETENCY-BASED
CASEWORK HANDBOOK 39 (Charmaine Brittain & Deborah Esquibel Hunt eds., 2004)
(discussing the New Deal program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as
are also conceptually and politically complicated. Reforming the
reporting requirements to demand more of the citizenry and
adopting more precise maltreatment definitions are particularly
thorny issues in these respects. But it is wrong for states annually
to risk the welfare of millions of children and families to avoid the
political and fiscal burdens involved in adopting a more effective
approach to the nation’s child abuse problem. It is also wrong to
abandon all respect for the values ensconced in the Fourth
Amendment in support of such a flawed, over- and underinclusive
system.
Children’s interests are always particularly vulnerable in the
ubiquitous constitutional and political battle between protecting the
rights of individual adults and governmental exercises of power in
the name of the public good. Advocates of the prevailing approach
to the maltreatment problem are right to be concerned about
unfettered family privacy, for children are “the Achilles heel of
liberalism.”  Enabled and then protected by liberalism’s doctrine17
of parental autonomy, adults sometimes cause great harm to their
children.  Understanding this is not the end of the story, however,18
for sometimes the opposite is true. Sometimes, in its zeal to protect
children from the perceived and real inclinations of their parents
and to safeguard its own health and welfare, the state itself
commits violent acts that harm the children. The most prevalent
example of this phenomenon throughout history—which I believe
is again at issue in the context of this Article—has been the
needless separation either psychologically or physically of healthy
children from their normally functioning families.  Discerning the19
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“established to prevent child welfare authorities from removing children from their parents
for financial reasons”); Lorie Graham, Indigenous Peoples: Reparations and the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 LEGAL STUD. F. 619, 624-26 (2001) (noting that “[b]y the time [the Indian
Child Welfare Act] was enacted into law in 1978, one-third of all Native American children
were being removed from their communities and families and placed in non-Indian foster
care, adoptive homes, and educational institutions” and discussing at length the reasons and
consequences of such unnecessary removals); Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His
Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 178, 207-08 (2002) (describing
the increased regulatory activity of government during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, stating, “intervention in the homes of poor families expanded through
child neglect and abuse investigations, and frequently led to the removal of children to
institutions”).
20. In his most recent work, Fourth Amendment scholar Andrew Taslitz develops the
compelling argument that government searches and seizures are inevitably acts of “political
violence.” ANDREW E. TASLITZ, LAW ON THE STREET: SEARCH AND SEIZURE, RACE AND RESPECT
IN AMERICAN LIFE (forthcoming 2006). In Professor Taslitz’s words, “[a]bsent a citizen’s
voluntary consent, all police activity involves violence or its threat. A ‘search’ is by definition
an unwanted, thus forced, invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. A ‘seizure’
similarly is an unwanted interference with a person’s freedom of movement or his possessory
interest in property.” Id. As he describes it, this violence typically causes its subjects to
experience a range of emotional responses including fear, degradation, humiliation, and
indignity along with its obvious physical impacts including confinement. Id. And he insists
that these facts ought not to be obscured simply because political violence “may often be
legitimate, necessary to enforcing the law, to encourage respect for it, and to catch the bad
guys.” Id. Indeed, given that the Framers were “distrustful of the state, fearful that it [would]
use its awesome force to ... impose tyrannical rule in ways both large and small,” Taslitz
suggests that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is best understood ... as ... an attempt to tame
political violence, ensuring its service to the ‘security’ of a free People by prohibiting
unreasonable exercises of the state’s use of force.” Id. In other words, the Amendment’s own
terms, which Taslitz agrees involve a preference for the particularized warrant and probable
cause, strike the balance between “[t]he right of the People to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects,” see U.S. CONST. amend. IV, and the need for the government
to be allowed to commit acts of political violence to secure “the ‘public’ or ‘common’ good,” see
TASLITZ, supra. Because I think that it more aptly describes the acts of the government in
child welfare cases, I use the term “public violence” in lieu of Professor Taslitz’s “political
violence,” but the essential point is the same.
necessity of a separation is obviously the critical issue. In this
Article, I argue that the Fourth Amendment’s unusually express
and considered compromise between individual rights and social
order, and the presumptive requirements that codify that compro-
mise, are particularly useful tools to resolve this issue because they
assure that we always balance the threat of private violence against
the public violence that necessarily results from governmental
searches and seizures.  More than that, though, the Amendment20
recognizes that while privacy sometimes permits the individual to
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21. Most notable in this regard is that Wayne R. LaFave’s essential treatise contains only
a brief section referring to the subject. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.3, at 457 (3d ed. 1996) (focusing on case law
involving home visits as a condition to receiving state welfare funds, and within that context
discussing also ordinary child abuse investigations). In that section, he notes that addressing
the subject further is unnecessary because “it has been thoughtfully addressed in the recent
legal literature.” Id. § 10.3, at 464-65. As explained below, this is in fact not the case. See
infra note 23 and accompanying text. Professor LaFave also notes that the subject has
“seldom emerged in the reported cases.” LAFAVE, supra § 10.3, at 464. He provides a “but
see” cite to one federal appellate case and two state cases. Id. § 10.3, at 464 n.32. Of course,
as I will discuss below, this issue has emerged quite strongly in the reported cases in the last
ten years. See infra notes 169-89 and accompanying text (discussing this case law). Professor
LaFave otherwise relies on dated analyses from two older articles to suggest that the legal
standard likely requires a warrant but only on a finding of reasonable suspicion that
maltreatment has occurred or that a child is at risk of abuse or neglect. Id. § 10.3; see infra
notes 328, 337-39 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of this work). Most
important from a doctrinal standpoint is the absence from Professor LaFave’s treatise of any
discussion of the relevance of modern special needs analysis to this obviously apposite body
of facts. 
22. See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1999)
(containing important treatment of issues implicated by abuse and neglect laws, and an
article excerpt arguing that mandatory reporting requirements, among other things, trigger
intrusive investigations, and thus ought to be considered most carefully, but otherwise not
mentioning investigations and their relationship to the Fourth Amendment); ROGER J.R.
LEVESQUE, CHILD MALTREATMENT LAW: FOUNDATIONS IN SCIENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY 295-
374 (2002) (containing a chapter entitled “Seizing Children, Terminating Relationships and
Providing Alternate Care,” which despite the “seizure” language focuses exclusively on
Fourteenth Amendment issues and does not otherwise address maltreatment investigations
or any Fourth Amendment issues); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD,
FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW (4th ed. 2000)
hide bad facts, it always means the right to dignity, personal
security, and mobility. This last and deeply valuable idea ought not
be abandoned, certainly not in the name of saving children who can
benefit from it as much as adults.
The important relationship of the Fourth Amendment to the child
welfare system has been surprisingly neglected by the legal
academy. This dearth of scholarly attention is especially surprising
given the judiciary’s deeply conflicting views on the subject. Largely
because of their tendency to focus on criminal procedure to the
exclusion of even dual (civil-criminal) purpose investigations, no
Fourth Amendment scholar has given the matter much attention in
the legal literature or in case or hornbooks.  And because of their21
tendency to focus on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and
state law, family and children’s law scholars also have ignored the
subject, both in the legal literature and in casebooks.  Occasional22
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(containing a substantial treatment of the broader subject entitled “Protecting the Child from
Abuse and Neglect” and a subcategory called “Discovery of Abuse” but focusing exclusively
in that context on reporting laws, and then skipping directly to “The Causes and Effects of
Abuse and the Treatment of the Abusing Family”); Michael Wald, State Intervention on
Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1000-
36 (1975) (discussing the risks and utilities inherent in the child welfare scheme, including
in the investigation process, without noting the Fourth Amendment’s relevance to this area).
Indeed, I have found only one family law text that gives any attention to the matter; its
authors state the problem exactly and nail the critical question on its head. See ELLMAN ET
AL., supra note 8, at 1384-87. Reflecting on the large number of unfounded reports and
unsubstantiated claims that pervade the system, its authors note that “[p]ractices used in
child abuse investigations are also the subject of increasing criticism.” Id. at 1385. In support
of this point, they cite “the provisions, explicit or implied, in many states that allow coercive,
investigatory home visits, often without a search warrant or the necessity of establishing
probable cause.” Id. The authors then ask: 
What is to be made of [the] criticisms [regarding the practices used in child
abuse investigations]? The risks of inaction, and of overly-aggressive
intervention, are both severe: failing to stop abuse causes great harm, even
death, to children; false accusations, aggressively pursued, can destroy families
and reputations.... egregious examples of both are plentiful. Has the law shown
enough sensitivity to the need to balance the risks of both mistakes? What
improvements seem most necessary in this area? 
Id. at 1387. My goal in this Article is specifically to address this series of questions.
23. Both pieces attempt squarely and thoroughly to address whether and how the Fourth
Amendment applies to child welfare investigations, and both recognize the critical
significance of the special needs exception to the analysis of this issue. The first piece is a
scholarly student note by Michael R. Beeman, Note, Investigating Child Abuse: The Fourth
Amendment and Investigatory Home Visits, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1034 (1989), which argues in
an older doctrinal context that the appropriate balance of the state’s need for an investigation
and the family’s right to privacy mitigates in favor of requiring only an administrative
warrant issued on the basis of the investigation’s reasonableness in the circumstances,
rather than on the basis of probable cause. The other piece is a more pragmatic article by
Mark Hardin, the Assistant Director of the American Bar Association’s National Legal
Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection. Mark Hardin, Legal Barriers in Child
Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REV. 493 (1988).
Hardin’s article provides a detailed analysis of then-applicable Fourth Amendment law to
all conceivable aspects of child maltreatment investigations in the context of his thesis that
states ought to enact legislation specifically authorizing CPS and police to force compliance
with child abuse investigations when necessary. Id. at 517-19. Hardin argues that such
legislation ought to require a warrant on reasonable suspicion for social workers and on
traditional probable cause for police in particularly intrusive settings. Id. at 536-48. 
A few other pieces discuss aspects of the issues this Article raises. See Alan W. Blackman,
Comment, Warrantless Home Searches: The Road to Calabretta, 22 J. JUV. L. 64 (2001-2002)
(providing an overview of the special needs doctrine’s evolution and its application to the
child abuse investigation in Calabretta v. Yolo County Dep’t of Social Services, 189 F.3d 808
(9th Cir. 1999));  Steven F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the Fourth
Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing from the child development perspective that
flurries of interest in this relationship have arisen over the last 15
years, which have generated two particularly noteworthy pieces.23
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the standards applied to governmental strip searches of children ought to vary based on the
child’s age); Michael Compitello, Comment, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten
Victims in the Battle Against Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135 (1997) (recognizing that child
abuse investigations often cause more harm than good so that a healthier balance must be
struck between family privacy and the states’ need to investigate maltreatment reports, and
arguing that because the courts and the constitutional doctrine under the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments are ineffective in this context, a legislative solution protecting
family privacy would best achieve this needed balance); Jillian Grossman, Note, The Fourth
Amendment: Relaxing the Rule in Child Abuse Investigations, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1303
(2000) (proposing that children be able to consent to searches and that the evidentiary
standard for exigent circumstances in child abuse cases be lowered to reasonable suspicion
to allow the government greater latitude in such investigations); Christina B. Sailer, Note,
Qualified Immunity for Child Abuse Investigators: Balancing the Concerns of Protecting Our
Children from Abuse and the Integrity of the Family, 29 J. FAM. L. 659 (1990) (contending
that allowing officers qualified immunity from civil rights claims in child maltreatment
contexts best reflects the balance between family privacy and the state’s need to investigate
maltreatment allegations).
24. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
This earlier work, however, was produced before the Supreme Court
refined the parameters of the Fourth Amendment’s special needs
exception, and before the issue had received attention from the
federal appellate courts. Consequently, it is relatively unhelpful in
today’s quite different jurisprudential climate. And because it gives
no more than a passing nod to the crucial individual interests and
real-world harms implicated by the states’ current investigatory
approach, it also fails to tee up the facts so as to allow a thorough
evaluation of the competing interests at issue. This Article seeks to
fill this broad and deep hole in the legal literature.
Part I first summarizes the child maltreatment problem and
describes the prevailing approach to investigating reports of abuse
and neglect. It then explores the real-world impact of this approach,
arguing that an unfettered and overbroad investigatory tool comes
at a steep cost to literally millions of children and families. Part II
sets out relevant Fourth Amendment doctrine and examines
whether the special needs exception might constitutionalize the
prevailing strategy of conducting warrantless investigations, often
on little more than mere suspicion. This doctrine applies where
“special needs, beyond the need for normal law enforcement”
renders these protections “impracticable.”  Part II concludes that24
the degree of interconnectedness between civil and law enforcement
authorities and motivations that underlie many if not most
investigatory schemes likely will preclude the doctrine’s usefulness
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25. This statistic is based on the number of cases that CPS agencies across the country
were able to substantiate. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at xiv. 
26. Id. at 22. Broken down by category, the data reveals that 
[d]uring 2002, 60.5 percent of victims experienced neglect (including medical
neglect); 18.6 percent were physically abused; 9.9 percent were sexually abused;
and 6.5 percent were emotionally or psychologically maltreated. In addition,
18.9 percent of victims experienced such “other” types of maltreatment as
“abandonment,” “threats of harm to the child,” and “congenital drug addiction.”
Id. (citations omitted).
27. NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT FATALITIES: STATISTICS AND INTERVENTIONS 1
(2004) [hereinafter FATALITIES], available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/
fatality.pdf. 
28. Id. at 2. According to the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect
Information, “[t]his population of children is the most vulnerable for many reasons, including
for this purpose. My own view is that absent exigent circumstances
or lawfully obtained consent, the Fourth Amendment’s presumptive
warrant and probable cause requirements ought to apply whenever
the state investigates children and their families in this context.
As the introductory illustration reflects, CPS acting alone can do
substantial harm to a child and her family. Part III thus develops
a normative argument based in fundamental Fourth Amendment
principles rejecting the exception. The investigations are gener-
ally too intrusive of deeply and reasonably held expectations
about privacy, dignity, personal security, and mobility, to justify
unfettered official intervention. I conclude that the Amendment
provides a unique and unexplored opportunity within the constitu-
tional jurisprudence to solve the delicate cultural impasse
between advocates of family privacy and proponents of aggressive
maltreatment programs in a way that best reflects the children’s
need for protection against both private and public violence.
I. THE PREVAILING APPROACH TO MALTREATMENT INVESTIGATIONS 
Approximately 896,000 children are abused or neglected in the
United States each year.  The maltreatment included in this25
estimate ranges from physical beatings and sexual abuse to
medical, nutritional, and emotional neglect.  At least 1,40026
children die each year from the most serious instances of maltreat-
ment.  The majority of child victims are below age three, with 4127
percent of fatalities involving children under age one, and 76
percent involving children under age four.  Undoubtedly, abuse28
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their dependency, small size, and inability to defend themselves.” Id.
29. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at 5.
30. See, e.g., Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88
Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5116) (conditioning
funding to states for child abuse prevention and treatment programs on states having in
effect, among other things, laws that provide for some form of mandatory reporting of child
abuse); D.C. CODE § 4-1321.02 (2001) (requiring professionals such as medical personnel,
teachers, law enforcement, daycare providers, and others who come into contact with
children through their work to report suspected abuse either to the police or CPS); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1993) (requiring “[a]ny person having reasonable cause to believe that
a child has been subjected to child abuse or acts of child abuse” to report the information to
the Division of Youth and Family Services); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413(1) (Consol. Supp.
2005) (requiring reporting by medical personnel and others that might “have reasonable
cause to suspect that a child coming before them in their professional or official capacity is
an abused or maltreated child,” as well as if they gain knowledge of possible abuse by the
parent or guardians coming before them in their professional capacity). Approximately
eighteen states have “any person” reporting requirements, while the majority “limit
mandatory reporting to professionals working with children.” CURRENT TRENDS, supra note
11, at 3. The reporting requirements were adopted in the mid- to late 1960s in response to
two important articles that for the first time described as medical diagnoses the “battered
child syndrome” and the “maltreatment syndrome,” and provided that a physician’s failure
to follow up on the diagnoses constituted a violation of professional ethics. See Vincent J.
Fontana et al., The “Maltreatment Syndrome” in Children, 269 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1389 (1963)
(expanding the “battered child syndrome” diagnosis to include “a situation ranging from the
deprivation of food, clothing, shelter and parental love to incidents in which children are
physically abused and mistreated by an adult,” thereby suggesting that by broadening the
diagnosis in this way and renaming it the “maltreatment syndrome” the term more “fully
describe[s] the true picture of this often life-threatening condition”); C. Henry Kempe et al.,
The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17, 17 (1962) (describing the “battered child
syndrome” as “a clinical condition in young children who have received serious physical
abuse” explaining that the diagnosis “should be considered in any child exhibiting evidence
of fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, failure to thrive, soft tissue swelling or skin
bruising ... or where the degree or type of injury is at variance with the history given
regarding the occurrence of the trauma,” and stating that “[p]hysicians have a duty and
responsibility to the child to require a full evaluation of the problem and to guarantee that
and neglect is a significant national problem that takes a real and
personal toll on children and families everywhere. Consequently, it
also is a most pressing policy and practical concern of state and
local governments, which are ultimately responsible for developing
and administering the response.
The most recent estimates from 2002 indicate that “2.6 million
referrals, including 4.5 million children, were made to [state and
local] CPS agencies [throughout the United States].”  A combina-29
tion of federal and state statutory law requires either “everyone” or
specially defined categories of persons, including teachers and
doctors, for example, to report suspected maltreatment.  The ten30
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no expected repetition of trauma will be permitted to occur”). For a discussion of the history
of the states’ child maltreatment efforts, see generally CURRENT TRENDS, supra note 11.
31. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at 16-17 tbl.2-5; see also U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 201 tbl.321 (2002) (listing
the same ten states as having the highest number of child abuse reports, albeit in a slightly
different descending order). 
32. See generally DEFINITIONS, supra note 14, at 1 (providing the minimum state
statutory definitions of child abuse, neglect, and sexual abuse required by the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act).
33. See, e.g., People v. Beaugez, 43 Cal. Rptr. 28, 32 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (rejecting
a “void for vagueness” challenge to a state child abuse statute in part because, “[t]he type of
conduct [addressed] defies precise definition” and “[i]n number and kind the situations where
a child’s life or health may be imperiled are infinite”); Campbell v. State, 240 So.2d 298, 299
(Fla. 1970) (stating that, “[t]he fact that specific acts of chastisement are not enumerated, an
impossible task at best, does not render the statutory standard void for vagueness”);
SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO FAMILY BREAKDOWN 64
(1971) (“[N]eglect statutes recognize that ‘neglectful’ behavior can also vary, and thus cannot
be easily or specifically defined.... The broad neglect statutes allow judges to examine each
situation on its own facts.”). But see Wald, supra note 22, at 1020 (emphasizing the
states with the most annual reports of child maltreatment are, in
descending order: California, New York, Florida, Texas, Michigan,
Georgia, Ohio, North Carolina, Illinois, and Missouri.  In describ-31
ing the typical state policies and practices relating to child welfare
investigations, this Article relies primarily on national figures and
on illustrative provisions and practices from these states.
A. Defining the Cases for Investigation
The first feature of the prevailing strategy involves, at least in
principle, taking no chances and casting the widest net possible in
identifying the cases that will be investigated. This objective is
accomplished through broad legal definitions of abuse and neglect,
and screening criteria that are nearly as broad. It also involves
statutory or regulatory provisions that mandate the investigation
of all screened-in reports, and related provisions that allow state
officials to go to court to compel compliance with the investigations.
Legal definitions of “abuse” and “neglect” are typically vague and
overbroad, often purposefully so.  This is to assure that the state32
can exercise wide discretion in treating targeted parental conduct
as maltreatment; and it ensures that the state is not precluded
from addressing such conduct by the failure of the legislature or
administrative officials to include all conceivable forms of abuse or
neglect in its laws.  For example, although California apparently33
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importance of “specific terminology” as a means of “limit[ing] the scope of intervention, ...
[clarifying] the types of harm that justify official action, and [constraining] expert testimony
so that it will not be based solely on individual views regarding proper child development”).
Wald further points out the difficulty of defining terms such as “inadequate home” and
“inadequate parent,” observing that, “[t]here is certainly no consensus about what types of
‘inadequate’ behavior would justify intervention.” Id. at 1022. Moreover, because of the
vagueness of so-called “moral neglect” statutes, “intervention is likely to be haphazard and
subject to the social worker’s or judge’s personal value judgments.” Id. at 1034.
34. STATE OF CAL. ET AL., MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES § 31-002(9)(B) (2002), available at http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/getinfo/pdf/cws1.pdf.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101 (2004). Applying this definition, CPS sought to interview
a two-year-old child apart from her mother and to enter into and examine the family home
based on an anonymous report that the child had once been seen naked and apparently
unsupervised in the family’s driveway. In re Stumbo, 582 S.E.2d 255, 256-57 (N.C. 2003). On
appeal from a lower court’s order compelling parental compliance with the investigation, the
North Carolina Supreme Court found that CPS had exceeded its authority in defining neglect
so broadly as to include these facts. Id. at 258-59 (noting that “not every act of negligence on
the part of parents or other caregivers constitutes ‘neglect’ under the law and results in a
‘neglected juvenile,’” and that, in general, such terms are defined only in situations of “either
severe or dangerous conduct or a pattern of conduct either causing injury or potentially
causing injury to the juvenile”). Nevertheless, absent a parent’s willingness to challenge a
proposed investigation in court, the broad definitions continue to serve as only minimal
limitations on official discretion to intervene in the family.
36. Virtually all states “included specific criteria for accepting or excluding referrals
alleging child abuse and neglect,” with exclusionary criteria such as third-party perpetrators
not responsible for the child’s care, referrals that lacked sufficient information, cases of
educational neglect, and referrals related either to reasonable discipline or custody issues.
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
has no intention to proscribe such culturally acceptable practices
as ear piercing, male circumcision, or reasonable corporal punish-
ment, it nevertheless defines “physical abuse” all-inclusively, as
“non-accidental bodily injury that has been or is being inflicted on
a child.”  Similarly, North Carolina defines a “neglected juvenile”34
most broadly to include the child “who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline ... or who is not provided necessary
medical ... or ... remedial care; or who lives in an environment
injurious to [her] welfare....”35
In part because the definitions of abuse and neglect are so broad,
and because anyone is permitted to make a report, including those
with no training in identifying maltreatment, most states have
procedures to “screen in” reports that conform to their official
interpretations, and correspondingly to “screen out” nonconforming
reports. This process serves to ensure, to the extent possible, that
the state conducts formal investigations only in circumstances
where legally relevant conditions exist.  Of the 2.6 million referrals36
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HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL STUDY OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES SYSTEMS AND REFORM
EFFORTS: REVIEW OF STATE CPS POLICY ch. III (2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/
hsp/CPS-status03/state-policy03/chapter3.htm; see, e.g., GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN RES., SOCIAL
SERVICES MANUAL §§ 2103.1, .18 (1999) (requiring that reports be screened to assure that
they meet certain criteria before being passed along for investigation). In Georgia, a report
is screened in if (1) it includes an allegation against a known or unknown person who may
be the child’s parent, guardian, or caretaker; (2) the alleged victim is under eighteen; and (3)
the report is consistent with the state’s maltreatment definition. Id. Most screened-out
reports in Georgia involve dated incidents, educational neglect, incidents of a criminal nature
where the parent’s negligence in allowing a child to be exposed to the situation has been
previously ruled out, reports of statutory rape when evidence exists that the parent has
protected the child, allegations concerning an unborn child, juvenile delinquency, and some
poverty and custody issues where the “only indicated concerns contain absolutely no report
of any abuse or neglect.” Id.; see also 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.503 (2003) (requiring that
reports be screened out that involve, inter alia, truancy, runaways, children between the
ages of ten and seventeen who need supervision because they have committed certain
offenses and are already under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, reasonable physical
discipline, latchkey children whose parents have taken “appropriate precautions to assure
the children’s safety,” or harmful or violent children); N.C. DIV. OF SOC. SERVS., N.C. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1 FAMILY SERVICES MANUAL § 1407 (2004), available at
http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-60/man/CS1407.pdf (requiring that reports
be screened out if they would not “minimally meet the statutory guidelines for child abuse,
or dependency” if true, such as reports of homelessness, head lice, truancy, and age-
appropriate sexual activity); OHIO DEP’T OF JOBS & FAMILY SERVS., FAMILY, CHILDREN AND
ADULT SERVICES MANUAL § 5101:2-34-06 (requiring reports to be screened out before
investigation unless they contain at least the names and addresses of the child and her
parents; the child’s age; the type, extent, and duration of the alleged abuse or neglect; the
circumstances giving rise to the maltreatment; and the child’s current condition).
37. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at 5; see supra note 36 (providing examples
of reasons why reports are screened in or out). Although data is not available about the
source of screened-in, rather than screened-out, reports, “professionals submitted more than
one-half (56.5%) of the [initial] reports.” CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at 6.
These “professionals” are defined as individuals whose work regularly brings them into
contact with children, and they are generally legally mandated to report suspicions of child
abuse. Id. Of the screened-in reports that are ultimately substantiated, “nearly one-quarter
... were referred by legal, law enforcement or justice personnel”; nevertheless, “four groups
of reporters [educational and social services personnel, anonymous reporters, and law
enforcement] accounted for more than one-half of all unsubstantiated reports.” Id. at 8; see
also id. at 18 tbl.2-7. 
38. According to a New York CPS official, most families under investigation do not realize
that they have the right not to talk to investigators; if they do recognize the existence of this
right, however, CPS is able to convince them of the value of cooperation “ninety-nine out of
100 times.” See Telephone Interview with Official, New York Child Protective Services,
made nationally in 2002, 67.1 percent, or approximately two-thirds,
were screened in, and 32.9 percent, or approximately one third,
were screened out.37
Most investigations, over 90 percent by some estimates, are
conducted with the apparent consent of relevant adults.  As I will38
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Albany County, N.Y. (June 24, 2003) (on file with author). In some cases, officials may
mislead parents regarding the state’s authority to compel cooperation. Thus, Georgia’s CPS
manual provides that when parents are uncooperative in a 24-hour investigation, the
investigator should “take immediate action to gain access to the child” by “[i]nform[ing] the
parents of the department’s intent to involve court/law enforcement unless they immediately
cooperate” with the investigation and, if this step fails, “contact[ing] the agency SAAG
[Special Assistant Attorney General] and/or the Juvenile Court for immediate legal
assistance” or “contact[ing] law enforcement for immediate assistance.” GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN
RES., supra note 36, § 2104.20. For cases that do not warrant an immediate response from
the courts or law enforcement, CPS is encouraged to (1) “[c]ontact[] relatives, friends, or
neighbors who may be of assistance in gaining entry to the home;” (2) “[c]ontact[] the school
principal or social worker or a public health nurse to assist;” (3) “[s]end[] the parent written
notification that explains the legal requirement” requiring CPS to investigate or (4)
“[o]btain[] a court order for [the] parent’s cooperation.” Id. In many cases, the quality of the
consent that is obtained also can be criticized on the basis that a large percentage of the
families subject to investigation are accustomed to state intervention in the home for other
reasons; these families may not be afforded the same privacy protections as those who are
otherwise free from such intervention. For example, the adults involved may be required to
permit home visits as a condition of receiving certain government benefits. See infra note 226
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)), and notes
296-300 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon generally).
39. See infra notes 139-46, 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing the contours of the
consent exception and its misuse by officials).
40. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999), is illustrative in this respect. In
that case, a CPS supervisor instructed the assigned caseworkers “to visit the Tenenbaum’s
home ... to examine the child for marks and bruises, to assure herself that [the child’s] living
conditions were acceptable, and to discuss with the Tenenbaums [their child’s] sleeping in
school and her delayed development.” Id. at 589. “In accordance [with their supervisor’s]
instructions, [the caseworkers] did not mention the real reason they were there—the reports
of possible sexual abuse.” Id.  
41. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing this investigatory approach).
explain below, there is reason to believe that state officials do not
lawfully obtain many of these consents. Specifically, the Supreme
Court has indicated that consent obtained from misleading
representations about the law enforcement motivations underlying
the investigation may be unlawful, as is consent given by children
who are not mature minors.  No data exists that describes the39
portion of apparently consent-based investigations that fall into
these categories. However, one could reasonably imagine that the
number is not insubstantial as officials appear to rely both on
deception  and school-based examinations  to avoid parental40 41
interference with the investigatory process. 
At the same time, states have developed a variety of compliance
protocols for use in circumstances where parents are approached
but refuse to cooperate with the investigation. They range from
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42. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Official, Georgia Department of Human
Resources, Division of Family and Children’s Services (June 24, 2003) (on file with author)
(explaining that in Georgia, a court will order parental compliance with a CPS investigation
where the department demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that “good cause”
exists to believe that maltreatment has occurred); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.301(12) (West
Supp. 2005) (providing that, if a parent denies CPS “reasonable access” to the child when
CPS deems access necessary, CPS shall seek a court order or other legal authority); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-303 (2003) (allowing state officials to obtain an order of noncompliance based
on a report and evidence of noncooperation with the investigation); Telephone Interview with
Official, Florida Department of Children and Families (June 24, 2003) (on file with author)
(explaining that the probable cause standard for obtaining a court order under section 39.301
is met “by virtue of a report [of abuse or neglect] being received”); Telephone Interview with
Official, Tennessee Department of Children and Families (July 9, 2003) (on file with author)
(explaining that, if denied access, CPS will first enlist the aid of law enforcement and then
file a motion asking the court to order the investigation’s completion without the parents’
consent; the judge then grants the order, for which no standard exists beyond noncompliance
with a statutorily required investigation, so no showing of abuse or neglect is necessary);
Telephone Interview with Attorney, Legal Division, Texas Child Protective Services (June
24, 2003) (on file with author) (explaining that, although compliance orders are generally not
used, “good cause” is usually shown through a report of child abuse or neglect and the lack
of cooperation by the child’s family with the investigation). 
43. See, e.g., SHELDON SILVER & ROGER GREEN, A GUIDE TO NEW YORK’S CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES SYSTEM 32 (2001) (noting that if a caseworker is not allowed into a
home, a Family Court judge can order the parent to permit entry if the judge concludes by
a fair preponderance of the evidence that probable cause exists to believe that the child has
been abused or neglected); see also Telephone Interview with Official, Communications
Division, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (July 8, 2003) (on file with author)
(explaining that if denied entry into a home, CPS generally contacts law enforcement for
assistance, who in turn, must obtain a search warrant to gain access to the child and home,
and noting that although court orders are not usually used, they would vary from county to
county depending on the local court rules). Some states formally require CPS to obtain a
warrant on a finding of probable cause, but then define probable cause as being met by the
filing of a report. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.301 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring court order
in certain circumstances); Telephone Interview with Official, Florida Department of Children
and Families (June 24, 2004) (on file with author) (explaining that probable cause for the
court order is met by receiving a report of abuse). 
requiring CPS to obtain a court order based on the report and an
affidavit of parental noncompliance,  to requiring CPS to obtain a42
search warrant based on a finding of probable cause to suspect that
a child is at risk of maltreatment.  Notably, the latter approach,43
which is most protective of family privacy, is relatively unusual.
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44. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.301(1) (West Supp. 2005) (“Upon receiving an oral or written
report of known or suspected child abuse, abandonment, or neglect, the central abuse hotline
shall determine if the report requires an immediate onsite protective investigation.”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-8(a), (a)(B) (Supp. 2004) (“The Department of Human Resources is
authorized and empowered ... to establish, maintain, extend, and improve throughout the
state ... []protective services that will investigate complaints of deprivation, abuse, or
abandonment of children.”); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2 (West Supp. 2005) (“The Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services shall, upon receiving reports [of abuse or
neglect], protect the health, safety, and best interests of the child in all situations in which
the child is vulnerable to child abuse or neglect, offer protective services in order to prevent
any further harm ..., stabilize the home environment, and preserve family life whenever
possible.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.628(1) (West Supp. 2004) (“Within 24 hours after
receiving a report ... the department ... shall commence an investigation of the child
suspected of being abused or neglected.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.145 (West Supp. 2005) (“All
child abuse and neglect reports shall be initiated within twenty-four hours and shall be
classified based upon the reported risk and injury to the child.... The division shall
immediately communicate all reports that merit investigation to its appropriate local
office.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-302(a) (2003) (“When a report of abuse, neglect, or dependency
is received, the director of the department of social services shall make a prompt and
thorough investigation in order to ascertain the facts of the case, the extent of the abuse or
neglect, and the risk of harm to the juvenile....”); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(2)(b) (Consol.
1994) (“Any telephone call made by a [mandated reporter], ... which if true would constitute
child abuse or maltreatment shall constitute a report and shall be immediately transmitted
... to the appropriate local child protective service for investigation.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.421(F)(1) (West Supp. 2004) (“[T]he public children services agency shall investigate,
within twenty-four hours, each report of known or suspected child abuse or child neglect ...
to determine the circumstances surrounding the injuries, abuse, or neglect ... and the person
or persons responsible.”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.301(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (“With
assistance from the appropriate state or local law enforcement agency, the department ...
shall make a prompt and thorough investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect
allegedly committed by a [caregiver].”); STATE OF CAL. ET AL., MANUAL OF POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES: CHILD WELFARE SERVICES § 31-101.1 (1993), available at http://www.dss.
cahwnet.gov/getinfo/pdf/ cws2.pdf (“The county shall respond to all referrals for service which
allege that a child is endangered by abuse, neglect, or exploitation [by conducting an
investigation].”); id. § 31-125 (setting out the requirements for an investigation).
45. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at 5 n.3, 21.
B. The Nature and Scope of the Investigation Itself
Once reports are screened in, the authorities are required to
investigate their allegations.  In 2002, the states screened in44
approximately 1.8 million referrals involving the welfare of
approximately 3.2 million children.  The investigation’s purpose is45
to gather evidence to determine if the report can be substantiated.
This evidence is typically used by civil authorities whose ultimate
objective is to assure the safety of the child, and by law enforcement
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46. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., NATIONAL STUDY OF CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES SYSTEMS AND REFORM EFFORTS: SUMMARY REPORT ch. VII (2003),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/CPS-status03/summary/index.htm#Looking (highlighting
the prevailing “competing ideas” that the state’s child welfare effort “should primarily
function as a service to assist families in meeting the needs of their children” and should
work to “assist[] law enforcement to gather the evidence to punish parents who do not meet
societal norms of caring for their children”); infra notes 48-49, 236-42 and accompanying text
(describing the role of law enforcement in the child welfare investigatory scheme). Compare
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 36, at ch. IV (explaining purposes of
investigation including “determining whether abuse or neglect had occurred or the child was
at risk,” “determining a disposition,” “assessing or remediating safety ... [and/or] risk,”
“determining need for services,” “protecting the child,” and “maintaining the family”), with
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE, PORTABLE GUIDES TO
INVESTIGATING CHILD ABUSE 1 (2001) (emphasizing, in offering an overview, that “[t]he role
of law enforcement in child abuse cases is to investigate to determine if a violation of
criminal law occurred, identify and apprehend the offender, and file appropriate criminal
charges”), and Robert B. Kean, Search and Seizure Law: A Primer for the Child Abuse
Investigator, in USING THE LAW TO PROTECT CHILDREN 129, 131 (1989) (stating that “[t]he
challenge presented to police and other law enforcement investigators is how to protect the
battered or abused child while at the same time gathering evidence which will be admissible
in a criminal trial”).
47. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.301 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring that the investigation
include (1) a generally unannounced visit to the family home; (2) an overall assessment of
the child’s residential environment; and (3) face-to-face interviews with the alleged child
victim, the child’s siblings, parents, and other adults in the household); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 424 (Consol. Supp. 2005) (requiring that all screened-in reports be investigated; that the
investigation include an evaluation of the alleged child victim’s home environment and
any other children who live in the same environment; a determination of the risk to the
children if they remain in the home; and a determination of the nature, extent, and cause
of the alleged maltreatment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-406 (Supp. 2004) (providing that
investigations be made promptly and include a home visit; a determination as to the nature,
extent, and cause of the harm; the identity of the perpetrator and others responsible for the
child; the home environments condition; the condition of other children in the home; an
interview with and physical observation of the child; and an interview with the child’s parent
or guardian); STATE OF CAL. ET AL., supra note 44, §§ 31-101, 31-110, 31-125 (2003) (requiring
state officials to conduct an initial investigation of screened-in reports that, unless the official
determines that an in-person investigation is not necessary, includes in-person contact with
the alleged child victim or victims, and with at least one adult who has information
concerning the allegations; if, after this initial investigation, the official concludes that the
allegations are not unfounded, the official must conduct a more thorough investigation that
includes a second round of in-person interviews with the child or children present at the
initial in-person investigation, and with all parents who have access to the child alleged to
be maltreated; additionally, the state must have contact with other persons having
authorities who seek to monitor violations of the criminal code and
sometimes to pursue charges against the offending parent.46
To achieve these objectives, investigations generally include a
home visit, an interview with the child’s parents or guardians, and
an interview with and examination of the child.  The investigations47
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knowledge of the child or children’s condition); STATE OF TENN. DEP’T OF CHILDREN’S SERVS.,
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES §§ 14.3, 14.5 (2002) (setting out procedures
based on code provisions); SILVER & GREEN, supra note 43, at 6, 31 (explaining that during
the mandated “home visit,” CPS look specifically for unattended children, “immediate
observable symptoms” of abuse such as bruises, ongoing parental mistreatment of a child,
and parental intoxication).
48. In many jurisdictions, CPS is authorized to and in fact does investigate cases without
the assistance of law enforcement. On the other hand, even in these states a substantial
degree of collaboration often exists amongst the two agencies. In some jurisdictions, the fact
that child maltreatment is often both a civil and criminal violation drives collaboration
designed “to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort, to promote proper and expeditious
collection and preservation of evidence, and to ‘develop a coordinated system for identifying
and investigating appropriate calls [sic].’” DONNA PENCE & CHARLES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE RESPONSE TO CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 8 (1992) (quoting D.J. BESHAROV, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION: POLICY GUIDELINES FOR DECISION MAKING 3 (1988))
available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/usermanuals/law/law.pdf; see also Leroy D. Baca
et al., “Silent Screams”—One Law Enforcement Agency’s Response to Improving the
Management of Child Abuse Reporting and Investigations, 22 J. JUV. L. 29, 41-47 (2001-2002)
(detailing five programs and projects undertaken in Los Angeles County that “allow[ed] all
of the county’s child protective agencies to [better] respond to allegations, address the most
critical aspects of investigations and, hopefully, resolve them to the victims’ benefit”). In
others, collaboration between the two agencies occurs to assure the safety of the CPS officials
or to maximize “voluntary” compliance rates as parents are typically more likely to consent
to an investigation faced with the in terrorem effect of police presence. PENCE & WILSON,
supra, at 6. For example, Illinois law requires CPS to seek the assistance of law enforcement
where “serious physical or sexual abuse has been alleged” or where there is reason to believe
that the home is unsafe because, for example, the parent is violent or has a lot of weapons.
Telephone Interview with Linda Williams, Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (June 12, 2003) (on file with author); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 36, at ch. IV tbl.4-D (providing an overview of law enforcement
involvement in child abuse investigations in all fifty states and showing that in almost every
state, law enforcement participates in circumstances involving allegations of severe abuse
and/or cases of emergency removal); infra notes 237-41 (describing thoroughly the
relationships between CPS and law enforcement in this context).
49. This may be the case, for example, where CPS is understaffed and requests that law
enforcement conduct the investigation so that the state’s mandatory timelines are met. See,
e.g., Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 785 n.1 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that police were asked to
investigate the welfare of a child who had excessive diaper rash because no CPS official was
available to do so). Or CPS and law enforcement both may be authorized or required to
respond collaboratively to child maltreatment reports. This could result in officials from the
two agencies actually conducting each aspect of the investigation together, or in the officials
parsing out the work and conducting aspects of the investigation separately. See, e.g., Wallis
v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1131-35 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing CPS and police in California
are generally conducted by officials from CPS, either alone or
with the assistance of law enforcement.  Depending on the48
jurisdiction and the circumstances, some investigations or aspects
of investigations may be staffed exclusively by law enforcement.49
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collaborating on investigations); CMTY. ALLIANCE OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, CHILD ABUSE
PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATION PROTOCOL (2002) (defining roles and responsibilities for law
enforcement and CPS in child abuse protective investigations; protocol includes a detailed
“wire diagram” that maps out the investigation’s steps, the responsibilities of each agency
at each step, and points at which key decisions, such as whether to remove the child, should
be made). 
50. For example, North Carolina explains, in most general terms, that “[a] home visit
provides firsthand knowledge of the home environment and observations of family
interactions in their everyday setting. The home visit allows an assessment of the physical
environment, problems and resources within the neighborhood, and family access to
community and family resources.” N.C. DIV. OF SOC. SERVS., N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 1 FAMILY SERVICES MANUAL § 1408(III)(C)(5) (2002), available at http://info.dhhs.
state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-60/man/CS1408.pdf; see also infra notes 51-52 (detailing the
scope of the home visit). But see Telephone Interview with Linda Williams, supra note 48
(during home visits, investigators are allowed to view the home, but not to search it—that
is, they may look for signs of abuse or neglect such as broken glass or feces on the floor, but
cannot go through any personal papers, drawers, or cabinets).
51. See, e.g., Janine Tondrowski, Intake and Investigation: Initial Stages of the CPS
Process, in HELPING IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A COMPETENCY-BASED CASEWORK
HANDBOOK 185 (Charmaine R. Brittain & Deborah Esquibel Hunt eds., 2004) (stating that,
in cases of chronic child neglect, “[a]ssessing whether the physical living conditions are
hazardous for the children is an important process to ensure safety”). In recommending how
a caseworker should proceed, the author further notes that
[h]aving an adult give [the caseworker] a ‘tour’ is necessary if [the caseworker]
is to actually observe the conditions throughout the house. [The caseworker]
must determine whether community living standards are met, noting such
items as whether the utilities are functional, the home has hot water, the
plumbing works, and there is a functioning heater. [The caseworker is] also
looking for safety hazards such as exposed wiring, broken glass, and unsanitary
conditions. Only by observing each room in the home can [the caseworker]
assess if there are obvious structural problems that pose a hazard.... Visiting
the kitchen and actually looking for food in the refrigerator and pantry are
necessary in making a complete assessment of well-being. 
Id.
52. See, e.g., Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing a social
During the home visit, officials searching for evidence may enter
the home; walk from room to room; open refrigerators, cupboards,
closets, and drawers; and request that the adults and children
cooperate to locate and examine items or conditions that may be
relevant to the investigation.  For example, if a child is reported to50
have been neglected, officials may look to see if the home is
relatively clean, and if there are responsible adults, food, clothing,
and other necessaries on the premises.  If the child is reported to51
have been excessively disciplined, officials may seek out, in addition
to the child herself, objects or other conditions in the home that
might have been used in such discipline.52
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worker during a home visit examining children for bruises and insisting on seeing the “piece
of Lincoln log roofing” that the mother allegedly had used to discipline the children in the
past); GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN RES., supra note 36, § 2104.1 (giving the state enormous
discretion in discovering evidence of physical abuse by calling for all children subject to an
abuse or neglect report who are under age one to be undressed and examined for physical
signs of maltreatment, as well as children four years and under who are the subject of a
physical abuse allegation; in the course of this examination, investigators should “[c]onsider
asking the parent’s assistance when undressing a young child”); DIANE DEPANFILIS &
MARSHA K. SALUS, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A GUIDE FOR CASEWORKERS 42 (2003)
(recommending that, in cases of suspected physical abuse, “[c]aseworkers ... examine the
nature of the injury, such as bruises or burns in the shape of an implement, e.g., a welt in
the shape of a belt buckle or a cigarette burn”). 
53. See Tondrowski, supra note 51, at 155 (suggesting to “always remember that it is
better to have too much information than too little, since the more comprehensive
information provided the reported, the better able [the caseworker is] to decide to accept the
referral and provide follow-up”); see also id. at 160 (noting that “[a] report may raise serious
safety concerns but otherwise offer limited information on the whereabouts of a child. In this
situation, the worker should be creative about finding ways to locate the child”).
54. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that “[t]he maltreatment type
percentages total more than 100 percent because many children were victims of more than
one type of maltreatment and were coded multiple times”). 
55. N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 50, § 1408(III)(C)(5).
56. Id. § 1409(IV) (providing in the context of an overall effort both to reduce the state’s
incidence of domestic violence in the state and to assure that children who witness domestic
Broad discretion is given to state officials undertaking these
investigations for two reasons. First, reports often are unspecific,
alleging, for example, that a younger child was heard crying, or that
a child was left at home alone. In such cases, officials are given the
latitude to determine the circumstances that led to the report.53
Second, even specific reports may be evidence of further and
different maltreatment. For example, a report indicating that a
child appears to be malnourished might lead to information that
the child also is being physically and emotionally abused, as
multiple forms of maltreatment sometimes coexist.  In such54
cases, merely investigating and even confirming the allegations of
malnourishment would result in an incomplete picture of the child’s
circumstances and needs. Thus, for example, North Carolina
requires its investigating officials not only to determine whether the
allegations in the report can be substantiated, but also “to assess ...
[w]hether the specific environment in which the child is found
meets the child’s need for care and protection.”  Recently, the state55
has added the requirement that every investigation, regardless of
the allegations in the report, also assess the possibility that the
child has been exposed to domestic violence.56
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violence are not unnecessarily separated from their nonabusive parent, that there is
“universal screening for domestic violence during CPS Intake for all reports of alleged child
maltreatment ... Assessment for the presence of domestic violence and its impact on the
safety of children is an ongoing activity throughout CPS Intake, Assessment, Case Planning
and Case Management, and Placement Services”). 
57. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11174.3 (West Supp. 2005) (identifying school as a site
where a child can be investigated; during the investigation, the child may choose to have a
school staff member present, but that person may not participate in the interview); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.628 (West Supp. 2004) (requiring schools and other institutions to
cooperate with child abuse investigations, including allowing access to the child without
parental consent for the purposes of conducting an investigation and/or preventing the abuse
or neglect of a child so long as CPS notifies the parent or guardian at the time of the contact
or “as soon afterward as the person can be reached,” unless such notification “would
compromise the safety of the child or ... the integrity of the investigation”); GA. DEP’T OF
HUMAN RES., supra note 36, § 2104.11 (“Interview and observe separately each allegedly
maltreated child .... Make every attempt to make the interview setting a private location
where the child can be interviewed alone.”); Telephone Interview with Official, California
Child Protective Services (July 23, 2003) (on file with author) (stating that school is a
preferred location for examining a child because it avoids parental interference); see also JAN
MCCARTHY ET AL., A FAMILY’S GUIDE TO THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 21 (2003) (informing
families that “[t]he CPS worker has the authority to talk to your child ... without your
consent and outside of your presence.... [T]he CPS worker decides who should be present
during the interview. Although your child can be interviewed and physically examined
without your permission, your cooperation and permission may be requested”).
58. Telephone Interview with Official, Legal Division, California Child Protective
Services (July 19, 2003). According to this official, “usually kids are interviewed without the
parent even knowing it. Very rarely does CPS actually go to the home, so we just don’t need”
to worry about parental noncompliance and obtaining a warrant to search the family
residence. Id. As a result of a series of decisions out of the Ninth Circuit, California is one
of the states where—until further review by the United States Supreme Court—a warrant
on a traditional finding of probable cause is clearly necessary to conduct a home visit in
circumstances where the parents refuse consent. See infra note 170.
Interviews with and examinations of children may be conducted
at school or away from the family home to assure, to the extent
possible, that parents will not interfere by coaching, intimidating,
or otherwise influencing their children’s response.  Indeed, one57
California official suggested that this investigatory strategy is
additionally useful as a way for the state to conduct its investiga-
tion without ever having to enter the family home.  Like home58
visits, investigations of the child herself may be relatively narrow
in scope, initially including only a private discussion with the
2005] STORMING THE CASTLE TO SAVE THE CHILDREN 439
59. E.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 503-04, 510 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing state officials
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, taking a fourth grade boy from his classroom, placing him in an
empty nursery, and interviewing him alone about intimate details of his family life).
60. E.g., Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1199-200 (10th Cir. 2003) (describing
state officials in Tulsa, Oklahoma, putting group of Head Start children together on tables
in a classroom, separated only by partitions, and conducting full medical examinations
including gynecological examinations and blood tests); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 11171.2
(West Supp. 2005) (setting out the right of doctors acting without parental consent to x-ray
a child to determine if the child has been abused); id. § 11171.5 (setting out the right of state
officials to obtain a court order directing the x-ray procedure); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 416
(Consol. 1994) (allowing investigators to take photographs of visible areas of trauma and
order radiological examinations for a child); FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CF
OPERATING PROCEDURE § 175-21 (2001) (depending on the circumstances, the assessment
may include a medical evaluation, psychological/psychiatric evaluation, or other assessment);
STATE OF MICH. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN’S JUSTICE, FIA PUB. 794, A MODEL
CHILD ABUSE PROTOCOL: COORDINATED INVESTIGATIVE TEAM APPROACH (1998) (requiring a
medical examination when an allegation exists involving sexual and/or severe physical abuse
which occurred in the past 72 hours, and strongly recommending such examination when an
allegation involves abuse which did not occur in the past 72 hours); Telephone Interview with
Linda Williams, supra note 48 (explaining that investigators are permitted to observe a
child’s body, but they must have parental consent before removing any clothing and
explaining that a child cannot be transported to see a physician without parental consent
unless in departmental custody).
61. See, e.g., DEPANFILIS & SALUS, supra note 52, at 9 (stressing that “[a] safe and
permanent home and family is the best place for children to grow up,” cautioning that “[m]ost
parents want to be good parents,” and admonishing that “CPS agencies and practitioners
must be responsive to and respectful of [differences in families’ structure, culture, race,
religion, economic status, beliefs, values, and lifestyles]”); CAL. SOC. WORK EDUC. CTR.,
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE 14 (Ray Liles ed., 2001) (identifying as
critical the need for state officials to “balanc[e] ... the rights of a child to minimum levels of
care and freedom from harm, with the rights of parents to retain custody of, and authority
and responsibility for, their children”); CAL. SOC. WORK EDUC. CTR., WORKING EFFECTIVELY
WITH FAMILIES (Martha Carlson ed., 2001) (offering guidelines and best practices on issues
such as “cultural factors in the casework relationship,” working with family strengths,
promoting family involvement in case planning, and working with children and resistant
clients); N.C. DIV. OF SOCIAL SERVS., supra note 50, § 1412(II), available at
http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/manuals/dss/csm-60/man/CS1412.pdf (“Family centered
practice focuses on the family with full knowledge and appreciation for its dynamics.... The
family-centered social worker values family resources, respects diversity among families,
supports parental efforts to care for their children.”)
child.  On the other hand, contact with the child may be pervasive,59
including a strip search and a gynecological exam.  60
State officials generally are cautioned to respect the child’s
dignity and the family’s sanctity as they engage their thorough
investigations.  However, while most agencies undoubtedly expect61
their officials to act in good faith, these two tasks—respecting
privacy and conducting the sort of comprehensive investigation the
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62. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO/HEHS-97-115, CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVICES: COMPLEX CHALLENGES REQUIRE NEW STRATEGIES 3 (1997) (offering an overview
of challenges faced by caseworkers and noting that they “must balance the often conflicting
roles of investigator and social worker. As investigators, CPS caseworkers collect evidence
and work with law enforcement officials; as social workers, they work with families to
identify services needed to improve conditions in the home and provide a safe environment
for the child”); Troy Anderson, Foster Care Cash Cow; “Perverse Incentive Factor” Rewards
County for Swelling System, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 7, 2003, at N1 (reporting that in a two-
year investigation, the newspaper found a “perverse incentive factor” resulting in “states and
counties earn[ing] more revenues by having more children in the system–whether it is
opening a case to investigate a report of child abuse and neglect or placing a child in foster
care” (quoting a report by the State Department of Social Services Child Welfare
Stakeholders Group)). The L.A. Daily News article also quotes David Sanders, the director
of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), as believing that caseworkers
were sometimes overly eager to remove children from their homes: 
At the extreme, there are clearly parents who never should have had their
children. They torture their children and everyone in the community would
agree that they should not have their children. On the other end, you clearly
have situations where families have done things, but may be under stress one
day, have every intention of taking care of their children and are not dangerous,
but involvement by child protective services ends up being much too intrusive.
Id. Bruce Robenstein, a previous DCFS deputy director, also goes on record as saying that
high-profile child fatality cases increased pressure for removals: “The word was, ‘Remove
everybody. Remove all the kids.’ It’s pretty fundamental that the county was breaking up
families that didn’t need to be broken up.” Id. As will be argued infra, it is precisely for these
reasons that the Fourth Amendment’s neutral magistrate is essential to include in this
scheme. The warrant process assures that this balancing is done by a person who is not
bound to follow state law, but rather, who is bound to weigh the privacy rights of individuals
against the state’s need to conduct a specific investigation. See infra notes 136-38, 323-34 and
accompanying text (describing the rationale for the warrant process and applying that
rationale to the child welfare context).
63. Beeman, supra note 23, at 1052 (footnote omitted).
64. See infra notes 190-220, 273 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s
view that law enforcement involvement in a civil investigation adds to its intrusiveness
quotient); supra notes 46, 48-49 and accompanying text (setting out the dual motivations that
underlie the investigations and discussing the role of law enforcement in conducting child
system contemplates—are inherently irreconcilable, at least when
delegated to a single official.  As one commentator wrote, “[t]he62
parent-investigator relationship is likely to be adversarial, not
mutually supportive. The two parties seek conflicting ends: the
parent seeks to preserve family unity and privacy, whereas the
investigator is obligated to violate the family’s privacy, the child’s
privacy, and, if necessary, disrupt the family unit.”  The fact63
that law enforcement is also typically involved in the investiga-
tory scheme and/or in the conduct of the investigation itself
necessarily increases the process’ intrusiveness.  Thus, in the best64
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welfare investigations).
65. See Anderson, supra note 62 (quoting a California Department of Social Services
Child Welfare Stakeholders Group report as “[finding] the vague definition of neglect,
unbridled discretion and a lack of training [to] form a dangerous combination in the hands
of social workers charged with deciding the fate of families,” and ultimately that thousands
of children were unnecessarily removed from their homes). In this regard, it has been noted
that
CPS workers, who are the first decision-makers in a child welfare case, are the
ones who have the most power to keep children in their families or to remove
them.... [E]ven the best family preservation program could not be an effective
resource unless the CPS worker decided to use it. 
INSOO KIM BERG & SUSAN KELLY, BUILDING SOLUTIONS IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 6-7
(2000).
66. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying table (setting out the national data on this
issue).
67. It is noteworthy in this regard that poor and minority children are significantly
overrepresented in the child welfare system. Consequently, these already-stressed children
and their families bear the brunt of the states’ prevailing approach to solving the child
maltreatment problem. According to the Children’s Bureau, “[a]lthough African-American[]
[children] account for 15% of all children in the United States, they account for 25% of
of circumstances, state officials may choose to be kind as they
conduct their thorough investigations, but it nevertheless remains
a required aspect of their job to complete them.  65
C. The Impact of the Prevailing Approach to Investigations
Although child maltreatment investigations clearly serve an
essential purpose in the overall CPS scheme, the reporting and
investigations process is also an enormous intrusion on individual
and family privacy: Once CPS screens in a report of maltreatment,
the state typically seeks to enter into and examine the family home,
and to seize and separate the children from their parents or the
school setting in which their parents have placed them so that they
can be interviewed and examined, either by CPS, the police, or
medical personnel designated by these officials. Generally, state
officials are authorized to exercise extraordinarily unfettered
discretion when they engage these intrusions. Approximately 70
percent of the time no abuse or neglect is found by the conclusion of
the investigations.  Even recognizing that some unknown portion66
of the unsubstantiated cases involves maltreatment that cannot be
proven, the majority of intrusions on family privacy do not directly
benefit the children involved, and in many instances actually cause
them demonstrable harm.  The table immediately below demon67
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substantiated maltreatment victims.... [and] comprise 45% of the total number of children
in foster care.” SUSAN CHIBNALL ET AL., CHILDREN OF COLOR IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CHILD WELFARE COMMUNITY 3 (2003). This study was commissioned
“[i]n response to concerns about [this] over-representation.” Id. at 1. It identifies a number
of theories to explain this data, including “disproportionate need,” “racial bias and child
welfare decision making,” and “substantially greater risks of child abuse and neglect for
children of color and their families due to a variety of risk factors (e.g., poverty).” Id. at 4-5.
The study found that social workers perceive the problem to be based on factors such as
“poverty, lack of resources in poor communities, discriminatory practices in the larger
society, the characteristics of the families entering the system, and the media,” as well as
factors internal to the child welfare system, such as worker bias and agency practices. Id. at
19-28. The National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information also identified
poverty as a major risk factor for maltreatment, particularly neglect. NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE
ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RISK AND
PROTECTIVE FACTORS FOR CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (2003), available at http://nccanch.
acf.hhs.gov/topics/prevention/emerging/riskprotectivefactors.pdf. As the Children’s Bureau
noted, “[t]here has been a persistently strong relationship between poverty and minority
status in the United States.” CHIBNALL ET AL., supra, at 4. The study goes on to say,
“[s]pecifically, African-American and Hispanic children are more than twice as likely to live
in poverty as non-Hispanic white and Asian-Pacific Islander children. Almost one-third of
African-American (30%) and Hispanic (28%) children live in poverty.” Id. (citation omitted).
Because “abuse [has been found to be] 14 times more common in poor families and neglect
is 44 times more common in poor families” and “the incidence rate [of child mistreatment]
is 26.5 times higher in lower income families,” it follows that, “[t]he greater incidence of
maltreatment among low-income families combined with the over-representation of families
of color living in poverty suggests a plausible explanation for the disproportional
representation of minority children in the child welfare system.” Id.; see also Wald, supra
note 22, at 1020-21 (“All commentators agree that the great majority of neglect cases involve
very poor families who are usually receiving welfare.... [M]any of these parents can best be
described as extremely ‘marginal’ people.”). Wald cites another study indicating that
“probably 75% of neglecting families seen by agencies have incomes below the poverty level;
half may be on welfare. Blacks are highly overrepresented.” Id. at 1021 n.186; see also
Candra Bullock, Comment, Low-Income Parents Victimized by Child Protective Services, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1023 (2003) (arguing that the child protective system
disproportionately affects low-income parents in part because poverty is confused with
neglect due to vague definitions, no legal right to counsel and the lack of financial resources
to secure representation, a lack of training or knowledge to understand the issues involved,
and a reporting bias in that professionals are more likely to report low-income families to
CPS).
strates the numbers at issue in this regard, both nationally and for
the ten states with the highest annual number of maltreatment
reports.
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68. In those states where the CPS system is state-supervised but county-administered,
the percentage of unsubstantiated claims likely represents an average of the precautionary
policies that prevail at the local level. Thus, for example, North Carolina’s index of 72.2
percent, as derived from data reported to the National Clearinghouse, is quite close to the
average of 69.3 percent calculated from its 2001-2002 state report of the precautionary
policies of its one hundred counties. See N.C. CHILD ADVOCACY INST., supra note 13
(providing data for fiscal year 2001-2002 on all one hundred North Carolina counties,
including data on the number of reports, the number of reports screened in and out, and the
number of screened-in reports investigated and substantiated; the aggregate numbers vary
slightly from what is presented here because of the different data sources). The one hundred
counties had indexes that ranged from a low of 5.1 percent substantiation to a high of 59.4
percent substantiation, with a standard deviation of 8.7 percentage points. See id. Such wide
disparities in substantiation rates among counties may be accounted for by differences in
staffing and support for the system’s overall programmatic purposes; the interpretation of
legal definitions of abuse and neglect and thus in screening policies; investigation protocols;
and substantiation requirements. North Carolina is relatively unique in having such detailed
data. However, because child maltreatment is in important respects a culturally relative
designation and because the inclination of officials to intervene in the privacy of the family
can also differ by region, one can safely assume that such variation among localities exists
across the country.
69. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, supra note 8, at 28 tbl.3-1.
70. Id. at 17 tbl.2-5.
71. Id. at 29 tbl.3-1.
72. Id. at 30 tbl.3-2.
73. These percentages reflect the number of children affected by unsubstantiated
investigations or other nonvictim findings.
74. Because data on investigated children are unavailable for Maryland, the state is
excluded from all of the national data.
Annual Data on Maltreatment Investigations:
Percentage of Unsubstantiated Claims68
     69 70 71 72 73 74Jurisdiction Child    
Population69
Investigations70 Children   
Investigated71
Children
Found To
Be Victims72
Unsubstanti-
ated Claims73
 U.S.  72,894,483  1,811,835  3,134,694   879,726  71.4%74
California    9,452,391     260,924     512,880   132,181  74.2%
New York    4,613,251     155,678     262,643     79,049  69.9%
Texas    6,102,316     129,956     210,375     48,808  76.8%
Florida    3,882,271     142,547     254,856   122,131  52.1%
Ohio    2,879,927       68,236     110,495     50,141  54.6%
Michigan    2,570,264       72,999     190,164     28,830  84.8%
N. Carolina    2,068,840       63,747     127,702     35,523  72.2%
Illinois    3,254,523       58,704     137,321     28,160  79.5%
Georgia    2,268,477       69,108     126,677     41,206  67.5%
Tennessee    1,404,661       28,348       37,525       8,494  77.4%
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75. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale for the broad
legal definitions of maltreatment) and note 62 (explaining CPS’s enthusiasm for this
excessively precautionary approach to removals especially after a child fatality). 
76. See, e.g., LEVESQUE, supra note 22, at 3-7 (summarizing studies that describe children
as maltreated when maltreatment is either actually substantiated or merely indicated).
77. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 897, 899 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting earlier district
court opinion in same case); see also Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs.,
103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that the “liberty interest in familial integrity is
limited by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of children—particularly
where the children need to be protected from their own parents”); Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d
784, 784-85 (10th Cir. 1993) (in response to claims that he had violated a child’s and family’s
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the officer argued that “[a]gainst the societal
imperative to protect children, particularly young children suspected of being victims of
neglect or abuse, plaintiffs’ interests in privacy must yield”); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1,
8 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that “[t]he right to family integrity clearly does not include a
constitutional right to be free from child abuse investigations”).
78. FATALITIES, supra note 27.
The states’ decision to adopt standards for screening in and
investigating allegations that allow overly broad discretion is
rationalized primarily on the ground that their officials need this
discretion to ferret out even subtle and hidden forms of maltreat-
ment.  The fact that some maltreatment experts believe that75
many more abused and neglected children exist than we know
about, and that many unsubstantiated reports actually involve
abuse or neglect, likely explains the perceived need for this broad
tool.  This policy choice is also justified by the belief that, on76
balance, maltreatment is clearly worse than the intrusions that are
necessary to find it. As one court explained:
[T]he “balance of harms” tips strongly in favor of [the state’s
broad authority to conduct investigations]. If [this authority
were restricted], it is likely that “some child abuse would go
undetected and some innocent lives unprotected.” This harm ...
is much greater than the loss of privacy in cases where [the
state’s approach] produces a false alarm.... “[T]he life of even one
child is too great a price to pay for the possible increased degree
of parental privacy.”77
The sentiments expressed in this excerpt are obviously weighty, for
it is a fact that approximately 1400 times a year in this country,
families and officials must confront a dead child who is the victim
of an abusive parent or guardian.  The child is often younger than78
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79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 3.
81. 247 S.E.2d 905 (N.C. 1978). The following factual narrative is derived entirely from
the case of State v. Wilkerson.
82. Id. at 907.
83. Id. at 908.
84. The fact that witnesses observed Kessler’s father abusing his baby but did not report
it merely adds to the outrageousness of the abuse. The reluctance of many witnesses to
report child abuse is an important obstacle to solving the child maltreatment problem. This
reluctance may come from an individual’s desire not to become involved in other people’s
problems, or it may stem from a more general cultural or community bias against invading
family privacy.
one, and in the overwhelming number of cases, younger than
eight.  The child’s death usually results from physical abuse or79
neglect, including battered child syndrome, drowning, suffocating,
shaking, and extended malnourishment.  80
The facts in the North Carolina case State v. Wilkerson  are81
emblematic of those that the states are anxious to avoid. The victim
in this case was two-year-old Kessler Wilkerson.  His father killed82
him after a long period of serious physical abuse. On the morning
Kessler  died, “neighbors heard loud sounds ‘like something was
being throwed [sic] inside the trailer’” where Kessler lived with his
mother, Nancy, and his father, Kenny. Neighbors then heard “the
voice of a little boy crying, and defendant shouting at him to shut
up.” Later that day, his father “delivered the child’s limp body to
ambulance attendants”; the boy was pronounced dead on arrival at
the hospital. An initial examination of his body revealed “[b]ruises
... on his chest, shoulders, upper arm and forearm.” The autopsy
showed “multiple bruises all over the child’s body and, internally,
significant bleeding and a deep laceration of the liver.” The medical
examiner determined that Kessler actually died as a result of
“abdominal hemorrhage from a ruptured liver.” In the criminal trial
of Kenny Wilkerson for the death of his son, witnesses testified that
they had observed him “frequently kick[ing] the child and on
occasion [making] him stand ‘spread eagle’ against a wall for long
periods of time.”  Wilkerson was observed two days before his son’s83
death kicking the child “with such force that his chest hit the wall.”
There are no words to describe the outrageousness of such
senseless abuse.  It took me several years to learn to teach this84
case and others like it without overwhelming emotion; they always
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85. For example, in my experience it is not unusual for a student who is also the mother
of a young child to ask to be excused from class, because she does not believe she can remain
composed during the discussion of this case. 
86. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting earlier district court
opinion in same case).
87. Thus, for example, investigations concerning severe and sexual abuse comprise only
a small bit of the work of officials who work in this area. Specifically, while sexual abuse is
initially implicated in a larger percentage of cases, only about ten percent of substantiated
maltreatment cases are attributed to sexual abuse. See supra note 26 (describing this
category). And although approximately 800,000 children annually are victims of
maltreatment, only about 1400 of these are child fatalities. Notably, most child fatality cases
involve child victims who were previously unknown to the system. See supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text (setting out this data).
cause students extraordinary discomfort.  At the same time,85
despite their compelling power, they do not explain the routine
failure to give anything more than a nod to the intrusive im-
pact—on family privacy and on the children’s own well-being—of
the official interventions designed to prevent them. That is, we
understand the extraordinarily harsh message that on one side of
the scales there is the real possibility of a dead baby like Kessler.
It is not so obvious, however, that on the other side of the scales
there is nothing more than a “possible [de]creased degree of
parental privacy.”  Indeed, the use of such impersonal rhetoric by86
advocates of the current system to describe the calculus on the
other side does the society and especially the children a huge
disservice by obscuring the reality that fully functioning real-life
families often pay a steep and very personal price for this approach.
Like Kessler, the children in these other families also have names,
faces, and stories that ought not to be hidden from view. 
Throughout this Article, I will use these previously obscured
faces alongside Kessler’s to illustrate the complex dynamic that
must be acknowledged in any legitimate analysis of the child
welfare exception to the Fourth Amendment. Fortunately, like
Kessler, the particular children I focus on for this purpose do not
represent the norm for state officials who investigate suspicions of
child maltreatment.  They are also clearly more fortunate than87
Kessler because their lives were not sacrificed to private or public
violence. Nevertheless, as Kessler does, they serve as appropriate
“poster children” for the important issues raised by their stories.
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88. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (2003). The following factual narrative is derived entirely
from this case.
89. Id. at 500. In general, spanking by a parent or by a private school teacher acting in
loco parentis is not against the law. Specifically, in most states it is only when a spanking
exceeds the scope of “serious physical harm” that CPS and/or the police can substantiate a
claim of physical abuse based on that conduct. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 334, 507 (3d ed. 2004) (setting out California rule
excluding reasonable corporal punishment from definition of physical abuse and discussing
modern criticism of legality of corporal punishment).
90. Doe, 327 F.3d at 500.
91. Id. at 501 n.2. According to the handbook, swats were administered based on a “mark
system.” This system was “used for enforcing discipline and control in the classroom.
Penalties for marks [were] at the discretion of the individual teacher. Marks [were]
accumulated weekly for students in all elementary grades, and they beg[an] each week with
a clean record. Three marks in one day or four marks in one week [would] result in one swat
to be administered the same day the last mark was given.” The handbook provided for a
“verbal reprimand” on the first mark, parental notification on the second mark, detention on
the third mark (unless it was given on the same day as the first two), and a swat on the
fourth mark. The handbook also indicated that the school would attempt to notify a child’s
parents in advance of a swat, “however, a swat will be given regardless if the parent can be
reached or not.” Finally, the handbook provided that “[p]arents should deal with each mark
at home to deter getting enough marks for a swat.” The academy served children from
kindergarten through fourth grade, although the handbook provided that only “elementary”
aged children were subject to the swatting. Id. at 500-01 & nn.2-3.
1. The Story of John Doe, Jr.88
In September 1998, CPS in Milwaukee, Wisconsin received a
written report from a ten-year-old girl’s guardian alleging that the
principal at the girl’s private Christian academy had spanked her.89
For two months, CPS did nothing: It did not screen the report in
or out; nor did it assign the report to an investigator. Only after
the child’s guardian sent a second letter was the case assigned to
John Wichman, who was characterized as “an experienced Bureau
caseworker.”  Wichman visited the family’s home and the guard-90
ian, who told him that the child’s principal swatted the child on two
occasions, the second swatting leaving a bruise mark. She also gave
him a copy of the school handbook which explained that children
who received “[t]hree marks [for bad behavior] in one day or four
marks in one week” would get one swat from the principal.91
Wichman then spoke to the girl who told him that “the second
paddling was administered above the rear area, approximately six
inches above her tailbone, and that she had struggled to get away
from [the principal].” The girl also told Wichman that she knew of
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92. No evidence existed in the record that otherwise explains this suspicion.
93. This decision to substantiate was
contrary to Bureau’s Investigation Standards, which provide that
substantiation can occur only after the assigned caseworker has obtained
statements from all “pertinent persons,” including the alleged maltreater and
any eyewitnesses. At the time Hansen made the decision to substantiate [the
principal], Wichman had not interviewed [him] or [the girl’s] teacher ... who was
present during both of the girl’s spankings. 
Id. at 501-02. Additionally, no physical evidence of excessive corporal punishment existed,
as the bruises that were alleged to have appeared on the girl’s back had disappeared by then,
and her guardian had not taken any pictures of them when they were still present. Id. at
501.
94. Id. at 502.
95. At the time, state law “technically require[d] a 24-hour response to all screened-in
reports.” Id. at 499. Nevertheless, CPS “guidelines separate[d] reports into three categories:
(1) 0-2 hour response; (2) 24-hour response; and (3) 2-5 day response.” Id. In this case, the
months-long delay was the result of CPS’s failure, whether deliberate or not, to screen in the
reports when they were first made. The guidelines for investigatory response times are only
invoked once a report is screened in. Id.
96. Id. at 503.
at least one other child, a fourth-grade boy named John Doe, Jr.,
who also had been swatted, but she did not know if he had been
hurt.
Based on these two interviews, Wichman told his supervisor,
Christine Hansen, that “the principal may have been out of control.”
And he suggested that the parents of the children who attended the
academy also were appropriate child abuse suspects based on their
acquiescence to the swatting policy, and the possibility, which
Wichman apparently imagined out of thin air, that they might have
been the subject of maltreatment reports in the past.  Without92
requiring any further investigation, Hansen substantiated the girl’s
allegations against the principal  and asked Wichman to report the93
allegations concerning John Jr.  That case was assigned to Carla94
Heck, another Bureau caseworker.95
On December 16, Heck and Wichman went to the academy to
interview John Jr. The associate pastor of the affiliated church
“asked [the social workers] whether he was legally required to allow
them to interview the boy” without a court order.  In response, the96
Heck and Wichman explained that “the [relevant] statute gave
them the authority to interview the child at school without notice
or parental consent,” and that if the school refused to comply, they
would “call the police, who would then force the school to allow the
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97. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion notes that “[a]lthough [the captain] made reference to
‘exigent circumstances,’ neither the caseworkers nor the police officers indicated that they
believed John Jr. was under any threat of immediate harm.” Id. at 503 & n.7. In fact, nothing
in the report on John Jr. suggested that such a threat was present, because the girl who told
CPS about the boy was unable to say whether he had been hurt by the swat he received from
the principal. The fact that the state waited a full three months before screening in the initial
report and investigating the case further undermined the state’s ability to make out exigent
circumstances on these facts. This suggests that at least the police knew that they were not
proceeding on lawful authority. 
98. Id. at 503.
99. Id. at 510.
interview in short order.” Heck and Wichman also refused to
disclose the reason for the investigation, or to permit anyone from
the school to accompany John Jr. as he was being examined.
Because of this, the assistant pastor told the social workers that he
would not allow them to proceed without a court order. And so they
called the police.
The police officer who arrived on the scene was “[u]nsure of how
to proceed.” He called his captain, who in turn “called the local
district attorney’s office, and received confirmation that [the state
statute] gave caseworkers the authority to interview children
suspected of abuse on school premises without having to notify or
obtain the consent of their parents or the school.” The captain,
joined by two other police officers, then went to the school to assist
the original officer and the two social workers to gain access to the
boy. The assistant pastor initially continued to resist the efforts of
the now six state officials to enter the premises to see John Jr.,
asking again whether a court order was needed before the interview
could proceed. Although no such conditions existed, the captain
responded that “‘a court order was not needed for an interview
under exigent circumstances.’”  The associate pastor finally97
acquiesced to the investigation.
“John Jr. was then escorted to the [empty] nursery section of the
church for the interview.”  He was “questioned by Heck and98
Wichman, with the uniformed police officer present, for twenty
minutes about intimate details of his family life.”  During the99
interview, the social worker asked the boy a series of questions,
including whether he had been physically disciplined at school,
whether his parents knew about the principal’s spanking, whether
he was physically disciplined at home, about “his father’s military
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100. Id. at 503-04.
101. Id. at 503.
102. Id. at 504.
103. Id. at 505.
104. Id. at 504.
105. Id. at 506.
history, where his father worked ... where his sister attended
school,” and “whether he knew of any other students at school who
had been spanked.”  John Jr. responded that the principal had100
spanked him once, that he had “held back tears” during the
spanking, and that “after the spanking [the principal] and his
teacher ... (who had witnessed the spanking), prayed with him.”101
He also confirmed that his parents knew he had been spanked, and
that his parents spanked both him and his sister with a paddle or
a spatula. Finally, he indicated that he knew of “at least six other
students, whom he identified for Heck,” who also had been spanked
at school.102
Meanwhile, CPS launched a parallel investigation of John Jr.’s
family based on the social workers’ suspicion that John Jr.’s
parents, John and Jane Doe, also were abusing him and his sister.
Heck and Wichman pursued this investigation for over a month.
During this period, the Does hired an attorney who communicated
with CPS but who would not allow the agents to meet with the
family or to interview or examine the children without a court
order. CPS responded by going to “several private schools in the
area in an attempt to interview John Jr.’s sister.”  CPS also103
threatened the family with “‘tak[ing] this whole thing up a notch,’”
by “‘go[ing] to the District Attorney,’”  and “‘tak[ing] steps to ...104
protect the children in [the family’s] home’”  if the parents did not105
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106. The Does “interpreted [these expressions] as a threat to remove their children from
their custody” if they did not voluntarily comply with CPS’s investigation as Heck and
Wichman saw fit to conduct it. Id. The validity of this interpretation was confirmed by
Wichman, who told the police that “if the Does did not have their attorney contact [CPS]
within the next 24 hours, he and Heck planned to go to [the family] residence and physically
remove the children from their custody so they might be interviewed.” Id. Wichman’s
supervisor, Christine Hansen, “testified in a deposition that Wichman’s stated intention to
the police that he would seek to remove the Doe children from their parents’ custody, if true,
would have been illegal, a drastic step, and inconsistent with [CPS] protocol.” Id. at n.11. In
light of this, the social workers’ threats can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, it could
be that they intended to violate either knowingly or unknowingly the CPS protocol described
by Hansen. Second, it could be that they intended to use the threat of removal—just as they
had used the police in the original visit to John Jr.’s school—to force compliance with their
investigation. 
107. Id. at 506 & n.10.
108. Id. at 507 & n.12.
voluntarily comply with the investigation.  John and Jane Doe106
explained that, throughout this period, they 
“lived in constant fear that Ms. Heck or one of her associates
would come to [their] home and remove [their] children,” and
that this fear caused them: (1) to maintain “a continual watch
for strange vehicles, believing that Ms. Heck or an associate
might come in an unmarked car or van”; (2) not to let their
children play outside ... without one of them present to “guard
to [e]nsure no [CPS] case worker came for them”; (3) to put up
blankets over their windows to prevent Heck or anyone else
with [CPS] from monitoring their activities; and (4) to purchase
a caller identification system to screen any calls from [CPS]
caseworkers.107
They also “took their children to a friend’s house [one evening] to
spend the night, fearing that someone from [CPS] would come to
their home and attempt to remove their children from their
custody”; ... “purchased a cellular phone [so that they could] keep in
constant contact ... regarding [CPS’s] ongoing investigation of their
family”; and Jane Doe, “overwhelmed that [CPS officials] had
interviewed her son at school” and by CPS’s conduct otherwise “took
a leave of absence from work from December 17, 1998 through
January 19, 1999 because she ‘was afraid to be away from her
children for any length of time ... not knowing what [CPS] might
do.’”108
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109. Id. at 505.
110. Id. at 504.
111. Id. at 506.
112. Id. at 506-07.
113. Id. at 508.
114. Id. at 507. 
During this same period and without any new evidence, CPS also
launched investigations of the other children John Jr. had identified
as having been spanked by the principal; as in John Jr.’s case, these
investigations included interviews with the children conducted
without parental notification or consent.  And it “opened a file on109
the corporation, ‘Greendale Baptist Academy.’”  In the course of110
this last investigation, CPS “ran background checks (for prior
contacts with [CPS]) on every family listed in the [church member-
ship] directory, whether they had children enrolled at the school
or not.” Its officials met with the police to update them on the
investigation, and to supply them “‘with copies of [CPS] reports ...
a copy of the [school’s] handbook, the church directory and some
information [CPS] received off of the Internet in regards to Bob
Jones University.’”  And it returned to the school with another111
social worker and two police officers to interview the other children,
a visit during which the school’s attorney refused to allow the state
officials’ entry without a court order and the police threatened to
arrest the principal “for obstruction of justice.”112
All of the investigations ultimately were closed in early- to mid-
1999.  No action was taken against the school, the principal, or113
the parents of the children who were the alleged victims of mal-
treatment. CPS’s lawyer sent the Does’ lawyer a letter “advising
that the investigation of [their family] was being closed because ‘[i]n
discussing the matter with you, we have been assured that there is
no safety, nor service needs for the ... family.’” CPS’s internal files
read differently. They “indicate[] that the investigation had been
closed because of the Does’ refusal to cooperate, thus preventing
caseworkers from substantiating abuse.” At no point in the
investigation did CPS or the police seek a court order to conduct the
investigation. This baffled the school’s lawyer, who said, “‘I don’t
know why they don’t just get an order from a judge. If they [can] get
the order then we can’t do anything about it.’”  Ultimately, the114
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the investigation had
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115. Id. at 515. When the investigations were closed, the Doe family, the school, and other
parents sued the social workers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, that the state
officials had violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Id. at 508. Specifically, they alleged that the officials had “conducted an
unreasonable search of [the school’s] premises” and “illegally seized John Jr.” Id. They also
alleged that the state law provision pursuant to which the officials claimed authority to
conduct an investigation that included interviewing the children outside the presence of and
without notifying or obtaining consent from their parents was unconstitutional. Id. The
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that if these were
constitutional violations, the doctrine of qualified immunity, which applies where a
constitutional right is not clearly established, barred the suit against them. Id. On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit “th[ought] it clear that [the state’s entry onto the school’s property and
its taking of John Jr. to interview him] constitute[d] both a search and a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 509. It also found that the school and John Jr. both had
reasonable expectations of privacy as against state intrusions at school, id. at 511, and that
the searches were conducted without “‘definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse,’” id. at
515. Finally, the court held that although the investigation and the statutory provision that
authorized them were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, the suit against the
state officials was properly dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at 515-16.
116. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). The following factual narrative is
derived entirely from this case.
117. Id. at 1131.
proceeded in the absence of “‘definite and articulable evidence
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused
or is in imminent danger of abuse.’”115
2. The Story of Jessie and Lauren Wallis116
In the latter part of 1991, the Wallis family, comprised of Bill,
Becky, and their two children, five-year-old Lauren and two-year-
old Jessie, lived in San Diego, California.  Many months had117
passed since they last had contact with Bill’s sister, Rachel, “who
suffer[ed] from a long history of psychiatric problems, including
severe dissociative and multiple personality disorders.” The family’s
estrangement from Rachel stemmed from a false report she had
filed with the San Diego County CPS “in April of 1990, alleging that
Bill was sexually abusing Lauren. CPS had investigated the report
and found that there was no credible evidence to support the
allegations and no action was taken against the Wallises.” Never-
theless, “Bill and Becky remained angry at Rachel ... and termi-
nated their relationship with her.”
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118. Id. at 1131-32.
119. Id. at 1132.
120. At the same time, the CPS caseworker who had received the initial report from the
therapist “wrote up her recommendations for the ... caseworker who would be assigned to the
matter, stating that she felt ‘we have no choice but to take the children into protective
custody until an investigation can be done.’” Id. And in a subsequent communications with
that caseworker, she indicated “that a district attorney ... told [her] that ‘we have enough to
pick up the kids.’” Id. Whether anyone at CPS that day ever communicated with anyone at
the Police Department concerning the possibility of removing Lauren and Jessie from the
custody of their parents is entirely unclear from the record.
Rachel was subsequently “hospitalized in a psychiatric facility
because she was suicidal and was afraid she would be murdered.”
During her stay there, “[s]he reported to her therapist ... that Bill
Wallis was planning to sacrifice his young son Jessie to Satan at the
‘Fall Equinox ritual,’ and that Bill had told her that Jessie’s ritual
murder would be covered up by staging a car accident in which his
body would be burned.” Rachel added that “both her parents
[Lauren and Jessie’s grandparents] were in a satanic cult, and that
Bill Wallis was also in the cult, but that Becky was not, and indeed
‘might not know’ about her husband’s and parents’ cult member-
ship.” In the course of this recitation, “Rachel recounted her
recently recovered memory ‘of being with her father in the woods,
with him wearing a cult robe reciting hypnotically “On the third full
moon after two blue moons a child will be killed.”’” Then, “[o]ne of
Rachel’s ‘alter’ multiple personalities told [the therapist] that the
incantation referred to Jessie and meant that he would be sacrificed
to Satan on the ‘Fall Equinox,’ supposedly one of the Satanic ‘High
Holidays.’” The court later explained that “[i]n 1991, the Fall
Equinox evidently fell upon September 23.”118
California law requires therapists to report suspected abuse and
neglect.  Acting on this requirement, Rachel’s therapist wrote119
CPS a letter on September 19 detailing what she could of her
consultations with her patient. This letter formed the basis for
CPS’s call to the state’s child abuse and neglect hotline. That same
day, CPS also called the police department, and provided the
responding officers with the information contained in the report. On
September 20, the police assigned two detectives to the case. CPS
separately assigned a caseworker to its own investigation.120
In the evening of September 22, 1991, the detectives “stake[d]
out” Becky Wallis’s car, tailed her as she began her drive home, and
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121. Id. at 1134.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1133. In the course of the subsequent litigation, CPS disavowed police claims
that they had been notified by CPS that “there was a pick up order.”  See id. at 1132-33
(describing the controversy concerning whether CPS told the police it had an order, and in
particular the principals’ changing stories concerning the controversy). Clearly, no one at
CPS got a court order to remove the children that day, and no one at the police department
ever checked to see whether the department’s actions were authorized by such an order. Id.
Officers and supervisors from the police department testified in the ensuing litigation that
at the time ... the Police Department had in effect a practice of taking “at face
value” telephonic representations from CPS that there was a court order to
remove children from their parents’ custody. Claytor testified that “it was not
unusual for CPS workers to call and ask for our units to respond to a particular
scene, and tell them that ‘we have a petition that’s been filed,’ or [that] kids
have already been made a ward of the court in response to a petition. That
eventually pulled her over in the parking lot of a local 7-11 conve-
nience store.  There, they “told her that they needed to ‘check on’121
[her two children, Lauren and Jessie], and said that if she took
them to her house, they would be able to ‘sit down and talk about
it.’” In fact, the officers’ intent was to remove the children from the
Wallis’s home. “In response to the officers’ [mis]representations,
Becky took the officers to the family’s home and agreed to their
entry.” 
When Becky and the officers reached the family home, it was
“around midnight, [and] her children were asleep,” in the care of
their father, Bill Wallis.  According to the officers, “[t]he children122
appeared well-cared for,” and “there was no sign of anything
suspicious.” Despite this, one of the officers 
decided to “interview” Lauren. She required Bill and Becky
[Wallis] to awaken Lauren so that she could question her.
According to [the officer], the sleepy five year old was “evasive,”
but told her that they had to move from the apartment in which
they had previously lived because of “spiders on the walls.”
Although [the officer] acknowledged that she had no information
from any source that Lauren had ever been sexually abused, she
asked her whether “anybody had ever given her bad touches or
abused her.” Lauren denied that anyone had.
Without interviewing either Bill or Becky Wallis, the officers then
announced that they were taking the children away because “‘there
was a pickup order’” that CPS had obtained.  This was untrue;123
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happened fairly often.”
 Id. at 1133. A supervisor testified that
the Police Department did nothing to verify that a pickup order existed because
“there’s been a longstanding agreement between law enforcement agencies, that
if I tell you I have a search warrant, up until recent times, you would be taken
at face value that you did, in fact, have a search warrant. Same way as when
I call down to verify that there is a warrant in the system for someone and
make the arrest, I don’t physically see it.”
Id. Also in dispute was whether anyone at CPS that day discussed with anyone at the Police
Department the previous allegations of sexual abuse that had been investigated and
dismissed, and whether the Police believed they were investigating the case or simply
locating the family to enforce the (nonexistent) pick-up order. 
124. Id. at 1134. The record is replete with different and sometimes contradictory
explanations from the officers involved in the investigation concerning the basis for their
belief that a court order in fact existed that mandated the removal of Lauren and Jessie that
night. Some of the court’s analysis suggests that the judges did not believe at least some of
the officers’ statements. In any event, all that is clear is that there never was such a court
order, that CPS never requested one, and that the court’s ultimate view was that the officers
were, if not prevaricating, at least unreasonable in their belief that a warrant existed.
125. Id. at 1134-35.
126. Id. at 1135.
there never was such a document.  Nevertheless, at 1:00 a.m. on124
September 22, Lauren and Jessie were awakened, taken away from
their parents and the family home, and brought to “a county
institution.” In the following days, “[t]he children were not allowed
to see their parents and cried for them constantly.”
Again without obtaining a court order or advising Bill or Becky
Wallis so that they would have an “opportunity to object to the
intrusive examinations, to suggest conditions under which they
might take place, or to be present,” the police arranged for Jessie
and Lauren to be taken from the institution to a local hospital for
“an evidentiary physical examination ... to determine whether
either child had been sexually abused.”  Dr. Mary Spencer125
conducted both children’s examinations, which
included internal body cavity examination of the children,
vaginal and anal. Dr. Spencer also took photographs of both the
inside and the outside of Lauren’s vagina and rectum and
Jessie’s rectum. These examinations were conducted on Jessie’s
third birthday. A social worker who observed the examinations
reported, not surprisingly, that Lauren was very upset by the
procedures and asked for her parents.  126
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Dr. Spencer subsequently told the social worker “that the results
disclosed medical evidence that both children had been molested,
and that Dr. Susan Horowitz, a specialist from Children’s Hospital’s
Sexual Abuse Unit concurred with her findings.”
Based on this representation and the allegation that “Bill was
going to sacrifice Jessie to Satan,” the social worker requested an
order from the juvenile court—the first contact with a court in this
case—to have the children placed in the county’s custody. The
judicial officer reviewing the request “specifically rejected the
allegations regarding occult sacrifice as a basis for retaining
custody of the children, but determined that Dr. Spencer’s report
provided sufficient evidence of sexual abuse to keep them in county
custody.” The order further provided that the children’s parents
were to be allowed “only one supervised visit per week.”
According to the court:
Two months went by. Then, on November 25, Dr. Horowitz sent
[the social worker] a letter that changed the lives of the Wallis
family. It informed CPS that Dr. Spencer’s statement in her
report that Dr. Horowitz supported the finding of sexual abuse
was false. In fact, Dr. Horowitz wrote, as of the time of Dr.
Spencer’s report, she [Dr. Horowitz] ... had not performed a full
review, and had not offered any conclusion. Dr. Horowitz’s letter
further stated that she now had reviewed the full file and, based
on all the evidence, she did not agree with Dr. Spencer’s
conclusion that the children had been abused. To the contrary,
Dr. Horowitz concluded that there was no evidence of abuse, and
that there were alternative, normal physiological explanations
for what Dr. Spencer had observed. Dr. Horowitz’s explanations
were based on Lauren’s history of vaginal irritation and
infection, as documented in her medical records, as well as other
information contained in those records.127
Based on this letter, the social worker “to his credit, immediately
released [Lauren and Jessie] ... to their maternal grandmother.”
CPS then
moved swiftly to dismiss the case in Juvenile Court. [And on]
December 6, 1991, Lauren and Jessie were returned by court
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128. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 97 (2d ed.
2003). The personal security, personal liberty, and private property aspects of this right have
been described as encompassing notions of autonomy, dignity, and locomotion. Thus, as
Fourth Amendment scholar Andrew Taslitz explains:
order to the custody of their parents. No one now contends that
either child was ever sexually or physically abused, that there
was ever any evidence of any abuse by their parents, or that Bill
Wallis had ever had any intention of sacrificing Jessie to Satan.
II. THE DOCTRINAL VALIDITY OF THE STATES’ RELIANCE ON A
CHILD WELFARE EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
States have developed and implemented the approach to the child
maltreatment problem described in Part I in substantial reliance on
the existence of a child welfare exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Specifically, they annually conduct over a million investigations on
the assumption that the reasonableness of the ultimate goal (or
perhaps some individualized suspicion) suffices to authorize them;
and they often exercise broad discretion in their conduct on the
assumption that the particularized warrant that would otherwise
fetter them is not required in this context. Part II of this Article
begins to explore the validity of these reliances.
A. The Amendment’s Presumptive Protections
The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.  128
“[T]he essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is ‘not the breaking
of [a person’s] doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,’ but rather
‘the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property.’”  Consistent with this account,129
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Privacy is essential to the flourishing of human relationships and free thought.
Property adds to the independence and security that give us a measure of
freedom from state and private coercion. Free movement—the right of
locomotion—allows us to travel, work, visit friends, and participate in
community and educational activities unmolested, in ways essential to human
autonomy and diversity. The inviolability of these interests is central to our
sense that we are being treated with dignity.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2266-67 (2002) (footnotes omitted); see also Akhil Reed Amar,
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 79 (2000) (asserting that
the Amendment implies “values of bodily autonomy, privacy, and free expression” as well as
“issues of bodily integrity, dignity, and liberty”); David Meyer, The Paradox of Family
Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 595 (2000) (explaining that Fourth Amendment privacy, like
the privacy protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is concerned
with safeguarding the dignity of the individual against state incursion).
130. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
131. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). This view of the Amendment’s
presumptive protections is based in general agreement amongst constitutional historians and
Fourth Amendment scholars about the relationship between its two clauses; specifically, it
reflects the sense of these scholars that “the ‘reasonable’ search is one which meets the
warrant requirements specified in the second clause.” JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42-43
(1966). Landynski further described this interpretation thusly:
The first clause ... recognized [an] already existing ... right to freedom from
arbitrary governmental invasion of privacy and did not seek to create or confer
such a right. It was evidently meant to re-emphasize (and, in some undefined
way, strengthen) the requirements for a valid warrant set forth in the second
clause. The second clause, in turn, defines and interprets the first, telling us the
kind of search that is not “unreasonable,” and therefore not forbidden, namely,
the one carried out under the safeguards there specified.
Id.; see also NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937) (same); Tracey Maclin, The
“[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. The
Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the
people which ‘is basic to a free society.’”  Much of the Supreme130
Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine and a significant portion of the
related scholarship is concerned with fixing the point at which an
invasion by government officials ceases to be reasonable and
becomes unlawfully arbitrary. In this regard, the prevailing view of
the text presumes that absent “a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions” a warrant and probable cause are
necessary to constitutionalize, or to make “reasonable,” a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure.131
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Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (1993) (same); David
A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000)
(same); William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with Duke University
School of Law) (same). The most notable academic opponent of this view is Professor Akhil
Reed Amar, who has interpreted the Amendment’s history as suggesting that searches and
seizures are presumptively more reasonable without a warrant. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 772-85 (1994). His different
historical interpretation of the text has been flatly rejected as “simply wrong” and “delusive”
by Professor Maclin, who is joined in this view by the other scholars already mentioned in
this footnote. Tracy Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-6, 21-23, 45-47 (1994).
132. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959). But see Craig S. Lerner, The
Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 (2003) (detailing in Parts IV and V
the historical evolution of the meaning and evidentiary value of probable cause). See also
James Etienne Viator, The Fourth Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 176 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed.,
1991) (arguing that The Collection Act of 1789 codified “the narrow contemporary
understanding of probable cause” which in essence required the magistrate to issue the
requested warrant “once the oath or affirmation of suspicion was made to him”).
133. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 231 (1983)). According to the modern Court, “the probable-cause standard is a practical,
nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at
370 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232). Thus, it “is incapable of
precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and
depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Id.; see Lerner, supra note 132, at 995-97
(discussing the “[i]llusion of [m]athematical [p]recision” inherent in the probable cause
inquiry).
134. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 129, at 180; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth
Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 62 (1996)
(suggesting that in the Founding Era and with respect to writs of assistance in particular,
probable cause meant “a high likelihood ... that a particular place contained stolen goods”).
135. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 129, at 180-81 & n.110; see also Beeman, supra note 23,
The probable cause requirement is generally thought to have
been intended to assure that “common rumor or report, suspicion,
or even ‘strong reason to suspect’” would be insufficient to
support a warrant application.  Because “[p]robable cause is a132
fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules,”  the Court has consistently refused to133
quantify this formula. Nevertheless, some judges have suggested
that “probable cause hovers somewhere just over or just under the
50% mark, depending upon the court and the situation.”  In any134
event, it is clearly “more than ‘reasonable suspicion’” which a
judicial “survey[] ... pegged ... at about a 30% certainty.”  135
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at 1040 (exploring the difference between the probable cause standard as traditionally
applied in the criminal search and seizure context, and its incarnation—as reasonableness,
reasonable suspicion, etc.—in other (including administrative) contexts); Lerner, supra note
132, at 996-1003 (discussing efforts to quantify the evidentiary weight of probable cause,
contrasting that with the weight ascribed to reasonable suspicion, and exploring the “[b]irth
of [r]easonable [s]uspicion”).
136. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
137. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978).
138. Id. Where such a search is “not programmatic but ... responsive to individual events,
a more particularized inquiry may be necessary.” Id. Although some administrative searches
are inevitable given how “vital [the] social objective” in issue, “the magistrate can perform
the important function of preventing harassment by keeping that invasion to a minimum.”
Id. at 507-08. This gateway procedure also serves to reassure the individual that a
contemplated search or seizure is lawful. See id. at 508.
[W]hen the inspector demands entry [without a warrant], the occupant has no
way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires
inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the
inspector’s power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector
himself is acting under proper authorization.
Id.
139. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (quoting Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). This means that it must not be “coerced, by explicit or
implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” Id. at 228.
The particularized warrant requirement ensures that the
question of “[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by
a policeman or government enforcement agent.”   In this context,136
“[t]he magistrate’s duty is to ... [conduct an] inquiry into the need
for the intrusion on the one hand, and the threat of disruption to
the occupant on the other,” to determine whether, taking these
circumstances into consideration, the officer’s warrant request is
reasonable.  In the case of an administrative search, the answer137
will turn on such factors as “the purpose, frequency, scope, and
manner of conducting the inspections.”  138
B. The Traditional Consent and Exigent Circumstances Exceptions
Traditionally, the two most relevant exceptions to the presump-
tive protections of the Warrant Clause have been consent and
exigent circumstances. 
Consent will justify a warrantless search or seizure when it is
“‘freely and voluntarily given.’”  The Court, balancing the139
“competing concerns [of] ... the legitimate need for ... searches and
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140. Id. at 227.
141. Id. at 229. 
142. Id. At the same time, “[w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor
to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua
non of an effective consent.” Id. at 227. The Court reasoned that imposing such a
requirement would “create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to be
conducted,” because in most cases, “where there was no evidence of any coercion, explicit or
implicit, the prosecution would nevertheless be unable to demonstrate that the subject of the
search in fact had known of his right to refuse consent.” Id. at 229-30.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998)
(affirming that the defendant’s minor child had the legal capacity to grant third-party
consent to enter the defendant’s motel room); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 (11th Cir.
1995) (finding as a matter of law that minors do have the capacity to give third-party consent
to police officers because, among other reasons, consent searches serve a legitimate purpose
properly balanced against the possible harm of limiting a child’s ability to consent); United
States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1990). The Clutter Court found that
[u]nder the circumstances of this case, where children twelve and fourteen
years of age routinely were left in exclusive control of the house, and
defendants’ possession of large quantities of marijuana was so open and
patently non-exclusive that its odor pervaded the house, the government
satisfied its burden of demonstrating the initial warrantless search of the
bedroom was by consent, since the boys enjoyed that degree of access and
control over the house that afforded them the right to permit inspection of any
room in the house.
Id.; see also Gregoire v. Henderson, 302 F.Supp. 1402 (E.D. La. 1969) (holding that a
seventeen-year-old boy, a permanent resident in his brother’s home, was capable of giving
valid consent to law enforcement to search the premises).
144. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979) (finding that, under the totality
of the circumstances, a sixteen-year-old juvenile familiar with the criminal justice system
understood his Miranda rights and knowingly waived them in making a murder confession
the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of
coercion,” has held that “the question whether a consent to a search
was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances.”  Among the factors that must be140
taken into account in evaluating those circumstances are “subtly
coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person who consents.”  In this regard,141
courts will consider the age, education, and intelligence of the
person in issue, as well as any advice that may have been given
concerning her constitutional right to refuse to give consent.142
Mature minors have been found capable of giving lawful consent to
enter and search premises over which they have common access and
regular exclusive control for certain portions of the day,  and to143
searches and seizures of their own persons.  Nevertheless, the144
2005] STORMING THE CASTLE TO SAVE THE CHILDREN 463
to the police); Gachot v. Stalder, 298 F.3d 414, 420-21 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the state
court had adequately considered the “totality of the circumstances” in determining that a
fifteen-year-old’s murder confession was voluntary after four hours of police questioning and
repeated notice of his Miranda rights); Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2002)
(applying the “totality of circumstances” test, and upholding as voluntary the confession of
a fourteen-year-old child, but stating nonetheless that “the younger the child, the more
carefully [the court] will scrutinize police questioning tactics to determine if excessive caution
or intimidation or simple immaturity that would not affect an adult has tainted the juvenile’s
confession”). Cf. In re David W., 163 Cal. Reptr. 87 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1043, 1043
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the questioning of a thirteen-year-old, with
permission from his mother but no arrest warrant or probable cause, “presents an important
question concerning a parent’s authority to waive her minor child’s right under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from ‘unreasonable seizures’”). 
Contrary to Hardin’s view, supra note 23, at 552-53 (arguing that because children can
talk to whomever they want at school, they have the right to consent to being interviewed
and examined by the state in connection with child welfare investigations), the notion that
immature minors cannot give lawful consent to the authorities to seize and to search their
person (including to interview and examine them) should not be particularly controversial,
as the law generally presumes that children lack the capacity to make legally relevant
decisions for themselves. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 89, at 1 (setting out as the foundational
premise of law concerning children that “[l]egal policy affecting children is shaped by
presumptions about particular attributes of childhood that set children apart from adults.
Because children are immature, the law assumes that they are unable to care for themselves
and incapable of making important decisions affecting their lives”).
145. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 8.2(n), at 707.
146. 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001) (noting that when state hospital employees “undertake to
obtain [evidence of criminal conduct] from their patients for the specific purpose of
incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients
are fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require”)
(emphasis in original); id. at 93-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking the majority’s apparent
suggestion that consent in such cases henceforth should be both knowing and voluntary, and
exclaiming that this expansion of the consent requirements “opens a hole in our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the size and shape of which is entirely indeterminate”). On
remand on this issue, the Fourth Circuit held that the general consent given to a state
hospital by pregnant women for medical treatment in connection with pregnancy was invalid
to immunize the state from a Fourth Amendment challenge to the hospital’s subsequent
authorities may not “mislead the consenting party as to the nature
of the crime under investigation and, consequently, the character
of the objects for which they desire to conduct a search,” then
“‘subsequently use that consent ... to conduct a general exploratory
search.’”  Finally, although consent in this context usually does145
not need to be knowing, and the mere presence of police ordinarily
will not vitiate voluntary consent, the Court’s recent decision in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston suggests that where family privacy
concerns are involved, a more rigorous test involving a requirement
of “knowing waiver” may be applied.146
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urinalysis that, unbeknownst to the women, was intended for use by law enforcement.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 404 (4th Cir. 2002). As one scholar has argued,
this decision has potentially “radical implications” for the Fourth Amendment’s consent
doctrine, as it suggests that “in addition to voluntariness,” it may now also require that
consent in similar circumstances be “‘knowingly and intelligently made.’” Andrew E. Taslitz,
A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 2-3 (2002). Professor Taslitz’s article
provides a thorough examination of the ramifications of Ferguson in this regard.
147. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 129, at 344.
148. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
149. Id.
150. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751 (1984).
151. Id. at 750.
152. Id. at 750-53 (explaining that “‘[t]he exception is limited to the investigation of
serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded’”). Thus, as Justice Brennan wrote for the Court
in Welsh v. Wisconsin, a case that involved a warrantless, nighttime entry into the home of
an individual suspected of the then misdemeanor offense of drunk driving,
[t]his method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all sense of
proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting
to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat on the gravity of the offense
thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to
reach it.... It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any
suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no
violence or threats of it.... When an officer undertakes to act as his own
magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real
immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant.
Id. at 751. The defendant in Welsh was, at the time of the warrantless entry into his home,
reported by one witness to have “driven [his car] erratically ... chang[ed] speeds and veer[ed]
from side to side, the car eventually swerv[ing] off the road and c[oming] to a stop in an open
Exigencies or emergencies also will justify warrantless searches
and seizures. This exception is intended to assure the right of the
authorities to intrude where a person’s welfare is believed to be in
immediate jeopardy, and otherwise to “protect[] officer safety and
the integrity of evidence in circumstances in which time is of the
essence.”  These have been defined as circumstances where “there147
is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a
warrant.”  Thus, the exception applies where probable cause exists148
to search or seize, and the conditions are sufficient to meet the
exigency requirement.  The scope of this exception often depends149
on “the nature of the underlying offense.”  When the offense is150
“relatively minor,”  for example, where it involves at most a151
misdemeanor with no threat of jail time, or where no imminent
physical harm is involved, the courts will often hesitate to ratify a
warrantless search or seizure on the basis of the exception.152
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field. No damage to any person or property occurred.... the driver [subsequently] walked
away from the scene,” and eventually went home. Id. at 742-43.
153. Id. at 752 (quoting State v. Guertin, 461 A.2d 963, 970 (Conn. 1983)).
154. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing this statistic in the context of
the states’ use of consent).
155. See supra notes 40, 140-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
concern about the validity of consent obtained in this circumstance).
156. See supra notes 39, 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing children’s incapacity
generally to give lawful consent).
157. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of the
exigent circumstances doctrine).
158. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text (discussing these prerequisites).
Courts generally scrutinize carefully a state actor’s assertion of
exigent circumstances, as the exception is “‘narrowly drawn to cover
cases of real and not contrived emergencies.’”153
States rely heavily on these two exceptions when they conduct
child maltreatment investigations. Indeed, over ninety percent of
investigations are said to be based on consent.  Certainly authori-154
ties intrude without a warrant or consent when a child appears to
be in imminent danger of important abuse or neglect. To the extent
they are appropriately employed, these exceptions will continue to
be available to state officials who wish or need to avoid the Fourth
Amendment’s particularized warrant and probable cause require-
ments. There is reason to suspect, however, that the exceptions are
frequently misused, for example, by officials who obtain consent
from a parent in part by misleading her about the law enforcement
aspects of an investigation,  or who obtain “consent” from a child155
who does not have the capacity to give it,  or who falsely claim the156
right to intrude on the basis of exigent circumstances,  or where157
the report does not concern serious maltreatment or establish
probable cause to believe the allegations are true.  Depending158
upon the jurisdiction—California, for example—the most problem-
atic use of the exceptions in terms of the number of investigations
conducted and the doctrine’s clarity may be investigations of
younger children at school without the knowledge of their
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159. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (describing the states’ use of the in-
school interview as a way to avoid parental involvement and interference with their
investigation of the child, and at least some California officials’ use of this tool in particular
to avoid having to obtain conducting a home visit); infra notes 170, 177, 181 and
accompanying text (explaining the Ninth Circuit’s position that the presumptive
requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply to child welfare investigations). As a practical
matter, until the constitutionality of this strategy reaches the courts, there is nothing (other
than the potential for legislative action) to prevent the states from proceeding in this fashion.
And even where the issue does reach the courts, unless they find that the children’s right to
be free from the investigations was “well established” at the time of the investigations, the
officials who engaged in them will be entitled to qualified immunity as against any claims
for damages. Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Soucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 200 (2001)). In other words, the only apparent risk to the states that have adopted
this approach is the possibility that in the future, the federal courts will determine that the
children’s rights were in fact well-established, and will require the officials at issue in those
cases to compensate their victims. I suggest that the states likely assume this is a small price
to pay for the ability in the meantime to continue to interview and examine children at
school.
160. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
parents.  For these reasons, they are not the child welfare159
exception to the Fourth Amendment that states claim to need. 
C. The Special Needs “Administrative Search” Exception
To the extent that a child welfare exception exists, it does so
because the special needs “administrative search” exception applies
in this context. The following discussion outlines the historical
contours and use of this doctrine, describes its most recent itera-
tion, and analyzes its compatibility with typical child maltreatment
investigatory procedures. It concludes that investigatory schemes
and investigations that are insufficiently divorced from law
enforcement, as when their purpose is to discover evidence that
would support both a civil and criminal charge, likely do not meet
the requirements of the special needs exception. 
1. The Historical Contours and Use of the Doctrine
The Court has held that “in those exceptional circumstances in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable
... a court [is] entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for
that of the Framers.”  In other words, when this exception applies,160
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161. Id. at 341.
162. Compare New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), and Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305 (1997) (defining special needs as “substantial” and “important” and related to public
safety), with Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), and City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (defining special needs as those involving primarily civil or
administrative rather than law enforcement concerns, and requiring a focus on the
investigation’s “immediate” or “primary” rather than “ultimate” purpose in this context).
These varying standards explain the conclusion reached by Hardin and Beeman, writing in
the late 1980s, that the special needs administrative search exception was applicable to child
welfare investigations. See Hardin, supra note 23, at 522 n.109 (assuming that the
administrative search exception applies to child welfare investigations even though its
“ultimate purpose ... is to rehabilitate the family [and its] primary initial concern ... is to
uncover possible abuse and neglect” (emphasis added)); Beeman, supra note 23, at 1049-52
(assuming that “as long as the administrative function of the search is not a ‘mere pretext’
the search will be judged on administrative terms,” and finding that child maltreatment
investigations meet this standard despite that they are “‘true search[es] for violations,’” that
“the ultimate objective of state intervention may be to ‘stabilize the home environment and
preserve family life’” and that “the investigator’s immediate objective is to determine ‘if
credible evidence of abuse or neglect exists’” (citations omitted)).
163. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding that
the Federal Railroad Administration’s promulgation of regulations for alcohol and drug
testing of railroad employees is not a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights in part
because the industry is highly regulated for safety); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)
(allowing an exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of
businesses that implicate public safety and that traditionally have been closely regulated);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (upholding provisions of the Gun Control Act
of 1968 that authorized warrantless searches of gun store premises because such owners
chose to engage in a highly regulated industry and thus have a reduced expectation of
privacy).
164. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (“[S]earches pursuant to
a regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable cause requirements
[of the Fourth Amendment].”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (recognizing
that the warrant requirement would be impracticable and perhaps “frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search,” but holding nevertheless that the Fourth
Amendment applied to such searches); Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that an inspector’s entry onto a landowner’s property was not a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights because his permit was conditioned on such regulatory inspections
and the state’s interest in protecting tidal wetlands constituted a special need). In Camara,
the Court did find that “a number of persuasive factors combine to support the
reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections,” and that system, based on “reasonable
the Amendment’s presumptive protections are discarded and
replaced by the courts’ own assessment of the relative value of
individual rights as against the government’s need to conduct an
investigation unfettered by those protections.  Over time and161
based on varying standards,  the Court has applied the special162
needs exception to inspections of highly regulated industries,163
routine regulatory health and safety inspections,  public school164
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legislative or administrative standards” has been found to meet probable cause requirements
without individualized suspicion for such inspections. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538; see also
TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 129, at 363-64.
165. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding as constitutional the
suspicionless and warrantless drug testing of public high school students involved in any
extracurricular activity); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (finding a
suspicionless, warrantless random drug testing program of high school athletes to be
constitutionally valid because of the compelling need to combat drug use among students and
their decreased expectation of privacy in school); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(holding a warrantless search based on reasonable suspicion of a public high school student
as constitutionally valid because of the special need for discipline in the schools, quick action
with respect to the student, and a lowered expectation of privacy among public school
students).
166. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding a
checkpoint program that stopped drivers to check for drunk driving, the Court finding the
public interest to be compelling enough and the invasion of privacy minimal enough to
overcome the lack of individualized suspicion). But see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 34 (2000) (striking down as unconstitutional a city program that established
checkpoints whose “primary purpose” was the “discovery and interdiction of illegal
narcotics”).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (holding that the government
could enter probationer’s home without a warrant where there was reasonable suspicion that
he had been involved in a crime, even though that crime was unrelated to the one for which
he had received probation, but leaving open the question whether the government could
enter a home in these circumstances on less than reasonable suspicion); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (upholding a local statute allowing warrantless searches of
probationers’ homes only if the search was based on “reasonable grounds” to suspect
possession of contraband goods, a violation of probationary terms).
168. See supra note 165 (setting out the cases involving drug testing amongst the cases
involving public school searches and seizures of children); see also Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (holding that the warrantless, suspicionless drug
testing (urinalysis) of U.S. Customs Services employees who applied for positions relating
to drug interdiction or that required the use of firearms is constitutional where positives are
not disclosed to law enforcement without employees’ consent (so that the program falls
outside of the realm of normal law enforcement), employees have a diminished expectation
of privacy, and the government’s needs are compelling); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 n.5 (1989) (holding that a warrantless, suspicionless program to
drug (urinalysis or blood) and alcohol (breathalyzer or blood) test railway workers who had
previously been involved in train accidents was constitutional because individuals’ privacy
interests are slight in comparison with the government’s compelling interest in ensuring
railway safety; the Court in Skinner recognized that the “record [did] not disclose that [the
provision allowing for retention of samples] was intended to be, or actually has been ... used
[to authorize the release of samples to law enforcement]” and thus “[left] for another day the
question whether routine use in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained pursuant to the
administrative scheme would give rise to an inference of pretext”). 
order and discipline-based searches,  highway roadblocks,165 166
routine monitoring of probationers,  and drug testing of public167
school children and government employees.  168
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169. Notably, a survey of state supreme court decisions shows that they are largely silent
on the subject. A few have implicitly adopted a child welfare exception to the Fourth
Amendment or to its particularized warrant and probable cause requirements, ruling that
the reasonableness of an investigation determines its lawfulness. See, e.g., Tate v. Sharpe,
777 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Ark. 1989) (finding that reasonable cause is sufficient for an order
compelling compliance with a child neglect investigation); Wildberger v. State, 536 A.2d 718
(Md. 1988) (finding reasonable, without engaging in any discussion of Fourth Amendment,
a warrantless search of a couple’s daughter in the family home for signs of physical abuse);
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Wunnenberg, 408 A.2d 1345 (N.J. App. 1979) (holding
that, to compel parents to comply with investigation, a showing of probable cause was not
required, just reasonableness based on the best interests of the child). A few others have
considered but avoided ruling directly on the issue, with the same result. See, e.g., In re
Stumbo, 582 S.E.2d 255, 261 (N.C. 2003) (deciding case on alternative grounds and thus
leaving intact the appellate decision that apparently holds the Fourth Amendment
inapplicable to child maltreatment investigations, which could presumably proceed on mere
reasonableness standard); H.R. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 612 So.2d 477, 478-79 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1992) (avoiding the Fourth Amendment question by construing the words “upon
cause shown” in the relevant state statute as allowing an investigatory entry into a private
home to mean reasonable or probable cause to believe that there was maltreatment); Parents
of Two Minors v. Bristol Div. of the Juvenile Court Dep’t, 494 N.E.2d 1306 (Mass. 1986)
(refusing to engage the Fourth Amendment issues involved in forcing compliance with a child
abuse investigation and instead holding that the juvenile court lacked the statutory or
common law authority to order compliance with a non-emergency home visit). 
Finally, a few have explicitly rejected arguments in favor of a child welfare exception that
would shield state officials from the particularized warrant and probable cause requirements.
See, e.g., Chavez v. Casarez, 31 P.3d 1027, 1036-37 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that police
had to obtain a warrant before entering a home in the context of a child abuse investigation
where no exigent circumstances permitted a warrantless search); F.K. v. Iowa Dist. Court,
No. 99-0095, 2000 WL 1593391, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2000) (holding in part that the
“Warrant Clause must be complied with ... ‘[i]n the context of a seizure of a child by the State
during an abuse investigation’” (quoting Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2d Cir.
1999))), vacated on other grounds, 630 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 2001); In re A.R. & C.P., 937 P.2d
1037 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (finding no basis to hold that the Fourth Amendment is
inapplicable in the child maltreatment investigations context); State v. Freed, No. A-95-
196, 1995 WL 663603, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1995) (holding in part that “the duty to
investigate imposed by [state law does not] eclipse[] the Fourth Amendment”); H.R. v. State
Dep’t of Human Res., 612 So.2d 477, 479 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (recognizing the difficult task
of social workers, but refusing to “empower[] [them] to enter private homes, poor or rich,
without reasonable cause to believe that the charged acts are occurring,” and holding that
the unsworn hearsay of two anonymous reports does not meet that requirement); State v.
Boggess, 340 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 1983) (holding that searches and seizures conducted in
context of child maltreatment investigations are subject to the Fourth Amendment); N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.W. & V.W., 398 A.2d 611, 613 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1978)
The Court has yet to rule on the applicability of the special
needs exception to child welfare investigations. The federal
appellate courts, however, began their examination of the broader
relationship of the Fourth Amendment to these investigations in
the mid-1980s.  As of this writing, only a sparse patchwork of law169
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(“It is also clear that the Fourth Amendment ... protect[s] [parents] from invasion of their
right to privacy within their home[s].”). None of the opinions in these cases expressly
considers the applicability of the special needs exception by that or any other name. 
Where the cases do include discussion of Supreme Court doctrine and federal appellate
case law, this discussion is often weak as a result of the failure to cite (and thus to
acknowledge the existence of) the most relevant cases, and to distinguish between Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment doctrines. See, e.g., In re Stumbo, 582 S.E.2d 255, 257 n.1 (N.C.
2003) (in declining to decide the case on Fourth Amendment grounds, making only one, brief
reference to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Heck to apply the Fourth Amendment
to child abuse investigation); Chavez v. Casarez, 31 P.3d 1027, 1035-36 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)
(discussing the treatment of the Fourth Amendment in child abuse investigations in the
federal circuits, without mentioning the Supreme Court’s special needs cases); In re A.R. &
C.P., 937 P.2d 1037, 1040-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Supreme Court decisions regarding
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in civil contexts and the reasonableness
requirement, but only with respect to child protective proceedings).
170. Wojcik v. Town of N. Smithfield, 76 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (using reasonableness
analysis to find school’s actions in reporting suspicions of abuse and agency’s actions in
investigating the reports to be constitutional); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 172-73
(2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the removal of a child is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
with requirements at least equal to those of ordinary arrests and perhaps even more
restrictive); Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 762 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to the seizure of a child in the context of a child abuse investigation but
that the seizure was reasonable in this case; the court offered “three modes of determining
whether a seizure was ‘reasonable,’” including probable cause, the less stringent
requirements under the special needs doctrine, and exigent circumstances); Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the examination of a child was subject
to the Fourth Amendment requirements of consent or probable cause and a court order, as
exigent circumstances were not present); Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that seizures in the home are presumptively unreasonable without a warrant or
exigent circumstances); Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d
1087, 1093 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that under the Fourth Amendment, the strip search of a
child in the family home can be justified only by a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances); Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the entry into and search of a foster mother’s home and children is “not subject to the same
scrutiny as searches in the criminal context” so the state did not need a warrant or probable
cause); Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407-08 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to strip searches of children but finding
consent for the home visit and explicitly rejecting the applicability of the special needs
doctrine); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding in a child
custody (not maltreatment) case that the warrantless seizure of a child was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment because none of the exceptions were present); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492
(7th Cir. 2003) (holding that searches and seizures of children on private property can be
effected only with probable cause, a warrant, or exigent circumstances, and explicitly
rejecting the applicability of the special needs doctrine to child maltreatment investigations);
Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the seizure of a child
from the family home requires a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, and
probable cause is not met by non-specific allegations of child abuse); Landstrom v. Ill. Dep’t
exists in the area. Nevertheless, eight of the twelve circuits have
resolved at least some of the questions that arise in this context.170
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of Children & Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670, 676-77 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that state actions
in verbally and physically examining a child without parental knowledge or consent may be
a constitutional violation);  Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding on a
motion for a preliminary injunction that where child protective services regulations appear
to guarantee the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of an investigation, a warrantless strip
search of a child in the public school is constitutional if it is reasonable, while a search in the
home requires a warrant based on probable cause); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that the standard for removal is the same under either the Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendments and requires a court order, consent, or a reasonable belief in
exigent circumstances and narrow action to eliminate only that emergency); Calabretta v.
Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 814 (9th Cir. 1999) (making an explicit statement that no social worker
exception to normal search and seizure law exists, and that the Fourth Amendment’s
presumptive requirements apply to child maltreatment investigations); White by White v.
Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815-17 (9th Cir. 1986) (disallowing the warrantless entry into
a home, even to investigate child abuse, unless exigent circumstances are present); Dubbs
v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s
presumptive requirements apply to child maltreatment investigations both inside and
outside of the home, and that the special needs doctrine does not apply because the program
could have secured consent of parents for genital examinations and blood tests of children);
Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1240-42 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
warrantless entry of a home to remove a child was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, as
neither the exigent circumstances nor special needs exception applied); Malik v. Arapahoe
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 191 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a court order to
seize a child that was based on distortion, misrepresentation, and omission was a violation
of the Fourth Amendment); J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the state had probable cause to remove the child, but that seizures implicate
the Fourth Amendment and could be subject either to its strict requirements or to the special
needs exception); Lopkoff v. Slater, 103 F.3d 144 (10th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, not the special needs exception,
applies both to police and social workers investigating child maltreatment reports and
intervening in families to protect children); Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a ten-minute interview with a principal to determine if child had abused
another was reasonable even if it was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Franz v.
Lytle, 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the special needs exception does not apply
to a child maltreatment investigation that included a genital examination by the police,
rather than social workers).
171. See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 509-10 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing definitions of
“search” and “seizure” and concluding that both apply in the context of the removal of a child
from his private school classroom for the purpose of interviewing him about possible corporal
punishment); Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 762 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We have observed that
the Fourth Amendment applies in the context of the seizure of a child by a government-
agency official during a civil child-abuse or maltreatment investigation.”); Wildauer v.
Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993) (assuming, without discussing, that a
CPS visit to a residence constituted a search, albeit not an unreasonable one); see also supra
note 170 (listing decisions from all circuits that have addressed the issue).
All eight circuits agree that maltreatment investigations
constitute Fourth Amendment “searches” and “seizures,”  and that171
CPS and the police participating in such investigations are state
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172. Despite the tendency of litigants to raise the issue of whether state officials acting
with a civil administrative purpose qualify as state actors under the Fourth Amendment, it
is clear that they do. As the Tenth Circuit explained, “[t]he ... Amendment protects the right
of the people to be ‘secure in their persons’ from government intrusion, whether the threat
to privacy arises from a policeman or a Head Start administrator. There is no ‘social worker’
exception to the Fourth Amendment.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th
Cir. 2003). A particularly clear statement of the more general proposition that civil officials
fall within the Fourth Amendment’s state action requirement can be found in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., in which the United States Supreme Court rejected the state’s argument that the
Fourth Amendment “was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law
enforcement officers” and thus that “although public school officials are concededly state
agents for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights
enforceable against them.” 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985). Indeed, the Court “has never limited the
Amendment’s prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted
by the police. Rather, [it] has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints
imposed upon ‘governmental action’—that is, ‘upon the activities of sovereign authority.’” Id.
at 335 (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)). In Camara v. Municipal
Court, the Court explained that this broad view of “state action” arises out of “[t]he basic
purpose of this Amendment ... [which] is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Thus,
[b]ecause the individual’s interest in privacy and personal security “suffers
whether the government’s motivation is to investigate violations of criminal
laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,” it would be
“anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment [only] when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior.”
 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 530, and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978)). Every federal appellate court that has reached the issue has
agreed that CPS officials are state actors under this doctrine. See Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492,
509 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the doctrine “protects against warrantless intrusions during
civil as well as criminal investigations by the government.... Thus, the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment apply to child welfare workers, as well as all other government
employees.”); Roska ex rel Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1241-42 (10th Cir. 2003)
(holding that social workers are covered by the Fourth Amendment and its Warrant Clause);
Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 401 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment regulates social workers’ civil investigations.”); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189
F.3d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that there is no “child welfare exception to normal
search and seizure law”).
actors.  Moreover, courts that have had occasion to address the172
issue have held that although certain aspects of parental privacy
are protected under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
child has enforceable Fourth Amendment rights separate from her
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173. Most of the federal appellate decisions discussed in this section arise on Fourth
Amendment grounds from the outset, so this distinction is unnecessary to the courts’
analysis or outcome. On the other hand, the distinction does arise in cases where plaintiffs
raise claims under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The claims under the
Fourth Amendment involve arguments that certain searches and seizures were conducted
in violation of that doctrine’s standards. The claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
involve arguments that certain aspects of the investigation process were in violation of the
rights of parental autonomy, or family integrity, or procedural due process. It is in reviewing
these different arguments that the courts have noted that the child’s own right to privacy in
the context of maltreatment investigations is to be addressed under the Fourth rather than
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,  Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the scope of an infant’s right to privacy is to be reviewed under the
specifically applicable terms of the Fourth Amendment, and not the general terms of the
Fourteenth); Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 757-58 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). This result is
reached using the standard rule of textual interpretation that where there is a provision that
on its terms is specific to the circumstances, it is to be used in lieu of general provisions that
can be interpreted to encompass the circumstances. Because children in general are
recognized as having objectively reasonable expectations of privacy sufficient to trigger the
Fourth Amendment’s terms, and because the various things that happen to them in the
context of maltreatment investigations—they are forcibly interviewed, examined, (re)moved,
and held away from their families—otherwise fit the operative (search and seizure)
definitions to the letter, the courts refer to the Fourth Amendment’s standards, including its
procedural requirements, when addressing their related constitutional complaints. Older
children are seen as having a subjective expectation of privacy that is legitimized under the
doctrine. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
325; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) (noting that a thirteen-year-old child’s “‘legitimate
expectation of privacy’” is substantially violated by a nude body search (quoting T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 325)). Children who are too young to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy may
be permitted to sue in their own right, substituting their parents’ expectations of privacy for
their own. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that elementary-aged
children at a private Christian academy were permitted to sue for violations of Fourth
Amendment substituting their parents’ expectations of privacy in that setting for their own).
174. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (acknowledging and applying the
children’s own Fourth Amendment rights in a public school drug testing context); Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (same); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (acknowledging
and applying the children’s own Fourth Amendment rights in the context of a public school
search concerning disciplinary violations). These cases all involved searches and seizures of
children in the public schools. The Court applied the special needs exception to judge the
constitutionality of the intrusions because law enforcement did not motivate any aspect of
the searches, and because the warrant and probable cause requirements were found to be
impracticable in the context of public schools’ enforcement of their order and discipline
obligations.
parents.  This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in173
cases where children are subject to official searches and seizures.174
The circuits disagree about whether child maltreatment investi-
gations trigger the Fourth Amendment’s particularized warrant
and probable cause requirements, or whether they come within the
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175. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (reviewing all of the cases and noting
especially those that use special needs language).
176. See Wojcik v. Town of N. Smithfield, 76 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that the
intrusion standard under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments was
“reasonableness”; and holding that CPS acted reasonably when it removed a child without
a warrant from her classroom and transported her to her sister’s school so that they could
both be interviewed together as part of an investigation of a report alleging that the girls
may have been excessively disciplined by their parents); Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993
F.2d 369, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that CPS and the police could conduct a warrantless
entry into and search of a state-authorized foster home as part of an investigation to assure
that the foster children were not being neglected, on the basis that foster parent had a
“substantially attenuated” privacy interest because of her relationship with the state
(quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977))).
177. In these jurisdictions, this rule attaches whether the search or seizure is conducted
by CPS acting alone, CPS acting in concert with the police, or the police acting alone in the
context of a child maltreatment investigation. See, e.g., Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 2000) (unreasonable seizure conducted by police, on orders from social workers);
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) (unreasonable search and seizure
conducted by social worker); Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993) (unconstitutional
search conducted by police officer). See also supra note 170 (reviewing all of the cases
including those from these five circuits).
special needs exception. Only a few circuits have explicitly dis-
cussed “special needs.”  In effect, however, only the First and175
Fourth Circuits appear to recognize the exception’s applicability at
least to certain kinds of child welfare investigations.  Five other176
circuits, the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth, either categori-
cally or probably have rejected its applicability in this setting.177
The position of the remaining circuit, the Seventh, is equivocal; it
has suggested, in different cases, both that the special needs
2005] STORMING THE CASTLE TO SAVE THE CHILDREN 475
178. See Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986). Darryl H. is frequently used for
the proposition that the Seventh Circuit has validated the constitutionality of strip searches
of children in public schools in the context of child maltreatment investigations. See, e.g., Roe
v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 403 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The
Seventh Circuit has held that a child protective services worker need only satisfy the lesser
special needs test and not the more rigorous probable cause requirement.”); Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Darryl H. as standing for the proposition
that “neither warrant nor probable cause [is] necessary for visual inspection of child’s body
for signs of abuse so long as relatively stringent state regulations [are] followed”). In fact, the
appellate court in Darryl H. merely affirmed two preliminary rulings to that effect by the
district court (involving the denial of a preliminary injunction and the granting of a summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds), expressly reserving for later consideration the
question whether the official acts at issue were constitutional. See Darryl H., 801 F.2d at
904-05 (“We have some misgivings about the final product. However, those misgivings may
be answered at trial. Until the trial judge has had an opportunity to deal with this matter
at a more mature stage of the litigation process, we cannot fault him for avoiding the most
costly error of all—loss of human life. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to
deny the preliminary injunction.”). In the course of its decision, however, the appellate court
emphasized its discomfort with the district court’s preliminary judgment that a state
screening procedure used in maltreatment cases was sufficient to assure the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of the strip searches. Id. at 901 (“[W]hile we do not believe it is
outcome determinative at this early stage of the litigation, we are somewhat less convinced,
at least on this record, that a nude body search may be constitutionally conducted in every
instance in which the hot-line criteria are met.”); see id. at 903 (“[A]t this point in the
litigation, we remain unconvinced that the Handbook will ensure, in all cases, the
reasonableness of the visual inspection.”). Thus, for reasons of both substance and procedure,
I believe that it is inaccurate to characterize Darryl H. as many courts have done, that is, as
a decision in support of the constitutionality of reasonableness-based official strip searches
of children on public school grounds. For authorities recognizing this point, see Franz v.
Lytle, which notes the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis in its decision on the “very preliminary
stages of the litigation process” and the fact that final decision in the case could not be
reached “without a more fully developed record.” 997 F.2d 784, 789 (quoting Darryl H. v.
Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 895, 908 (7th Cir. 1986)).
179. See Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting in dicta that this is the
appropriate standard to apply in child maltreatment investigations).
180. The best example of this apparently losing argument in the federal appellate case law
is found in Darryl H., 801 F.2d 893, in which the court of appeals recounts (but does not
adopt) the district court’s rationale for upholding the constitutionality of strip searches of
children by social workers in the public schools setting on mere reasonableness grounds:
Not only would [application of the Fourth Amendment’s traditional standard in
these cases] require more manpower and a larger budget, the more serious
exception  and the arrest standard—a warrant or probable cause178
or exigent circumstances —applies.179
Notably, courts that favor the Fourth Amendment’s particular-
ized warrant and probable cause requirements reject the argument
that state officials need unfettered discretion to conduct this class
of investigations simply because they concern children.  Instead,180
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problem with the procedure is that a delayed examination of a child may simply
come too late to protect a child in imminent danger of grave bodily harm or
even death. Unfortunately, there is no quicker way of knowing whether a child
is at grave risk than by an actual examination of the child. Even assuming that
most abuse situations are not life-threatening, this court finds that the life of
even one child is too great a price to pay for the possible increased degree of
parental privacy through additional preliminary investigation which [the
traditional requirements] would demand.
Id. at 899 (quoting from the district court’s opinion below); see supra note 178 (discussing the
courts’ frequent misuse of Darryl H.) and supra note 75 (explaining that this is a principle
rationale for the states’ “take no chances” approach to maltreatment investigations).
181. See, e.g., Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that,
in the area of child abuse, as with the investigation and prosecution of all
crimes, the state is constrained by the substantive and procedural guarantees
of the Constitution. The fact that the suspected crime may be heinous—whether
it involves children or adults—does not provide cause for the state to ignore the
rights of the accused or any other parties. Otherwise, serious injustices may
result. In cases of alleged child abuse, governmental failure to abide by
[traditional] constitutional constraints may have deleterious long-term
consequences for the child and, indeed, for the entire family. Ill-considered and
improper governmental action may create significant injury where no problem
of any kind previously existed);
Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3d Cir. 1989)
(finding that 
[i]t evidences no lack of concern for the victims of child abuse or lack of respect
for the problems associated with its prevention to observe that child abuse is
not sui generis in this context. The Fourth Amendment caselaw has been
developed in a myriad of situations involving very serious threats to individuals
and society, and we find no suggestion there that the governing principles
should vary depending upon the court’s assessment of the gravity of the societal
risk involved);
White by White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing that “[c]hild
abuse is a heinous crime. So are murder and rape. Just as the repulsiveness of the latter two
crimes does not affect the constitutional restrictions placed on police officers, neither should
our repugnance to the former crime cause us to condone police procedures that infringe
constitutional protections.”); cf. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1207 (10th Cir.
2003) (commenting that 
[t]he defendants’ argument seems to be based, at bottom, on the view that in
the absence of a criminal or other investigatory purpose, medical exams such
they equate child abuse with other violent crimes for which no
exception exists to the the Fourth Amendment’s usual strictures;
they find that the exigent circumstances exception is an adequate
tool to protect children who the government legitimately perceives
to be at risk; and they recognize that in many of the cases in which
the government intrudes, not only does it fail to find abuse or
neglect, but it often itself causes substantial harm to children and
families through its intervention.181
2005] STORMING THE CASTLE TO SAVE THE CHILDREN 477
as those [required by the Head Start program in issue] are for the good of the
children and should not be hamstrung by legalistic requirements like warrants
or consent. We do not doubt that [this program] was acting in the interests of
children, as it understood them. But the requirement of patient consent, or
parental consent in the case of minor children, serves important practical as
well as dignitary concerns, even when a social welfare agency, like [this one],
believes it is acting for the good of the child).
182. 532 U.S. 67 (2001); see generally infra Part II.C.2 and accompanying text (describing
the modern special needs doctrine and the place of Ferguson in that doctrine).
183. 299 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2002).
184. Id. at 406.
185. Id. The Fifth Circuit explained that the Court has “permitted visual body cavity
searches only in the prison setting.” Id. at 406 n.14.
186. Id. at 406-07.
187. Id. at 407.
Because of its particular relevance to this Article, Part II.C.2.a
below discusses the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Ferguson v.
City of Charleston at some length.  It is important to note here,182
however, that the few federal appellate cases that have been
decided since then interpret Ferguson to preclude application of
the special needs exception to child maltreatment investigations.
The Fifth Circuit’s Roe v. Texas Department of Protective and
Regulatory Services,  from which the introductory illustration is183
taken, typifies these recent cases. In rejecting CPS’s argument
that the constitutionality of the intrusion should be evaluated
under the special needs test, the Fifth Circuit panel noted that
“[t]he [Supreme] Court only rarely [in the prisons setting] has
permitted ‘special needs’ searches in the face of a person’s strong
subjective privacy interests.”  It also noted that “[t]he Court has184
never upheld a ‘special needs’ search where the person’s expectation
of privacy was as strong as [this child’s] interest in bodily
privacy.”  Most significantly, it distinguished earlier circuit court185
cases applying the exception to child maltreatment investigations
on the ground that these had been decided before the Court’s
critical decision in Ferguson: “Identifying the goal of protecting a
child’s welfare and removing him from an abusive home is easy;
disentangling that goal from general law enforcement purposes is
difficult.”  This is because the law in Texas, as elsewhere, requires186
a thorough investigation both to satisfy this public welfare goal, and
to assure that the criminal law consequences of abuse and neglect
cases are treated efficiently and effectively.  Thus, even when187
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188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003)
(noting that in “special needs” cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized
suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical, the court
found that “no special need ... renders the warrant requirement impracticable when social
workers enter a home to remove a child, absent exigent circumstances”; “individualized
suspicion is at the heart of a removal of a child from a home, distinguishing the instant case
from the various drug testing cases that have been addressed by the Court”; “unlike the
situation in [the Supreme Court’s heavily regulated industry cases] ... there is no need for
surprise or sudden action that renders obtaining a warrant counterproductive”; “this
situation [is also not] similar to the [Court’s special needs probationary decisions]—the
Roskas were not [already] in the criminal justice system, there was no deterrent function
being served by the threat of a sudden, warrantless search, and there was no immediate need
for a quick response”; and “[s]imply put, unless the child is in imminent danger, there is no
reason that it is impracticable to obtain a warrant before social workers remove a child from
the home”); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 517 n.20 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to decide “the
propriety of a generalized ‘special needs’ exception to the Fourth Amendment” but
nevertheless citing Ferguson and noting that “there is no apparent justification for carving
out a ‘special needs’ exception for child abuse investigations in this context”); Dubbs v. Head
Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the applicability of the special
needs doctrine to medical—including genital and blood—examinations of preschool children
who were enrolled in a state-administered Head Start program, and emphasizing the
government’s failure to demonstrate that obtaining consent to conduct these examinations
was “impracticable” in the circumstances).
conducted entirely without the police, “social workers’ investiga-
tions [are] ... a tool both for gathering evidence for criminal
convictions and for protecting the welfare of the child.”  It188
concluded, “Ferguson teaches that we must apply traditional Fourth
Amendment Analysis where a child protective services search is so
intimately intertwined with law enforcement.”  189
Finally, because all of these appellate decisions have been
reached on facts that involve either intrusions into the personal
residence—in the guise of investigatory home visits—or interviews
coupled with examinations of the children who are the subject of
maltreatment reports, we know very little about how the courts
would rule in cases involving less intrusive searches and seizures.
The fact that the decisions often fail to distinguish between their
special needs and reasonableness analyses compound this uncer-
tainty. Thus, for example, the cases tell us little about whether a
student’s brief detention at school by a state official, such as a
teacher, an administrator, a social worker, or a police officer, would
trigger the Fourth Amendment’s particularized warrant and
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190. See generally Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67 (stating that mere incidental implications will
not pose a problem for conferring special needs status); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (finding that the question of criminal consequences is relevant to the requirement of
a warrant, but not dispositive of special needs status, as the standard to get a warrant is
reasonableness of administrative scheme as applied to the subject individual).
191. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
192. Id. at 712. 
193. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
194. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
195. Ferguson and Edmond mark a shift in the Court’s special needs jurisprudence.
Principally, this is because of the Court’s precise enunciation in these cases of the “primary
probable cause requirements in jurisdictions that already use that
standard in more intrusive contexts.
2. Modern Principles
The special needs exception’s parameters and requirements have
evolved significantly since many of these cases were decided. Today
the exception applies potentially to insulate the government from
the Warrant Clause’s strictures only in circumstances where the
government is able to show that an investigation or investigatory
scheme’s immediate and “primary programmatic purpose” is civil
or administrative rather than law enforcement. Under this test,
which requires an objective analysis of the official motive that
predominantly drives the particular investigation or scheme, a civil
program and investigation may have incidental criminal implica-
tions without losing its special needs status.190
The same may be true of programs that have a dual purpose that
is, both a civil and law enforcement purpose. As the Court explained
in Burger v. New York,  “a State can address a major social191
problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through
penal sanctions. Administrative statutes and penal laws may have
the same ultimate purpose of remedying the social problem, but
they have different subsidiary purposes and prescribe different
methods of addressing the problem.”  In City of Indianapolis v.192
Edmond  and Ferguson v. City of Charleston,  however, the193 194
Court cautioned that where the “primary programmatic purpose”
of a dual-purpose scheme is law enforcement, or where the investi-
gation itself is insufficiently “divorced” from law enforcement
motives, the special needs exception will not apply.  195
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programmatic purpose” test. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81, 83-84; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. As
applied to dual purpose investigations, this test is a means to distinguish a program’s
“ultimate” purpose from its “immediate” or “direct” purpose. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84;
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32. In turn, it is a means to rein in the special needs exception,
especially in circumstances where law enforcement is involved and thus, where the
investigation is deemed particularly intrusive. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54; see also infra notes
251-53 and accompanying text (concluding that my reading of Ferguson’s applicability to
maltreatment investigations is consistent with the Court’s recent narrowing of the
exception’s applicability). Courts since Edmond and Ferguson have noted this shift, although
they have disagreed as to its application. Remarkably, however, other than student
commentators, only a few scholars have considered its implications. See Lucinda Clements,
Note, Ferguson v. City of Charleston: Gatekeeper of the Fourth Amendment’s “Special Needs”
Exception, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 263 (2002) (discussing at length the distinctions between
multiple or ultimate purposes and a primary purpose, and the implications of this distinction
for a special needs search); Jonathan Kravis, Case Comment, A Better Interpretation of
“Special Needs” Doctrine After Edmond and Ferguson, 112 YALE L.J. 2591 (2003) (using the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act as an example, arguing that special needs analysis
should focus on the context for the search, rather than on its purpose); Christopher Mebane,
Note, Rediscovering the Foundation of the Special Needs Exception to the Fourth Amendment
in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 177 (2003) (analyzing the impact of
Ferguson on special needs searches, including the extent to which law enforcement may be
involved); cf. Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (2004) (arguing that the special needs exception should
apply to searches for bombs and other weapons of mass destruction, as their primary purpose
is to thwart a terrorist attack not to further traditional law enforcement purposes).
196. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (stating that this case did not fit within the closely
guarded category of “special needs”).
197. In applying this test, the articulated goals of the program’s and investigation’s
administrators are relevant in determining programmatic purpose, but they are not
dispositive. Id.; see also Taslitz, supra note 146, at 27-28 (noting that in this ruling is an
implicit rejection of its holding in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996), that “an
officer’s subjective intentions [are] irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment, except, when
determining that a search is an administrative one”).
Recognizing that the primary programmatic purpose inquiry can
be a slippery one—a gross understatement at best—the Court
emphasized its intention to scrutinize carefully in the future the
government’s assertions of special needs to ensure that they meet
these standards.  However, beyond suggesting that the inquiry is196
an objective one, the Court did not explain how to determine the
primary purpose of a dual-purpose program.  Some indication of197
the methodology that is likely to prevail may be gleaned from cases
and scholarship that have addressed the issue. These suggest that
where a reasonable outside observer concludes that a dual-purpose
search or seizure is heavily steeped in or “excessively entangled”
with ordinary criminal law enforcement, and/or that the law
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198. Ferguson itself is particularly useful for this purpose. See infra notes 214-26 and
accompanying text (describing the Court’s analysis of these factors); see also Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (involving the constitutionality of a law enforcement-
administered roadblock designed to gather evidence from possible witnesses to an earlier hit-
and-run accident that killed an elderly man on a bicycle, in which the Court held that the
roadblock was reasonable and thus constitutional because its purpose was to seek
information from willing witnesses and not to inspect the stopped vehicles and their drivers
to determine if they had committed the crime, thus minimizing if not eliminating the stigma
associated with a targeted criminal investigation; the government had an important interest
in apprehending the hit-and-run driver and thus in seeking any information it could gather
from possible witnesses as to his/her identity; and the investigation was well-tailored, thus
the intrusion on the drivers was minimal in time and scope); infra note 224 (comparing
Ferguson and Edmond on the one hand, and Lidster on the other, to explain the Court’s
apparent interest in the stigmatizing effects of investigations in the context of its special
needs analysis). Only one scholar thus far has sought to interpret the Court’s newest twist
on the special needs exception. See Taslitz, supra note 146, at 4-6, 28-30 (suggesting that the
only way to make sense of the Court’s primary programmatic purpose test in light of its
related precedents is to look to the meaning “attributed to the state actors by their audience”
which itself “turn[s] on the common social meaning of particular conduct in our political
culture”; the Court has not allowed special needs to apply where this social meaning is
particularly stigmatic). Others have written about Ferguson in particular, but in ways that
seek to avoid rather than understand the new test. See Kravis, supra note 195 (arguing, in
effect, that a useful way to interpret this test is to collapse it with the reasonableness test’s
practicability inquiry, i.e., asking “[d]oes the context of the search at issue create a special
need for warrantless searches?”); Mebane, supra note 195 (analyzing the impact of Ferguson
on special needs searches, including the extent to which law enforcement may be involved);
Rosemary Missisian, Note, The True Need of the Special Needs Doctrine: Individual
Rights–Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 879, 911-12 (2002) (offering an
overview of how lower courts have decided special needs cases in the wake of Ferguson, and
how the role of law enforcement has been distinguished in different fact patterns).
199. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83-84, 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The traditional
warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived in our previous cases on the explicit
assumption that the evidence obtained in the search is not intended to be used for law
enforcement purposes.”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (resting
the approval of the public school drug testing program in part on the fact that “the results
of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to know;
and they are not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any internal
disciplinary function”). Note that an authority’s intent to discover evidence also for law
enforcement purposes goes both to proving the extent of the intimate relationship between
civil and law enforcement authorities and to demonstrating the particular intrusiveness of
an investigation.
enforcement aspect is dominant or highly stigmatic, special needs
will not apply.  In this regard, the Court has emphasized that198
investigations intended from the outset to gather evidence for law
enforcement purposes will be especially suspect.  199
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200. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
201. 532 U.S. at 70.
202. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, in an opinion which was joined by Justices
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Kennedy concurred. See infra note 204
(discussing his opinion). Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Thomas. See infra notes 204, 223 and accompanying text
(discussing this dissent).
203. 532 U.S. 67. As a threshold matter, the Court found that the hospital’s personnel
were state actors, id. at 76; the drug tests were searches, id.; and the profile the hospital had
developed to determine which pregnant patients were to be tested for illegal drugs met
neither the probable cause nor reasonable suspicion tests, id. In this regard, the Court noted
that while the state argued that the searches were not suspicionless, it failed to “point to any
evidence in the record indicating that any of the nine search criteria was more apt to be
caused by cocaine use than by some other factor, such as malnutrition, illness, or indigency.”
Id. at 77 n.10; see infra note 208 (setting out hospital’s search criteria). I would add that
there are also many individuals who are not drug users who choose for various personal
reasons not to seek routine and periodic prenatal treatment. In any event, the Court
emphasized the irrelevance of the state’s posture in this respect, based on its position that
“the policy would be valid even if the tests were conducted randomly.” Id.
204. Id. at 83-84. As of this writing, there is on the Court a majority of five in support of
what a disgruntled Chief Justice Rehnquist called the “non-law enforcement primary
programmatic purpose test” for the special needs doctrine. The Justices who comprise this
majority are Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsberg, Souter, and Breyer. The stability of this
group is unclear, as Justice O’Connor has announced her retirement and it is possible that
a. Ferguson v. City of Charleston
Ferguson v. City of Charleston sets out the Court’s most modern
iteration of the special needs doctrine in the context of the type of
dual-purpose scheme that the states have adopted in the child
welfare area more generally. For that reason, some lower courts
have concluded that the case is determinative of when the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements apply to
child maltreatment investigations.  In the Court’s own words,200
Ferguson involved the issue “whether the interest in using the
threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using
cocaine can justify a departure from the general rule that an official
nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if it is not authorized by
a valid warrant.”  By a majority of six-to-three,  the Court found201 202
that the state’s policy of warrantless, suspicionless searches of
pregnant patients’ urine violated the Fourth Amendment.  Five of203
the Justices in the majority found that the state’s articulated
“special needs” to protect the patient and her fetus were secondary
to its normal law enforcement functions.  204
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she will be replaced by a jurist whose views are more in line with those of the dissenters on
this issue. Nevertheless, it remains the majority view. It is also not a weak majority, as
Justice Kennedy concurred in Ferguson, expressing his view that a program’s “ultimate goal”
rather than its “immediate purpose” is the proper starting point for the special needs inquiry,
id. at 86-87, and that its focus ought instead to be on the degree of “law enforcement
involvement” in the program. Id. at 87-89 (describing the Court’s analysis in Skinner, Von
Raab, and Vernonia as resting on the government’s ultimate health, welfare, and safety
objectives in each instance, rather than on the immediate motivations for evidence-gathering
toward those ends). Specifically, he wrote that 
[t]he special needs cases we have decided do not sustain the active use of law
enforcement, including arrests and prosecutions, as an integral part of a
program which seeks to achieve legitimate, civil objectives. The traditional
warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived in our previous cases on
the explicit assumption that the evidence obtained in the search is not intended
to be used for law enforcement purposes.
Id. at 88. The dissent in Ferguson was written by Justice Scalia, who was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Scalia wrote that in assessing the applicability of the
special needs doctrine, the Court was bound by “the District Court’s finding of fact that the
goal of the testing policy ‘was not to arrest patients but to facilitate their treatment and
protect both the mother and the unborn child.’” Id. at 98. In other words, in his view, the
purpose of the policy was established below by the state’s assertion (and the lower court’s
acceptance of the assertion) that it was administrative and not law-enforcement. He argued
that the program’s additional (and in this case later-acquired) goal related to law
enforcement was irrelevant to the outcome of the special needs inquiry, as this doctrine
“contains no such exclusivity requirement.” Id. at 98 n.8. He wrote, “the addition of a law-
enforcement-related purpose to a legitimate medical purpose [cannot] destroy[] applicability
of the special needs doctrine” because “the special needs doctrine was developed, and is
ordinarily employed, precisely to enable searches by law enforcement officials who, of course,
ordinarily have a law enforcement objective.” Id. at 100 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 870-72 (1987)) (describing the warrantless search of a probationer’s home by a civil
probation officer after the probation officer received a tip that the probationer had a gun in
violation of the terms of his probation). Thus, while “the doctors [in Ferguson] do not
‘ordinarily conduc[t] searches against the ordinary citizen,’ and they are ‘supposed to have
in mind the welfare of the [mother and child],’” the fact that “they have in mind in addition
the provision of evidence to the police should make no difference” to the outcome of the
special needs inquiry. Id. at 101.
205. Id. at 70.
206. Id.
The drug-testing program in Ferguson originated from the
hospital’s concern about “an apparent increase in the use of cocaine
by patients who were receiving prenatal treatment.”  The staff205
concluded that adding a cocaine metabolite screen to the standard
prenatal urinalysis would allow it to refer patients who tested
positive to substance abuse treatment and counseling services, both
of which were designed ultimately to protect the growing fetus’s
health.  To enhance the likelihood that drug-abusing pregnant206
women would enter counseling and treatment, the hospital entered
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207. Id. at 70-71.
208. Id. at 71. The profile provided that women with one or more of the following nine
characteristics would be subject to the illegal drug screen: “‘1. No prenatal care; 2. Late
prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation; 3. Incomplete prenatal care; 4. Abruptio placentae;
5. Intrauterine fetal death; 6. Preterm labor “of no obvious cause”; 7. IUGR [intrauterine
growth retardation “of no obvious cause”]; 8. Previously known drug or alcohol abuse; 9.
Unexplained congenital anomalies.’” Id. at n.4.
209. Id. at 72.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. Nevertheless, in the early phases of the program, the police immediately arrested
a patient who had tested positive. Id. at n.5.
213. Id. at 72.
214. Id. at 79. In this regard, and by analogy to its previous drug testing decisions, the
Court described the degree of divorce from law enforcement that is necessary for the doctrine
to apply. Thus, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the
government “prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but
into an agreement with the local prosecutor, who believed that
women who used drugs during pregnancy were committing child
abuse, to “prosecut[e] mothers whose children tested positive for
drugs at birth.”  Thus, the policy provided (as it had before the207
local prosecutor became involved) that pregnant patients were to
have their urine screened for illegal drugs in circumstances where
the hospital had some reason to suspect they might be drug
users.  Initially, the policy provided that when a newborn tested208
positive for cocaine metabolites, “the police were to be notified
without delay and the patient promptly arrested”;  but this aspect209
of the protocol was later amended to exempt mothers from arrest
who promised to enter treatment and counseling.  When the210
patient herself tested positive during pregnancy, the police were
to be informed of the results but were not to take any action and
the patient was to be urged to enter treatment and counseling.211
Only if the patient tested positive a second time were the police
authorized to arrest her.  Finally, the policy established “proce-212
dures for the police to follow when a patient was arrested” as well
as “the precise offenses with which a woman could be charged,
depending on the stage of her pregnancy.”213
Examining the hospital’s argument that its program qualified for
special needs status, the Court explained that to constitute “special
needs,” the motives that primarily or most immediately animate its
investigations must be “divorced from the State’s general interest
in law enforcement.”  Applying this standard, the Court noted the214
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rather to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from impairment
of employees by alcohol or drugs.” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80 n.16 (internal quotation
omitted). In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), the Court
concluded that “it was clear that the ... program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs
of law enforcement. Test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee
without the employee’s consent.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), the Court rested its approval of the program “in
part on the fact that the results of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class of school
personnel who have a need to know; and they are not turned over to law enforcement
authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In other words, in its previous drug testing cases, the Court had approved the
warrantless–and in some instances suspicionless–searches in circumstances where the
individual subject to search had a reduced expectation of privacy, and the evidence was
sought for objectives other than law enforcement. 
215. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82.
216. Id.
217. Id.
extent to which the hospital’s written policy was dominated by its
law enforcement aspects, and the fact that it failed to focus on
the patient’s and the fetus’s health care.  It further noted the215
extensive involvement of the local police and prosecutor’s offices
in the development of the policy at its outset, as well as their
involvement throughout its administration.  For example, the216
Court observed that
[i]n the course of the policy’s administration, [law enforcement]
had access to [the principal nurse’s] medical files on the women
who tested positive, routinely attended the [hospital’s own]
substance abuse team’s meetings, and regularly received copies
of team documents discussing the women’s progress. Police took
pains to coordinate the timing and circumstances of the arrests
with [the hospital’s] staff, and, in particular, [the principal
nurse].  217
Holding that this degree of entanglement between administrative
and law enforcement authorities and motivations was fatal to the
government’s claim of special needs, the Court concluded:
While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to
get the women in question into substance abuse treatment and
off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to
generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach
that goal. The threat of law enforcement may ultimately have
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218. Id. at 83-84. The Fourth Circuit, apparently viewing the collaboration between the
hospital and the prosecutor in this case as a classic dual-purpose program, had earlier held
that the special needs exception attached because the hospital “‘conducted the urine drug
screens for medical purposes wholly independent of an intent to aid law enforcement efforts’”
and because on balance “the interest in curtailing the pregnancy complications and medical
costs associated with maternal cocaine use outweighed ... a minimal intrusion on the privacy
of the patients.” Id. at 75.
219. Id. at 84-85. The Court further noted that some hospital staff members “made this
distinction themselves.” See id. at n.24 (citing Pl. Ex. No. 14, Hulsey, 11-17-89, Coke
Committee, 1-2: 
The use of medically indicated tests for substance abuse, obtained in
conventional manners, must be distinguished from mandatory screening and
collection of evidence using such methods as chain of custody, etc.... The
question is raised as to whether pediatricians should function as law
enforcement officials. While the reporting of criminal activity to appropriate
authorities may be required and/or ethically just, the active pursuit of evidence
to be used against individuals presenting for medical care may not be proper).
been intended as a means to an end, but the direct and primary
purpose of [the hospital’s] policy was to ensure the use of those
means. In our opinion, this distinction is critical. Because law
enforcement involvement always serves some broader social
purpose or objective, under [the government’s] view, virtually
any non-consensual suspicionless search could be immunized
under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in
terms of its ultimate rather than immediate purpose. Such an
approach is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.218
In so holding, the Court emphasized
[t]he fact that positive test results were turned over to the police
does not merely provide a basis for distinguishing our prior
cases applying the “special needs” balancing approach to the
determination of drug use. It also provides an affirmative reason
for enforcing the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. While
state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a duty to
provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they
inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when
they undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients for
the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, they have a
special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully
informed about their constitutional rights, as standards of
knowing waiver require.219
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220. See Raju Chebium, High Court to Decide if Hospital Erred in Sharing Medical Test
Results with Police, CNN.com, Oct. 3, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/LAW/scotus/
10/03/scotus.prenataltesting/index.html (“MUSC officials, local prosecutors and the
Charleston, South Carolina Police Department all said the policy was designed to safeguard
the lives of the fetuses, citing medical studies definitively linking birth defects and other
problems to cocaine use by the expectant mothers.”). Robert Hood, the hospital’s attorney,
also stated that, “[m]edical criteria underlie the program. The law enforcement’s only role
was as a tool ... by which the health care providers were trying to prevent pregnant women
from using cocaine.” Id. 
221. Despite the hospital’s insistence that the threat of prosecution was designed to
protect the health and safety of the fetuses, over 100 leading medical professionals sent a
letter to the U.S. Surgeon General expressing their opinion that such a policy was ultimately
more harmful to the fetus, as mothers were less likely to seek prenatal care and medical
attention in such circumstances. Sign on Letter: Ferguson v. City of Charleston, Letter from
American Acad. of Physician Assistants et al., to David Satcher, Surgeon Gen. of the U.S.
(Oct. 2000), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/library/ferguson_letter2.cfm. A number
of women’s groups submitted amicus briefs on behalf of the petitioners; the hospital had no
briefs filed in its support. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67.
222. See supra note 220 (setting out the hospital’s lawyer’s views in this regard).
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that it was Nurse Shirley Brown, the case manager for the
MUSC obstetrics department, who initiated contact with the prosecutor’s office after hearing
of such prosecutions on the news. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-71. Although very few women
were actually arrested and prosecuted for drug use under the hospital’s program, supporting
the proposition that such law enforcement purposes were secondary in the hospital’s actions,
the plaintiffs’ attorney alleges that “whenever a woman seriously challenged the legality of
the prosecution, the prosecutor would drop the charges. They did not want to risk losing in
court.” Interview by Christian Harlan Moen with Lynn Paltrow, The Fight for Reproductive
Rights: Hard-Won Protections for Reproductive Freedom Are Increasingly Under Attack, Says
This Advocate for Pregnant Women, 39 TRIAL 48 (Aug. 2003). In addition, during the trial it
was revealed that Nurse Brown held racist views, including that interracial relationships
were “against God’s way;” that she had noted on white patients’ charts if their partners were
African-American; and “[s]he also raised the option of sterilization for black women testing
positive for cocaine, but not for white women.” Petitioner’s Brief at 13 n.10, Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936), 2000 WL 728149.
The hospital’s administrators were probably surprised that the
Court’s “objective view” of their primary programmatic purpose was
law enforcement, and that their health and safety motivations were
only “indirect” and “ultimate.”  As the Court itself noted, the220
hospital employed a number of means to protect fetuses by ensuring
the health and safety of their mothers, including collecting and
analyzing the women’s urine for the presence of illegal drugs, and
counseling them to attend rehabilitation programs to remediate
the fetal environment.  The in terrorem effect of possible law221
enforcement action likely was seen by the hospital staff as merely
an additional tool, albeit an important one, in its arsenal of
persuasive, compensatory, and punitive tactics.  Given that222
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223. Dissenting in the case, Justice Scalia remarked on these same inconsistencies and
asserted that the majority’s characterization of the searches was incompatible with the true
facts, including as found by the district court. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 98-100.
224. The idea that the stigma associated with law enforcement might be a basis for
distinguishing amongst at least the Court’s most recent special needs decisions is based in
a comparison of its decisions in Ferguson and City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000), on the one hand, and Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), on the other. The Court
found that the special needs exception was inapplicable to insulate the government from the
presumptive requirements of the Fourth Amendment in both Ferguson and Edmond, but
later allowed its application in Lidster. Compare Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426-28, with Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 83-84, and Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32. To the extent the cases can be distinguished,
it is in the absence of stigma associated with the search and seizure in Lidster. 540 U.S. at
425. In Lidster, the majority noted that unlike evidence-gathering highway stops,
information-seeking ... stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove
intrusive. The stops are likely brief. The police are not likely to ask questions
designed to elicit self-incriminating information. And citizens will often react
positively when police simply ask for their help as “responsible citizen[s]” to
“give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement.”
Id.; see also id. at 423-25, 428 (discussing the difference between evidence and information-
gathering searches and seizures). On the other hand, the searches and seizures at issue in
Ferguson and Edmond involved individuals whom the government suspected might be
implicated in both civil and criminal law violations. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-72 (state
suspected pregnant women of using illegal narcotics); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34 (discussing
legality of city roadblocks designed to find illegal drugs). Thus, objective observers of the
searches in Lidster would not conclude that the targets were suspects, whereas objective
observers of the searches in Ferguson and Edmond could not help but come to that
conclusion. Thus, it is this problem of being considered a suspect of both civil and law
enforcement authorities that distinguishes these most recent decisions. Notably, the police
were responsible for staffing both the Edmond and Lidster investigations, which makes clear
that it is the law enforcement motivation underlying a search or seizure rather than its
staffing that is determinative for the Court.
hospitals generally have longstanding systematic approaches to
prenatal care, many of which were part of the program in this case,
it is understandable that the joint protocol’s emphasis would be on
the novel law enforcement component, and not on its established
parts.223
Viewing the program this way begs the question why the Court
ruled as it did. Why was this not a classic “dual-purpose” scheme
whose civil component qualified for special needs status? Although
the answer is not obvious in the opinion, one could reasonably
conclude that the Court was swayed by the highly stigmatizing
nature of law enforcement’s involvement in the development and
administration of the policy.  As one Fourth Amendment scholar224
has explained, the program allowed a set of particularly vulnerable
women to be labeled “potential child abusers” based on quite
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225. See Taslitz, supra note 146, at 5-67 (discussing the stigmatizing effect of being labeled
a child abuser and its possible impact on the Court in reaching its decision in Ferguson); see
also supra note 208 (setting out the criteria for screening women into the program). 
226. Compare Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (judging a school board’s drug
testing policy according to reasonableness and finding it to be constitutional because it
served the board’s important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its
students, its regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy
among students, and its method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was
minimally intrusive); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (judging the
Fourth Amendment constitutionality of a public school’s program randomly to search
students’ urine for drugs according to its reasonableness rather than its compliance with the
requirements of the Warrant Clause, for the same predominant order and discipline
reasons upon which it based its decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O.; in addition, this program
was not suspicion-based, and by its explicit terms, the results of the drug tests would not
be provided to law enforcement); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (judging the
Fourth Amendment constitutionality of a search and seizure of a child’s purse by a public
school official in connection with the investigation of an allegation of a violation of school
rules—smoking in the bathroom—according to its reasonableness rather than its compliance
with the requirements of the Warrant Clause, because public schools have the responsibility
to assure order and discipline in the schools, a responsibility which the Court has long held
trumps or substantially diminishes the weight of students’ individual constitutional rights;
while the inspection in this case was suspicion-based, it was not at the outset associated with
law enforcement); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (judging the Fourth Amendment
constitutionality of a home visit to be conducted by state officials in connection with the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program according to its reasonableness rather
than its compliance with requirements of the Warrant Clause because the receipt of AFDC
funds was otherwise constitutionally conditioned on the accessibility of the home to the
officials who were to assure that they were appropriately used by parents for food and
meager evidence.  In the end, this label may have been too225
incendiary for the Court, especially in a country that still views
mothers and motherhood as sacred.
Ultimately, Ferguson’s place in the Supreme Court’s modern
special needs jurisprudence may be marked by the attention given
to stigma, and by its special facts: Women who would be mothers,
vulnerable because of their pregnancy and their poverty, targeted
for a deeply demeaning investigation by civil and law enforcement
authorities who often proceeded with little evidence to support
their suspicions of maltreatment and guilt. These facts distinguish
the case from the Court’s other special needs precedents involving
children’s health and welfare. For doctrinal purposes, the most
important distinction is the presence of a significant law enforce-
ment purpose to the investigations almost from the outset of the
program, and the finding that in the factual context, the objective
view inevitably sees this purpose as predominant.226
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clothing for the children; the home visit, i.e., inspection of the personal residence, was
neither based on individualized suspicion nor associated in any way with law enforcement).
227. See, e.g., Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993) (reviewing the actions of a
police officer asked by CPS to investigate a case of severe diaper rash who conducted a
standard law enforcement investigation into the possibility that the child had been sexually
abused; and holding that the special needs exception is inapplicable in these circumstances
involving both the appearance and fact of crime control). The trial court in Franz found that
although the police officers had a “statutory responsibility ... to cooperate with [CPS],” in this
case “at all times [Officer Lytle] was conducting a criminal investigation involving searches
‘aimed at uncovering incriminating evidence of sexual abuse by one or both parents.’” Id. at
786, 788. Specifically, the court found that the officer’s “focus was not so much on the child
as it was on the potential criminal culpability of her parents. ... [which] is the hallmark of
a criminal investigation.” Id. at 791. The court also noted that the officer “was in uniform and
carrying a gun at all times; he recorded his meeting with Mrs. Franz following police policy;
he filed standard [state bureau of investigation] reports of his investigation; and he informed
his superior that he was investigating a possible child molestation.” Id. Finally, the court
found that because he misled the Franz family concerning the nature of his investigation, he
could not “reasonably [have] believe[d] plaintiffs gave [lawful] consent to the searches” that
formed the investigation. See supra notes 38-41, 139-46, 155-56 and accompanying text
(discussing the role that official deception concerning the law enforcement motives
underlying an investigation plays in the determination of lawful consent).
228. Thus, in Franz, the fact that CPS had originally called on the police to conduct the
investigation to assure that the child was safe, 997 F.2d at 785 n.1, was ultimately irrelevant
to the court’s determination that the investigation’s motivation was law enforcement.
to Child Welfare Investigations
b. The Applicability of the Modern Special Needs Exception
Whether states can rely on the special needs exception to
constitutionalize their present approach to child welfare investi-
gations clearly will depend on the nature and degree of law
enforcement’s involvement in the administrative scheme and in
particular investigations. Where a program’s or investigation’s
primary programmatic purpose is obviously law enforcement, the
special needs exception will not exempt it from the requirement of
a particularized warrant based on probable cause. The paradig-
matic example in this category is a police-staffed investigation of a
report suggesting that a child may have been sexually or physically
abused in such a way that would constitute a criminal offense if
substantiated.  The incidental participation by civil authorities227
whose exclusive interest was to prevent any further harm to the
child would not affect this result.  On the other hand, programs228
and investigations that are primarily or exclusively motivated by
civil concerns likely will pass muster and thus be accorded special
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229. An illustration of such treatment would be where a state or locality tracks simple
neglect cases—cases involving allegations about a dirty house or an ill-clothed or dirty child,
for example—exclusively to civil authorities who investigate the allegations on their own and
exclusively for civil purposes, and where the authority’s approach to the family is
rehabilitative or therapeutic, rather than adversarial and punitive. These programs likely
would pass special needs muster because their advocates could claim what they cannot in the
usual context, that their programmatic purposes are divorced from law enforcement; that the
investigations are designed to yield evidence in support of civil and not joint civil/criminal
ends; that to the extent they land on evidence that is destined also for law enforcement, it
is merely incidental in the same sense that it would be when a pediatrician or a
schoolteacher lands on similar evidence and reports this as required to law enforcement or
to a multidisciplinary team; that their primary civil motivation is objectively evident because
law enforcement personnel are in fact nowhere to be seen in the equation; and that the
program is run in such a way that substantially diminishes if not eliminates the stigma and
fear that attaches to ordinary maltreatment investigations because of their ties to crime
control. See, e.g., CHILDREN’S SERVS., N.C. DIV. OF SOC. SERVS., MULTIPLE RESPONSE SYSTEM
AND TEAM DECISION MAKING APPROACHES (on file with author); see also DEPANFILIS & SALUS,
supra note 52, at 50 (offering an overview of “noninvestigative or alternative responses” such
as dual-track responses that “permit[] CPS agencies to respond differentially to children’s
needs for safety, the degree of risk present, and the family’s need for support or services”).
In such systems, law enforcement personnel become involved only in the more severe cases
of physical or sexual abuse. Id. According to a North Carolina CPS official, North Carolina,
Missouri, and Florida all have begun such dual-track pilot programs. Rebecca Brigham,
North Carolina Children’s Services, Presentation Before the Duke University Center for
Child and Family Policy’s Child Abuse and Neglect Working Group (Feb. 26, 2003)
(presentation handouts and notes on file with author).
230. Writing before me, Hardin took the position that the special needs exception could
not attach where the investigation was either conducted by or involved the substantial
participation of the police. See Hardin, supra note 23, at 536-38. While the involvement of
law enforcement clearly continues to have important implications for modern special needs
analysis, the mere fact that law enforcement is responsible for staffing an investigation is
not dispositive. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (applying the special needs
doctrine to roadblock search and seizure conducted by the police). 
needs status. For example, a jurisdiction may choose to track
certain allegations of maltreatment to an entirely civil system, and
otherwise to treat the individuals targeted for investigation in ways
that do not trigger the moral opprobrium that ordinarily is
associated with suspicions of abuse or neglect.  Note, however,229
that like in Ferguson, the state’s exclusive use of civil personnel to
staff a program is not dispositive of this inquiry if its purpose in
part is to gather evidence for law enforcement; the converse is also
true.230
The more difficult programs to assess are those that lie in
between, the arguably true dual-purpose schemes that are or
appear to be equally motivated by civil and law enforcement
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231. 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000); see also supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text
(describing this case).
232. 299 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2002); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 162 (describing older analyses of the application of this doctrine to
child welfare contexts).
234. See supra Part II.C.2.a (discussing Ferguson and the special needs analysis that
emerges from that decision).
235. See supra notes 25-65 and accompanying text.
236. PENCE & WILSON, supra note 48, at 5 (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N ET AL., LAW
ENFORCEMENT/CHILD PROTECTION COOPERATION IN HANDLING OF CHILD ABUSE CASES 10
(1989)). Depending upon the state, there is more or less overlap in the civil and penal codes’
definitions of abuse and neglect. North Carolina, for example, defines general forms of abuse
and neglect in its Juvenile Code, and these definitions are applied by reference “in criminal
cases involving a charge of contributing to the abuse or neglect of a minor child.” JANET
MASON, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN NORTH CAROLINA 13, 14 n.7 (2d ed. 2003).
On the other hand, child sexual abuse is defined only in the Criminal Code which is cross-
referenced in the Juvenile Code. Id. at 103 (setting out the text of the Juvenile Code’s abuse
definition, which references the Criminal Code’s definition of the covered sexual offenses).
The proper supervision of children also is defined in the Criminal Code. Id. at 30 n.8.
concerns. (These are also the most important for the purposes of
this Article, because the majority of child welfare programs fall
into this category.) The investigation in Wallis v. Spencer involv-
ing allegations of satanic worship and child sacrifice  and the231
investigation in Roe v. Texas Department of Protective and
Regulatory Services involving a social worker’s decision to photo-
graph the genitals of a six-year-old girl during a home visit  fall232
into this category. Older precedents suggest that they would qualify
for special needs status primarily because their civil objectives are
more than pretextual.  More recent cases, Ferguson in particular,233
suggest that the degree of interconnectedness between their civil
and law enforcement aspects, and the stigma that consequently
arises, create the impression (at least) that the investigations are
motivated primarily by law enforcement and thus are inappropriate
for special needs treatment.234
Part I described typical maltreatment schemes and the investi-
gations that are pursued according to their terms.  Because in235
“most States, all or most all forms of reported child abuse or
neglect are crimes,”  an important relationship inherently exists236
between CPS and law enforcement. This relationship is diverse and
wide-ranging: Many states require CPS and law enforcement to
coordinate the development and/or implementation of intake,
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237. For example, Michigan requires each county within the state to assure that its
prosecuting attorney and CPS together determine how law enforcement should be involved
in investigations, as well as “adopt and implement standard child abuse and neglect
investigation and interview protocols.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.628 (West 2002). These
procedures are required to be modeled after protocols developed by a government task force
on children’s justice issues. See A MODEL CHILD ABUSE PROTOCOL: COORDINATED
INVESTIGATIVE TEAM APPROACH, STATE OF MICHIGAN GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN’S
JUSTICE, FIA PUB. 794 (1998). The Model Protocol provides that the purpose of investigations
is to determine whether a child has been abused or neglected, to determine whether there
is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, to minimize trauma to the
child, and to ensure fairness to the accused. Id. California requires law enforcement and CPS
to implement cooperative arrangements to coordinate duties in connection with
investigations. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166.3 (West 2001). Georgia provides that the
investigation is to be conducted by CPS coordinating with law enforcement as necessary, but
particularly where allegations have possible criminal law implications, or where a CPS
investigator finds children at home unattended. GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN RES., SOCIAL SERVICES
MANUAL § 2104.1, .16 (1999); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.301, 39.306 (2003) (requiring CPS to
forward allegations of criminal conduct to law enforcement, which determines if an
investigation is required; if so, the two agencies are required to coordinate their investigative
activities where feasible, with law enforcement assuming the lead where the allegations
involve death, aggravated abuse, or sexual abuse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West
2004) (providing that required investigation “shall be made in cooperation with law
enforcement”); STATE OF WISCONSIN, DEP’T OF HEALTH & FAMILY SERVS., DIV. OF CHILDREN
& FAMILY SERVS., COLLABORATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ON CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT REPORTS (Feb. 2004), available at http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/dcfs_info/num_
memos/2004/2004-05.htm (containing revision of existing Child Protective Service
Investigation Standards to provide for collaboration with law enforcement in compliance with
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (2003)).
238. PENCE & WILSON, supra note 48, at 8 (quoting D.J. BESHAROV, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION: POLICY GUIDELINES FOR DECISION MAKING 3
(1988)).
239. Id. The government has “encouraged [local officials] to establish formal CPS/law
enforcement protocols” to achieve these coordinated ends. Id. In support of this approach, the
Clearinghouse cites the 1984 final report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family
Violence and the conclusions of the Tennessee’s Child Sexual Abuse Task Force, which in
1986 found as follows:
screening, and investigatory procedures.  This collaborative237
approach is likely to become more prevalent, as the federal
government is actively seeking to “eliminate unnecessary duplica-
tion of effort, to promote proper and expeditious collection and
preservation of evidence, and to ‘develop a coordinated system for
identifying and investigating appropriate calls.’”  Toward that238
end, the government is promoting the use of multidisciplinary
“teams” comprised of CPS and law enforcement officers who
“shar[e] information, assign[] investigative tasks, and participat[e]
in a shared decisionmaking process.”  Presently, however, most if239
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The team representatives of each discipline (law enforcement, child protective
services, and in some cases prosecutors and mental health) bring their various
expertise to be utilized as part of the total investigative process. By applying
their expertise as part of a coordinated effort the Team members can work more
efficiently and effectively. The independent goals of each discipline are still met
with the only difference being that the investigative process will be coordinated
through the Team. All Team members will not actually work all aspects of the
investigation, but will actively coordinate the total process drawing from the
resources available through all involved disciplines and other disciplines as
needed.
Id. The Department of Health and Human Services advocates this team approach to the
investigation of child maltreatment reports, and describes the complete team (including the
police, CPS, and others) this way:
Law enforcement brings to the team “expertise in the collection and
preservation of evidence, in crime scene examination, and in taking statements
and confessions.” Law enforcement can also make arrests and present the
criminal case in a lawsuit through obtaining warrants, presenting the case at
a preliminary hearing or grand jury and in criminal court. CPS caseworkers
often have greater experience in interviewing children (victims and siblings),
in assessing the risk of further abuse, in arranging for medical or psychological
exams and services, and in working with the protective alternatives of juvenile
or family court. Law enforcement can also place children in custody, but the
CPS agency generally must provide foster care services. Other members of an
investigative team might include the prosecutor or agency attorney who
assesses the evidence as it is collected and then formally prosecutes the case.
The prosecutor can assist in drafting search warrants, preparing witnesses, and
providing general direction and guidance. Mental health professionals also
provide consultation to investigators on the clinical needs of the victim and
others involved in the investigation, help interpret psychological information
secured, and offer guidance on interviewing strategies with children and adults.
Id. “Participation in ... [multidisciplinary teams] is mandated for Federal agencies under the
Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 and the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence
Prevention Act (Public Law 101-630).” NAT’L INDIAN JUSTICE CTR. FOR THE OFFICE OF VICTIMS
OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING TRIBAL/FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES THROUGH AGENCY COOPERATION,  available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/ovc/publications/infores/pdftxt/tribalbult.pdf.
240. Typically, the police are used to provide direct “law enforcement support to CPS.” See
PENCE & WILSON, supra note 48, at 6. In some localities, such support is provided
systematically. For example, in Palm Beach County, Florida, a protocol developed by the
Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the Law Enforcement Planning Council
ensures that all reports of child abuse received through either 911 calls or the state hotline
are jointly investigated by DCF and law enforcement.” CMTY. ALLIANCE OF PALM BEACH
COUNTY, supra note 49. The protocol includes a detailed “wire diagram” that maps out the
steps of the investigation, the responsibilities of each agency at each step, and points at
which key decisions, such as whether to remove the child, should be made. 
not all states contemplate that the evidence-gathering function may
be conducted by officials from either agency, or both working
together,  and that relevant evidence will be shared between the240
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In other localities, law enforcement is used to support CPS when its officials “must visit
isolated, dangerous locations and deal with mentally unstable, violent, and/or substance
controlled individuals.” PENCE & WILSON, supra note 48, at 6-7. And Texas provides that,
“with assistance from the appropriate state or local law enforcement agency, [CPS] shall
make a prompt and thorough investigation of a report of child abuse or neglect committed
by a person responsible for a child’s care, custody or welfare.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.301
(Vernon 2002). Specifically, in Texas, CPS must notify law enforcement within one to three
days of receiving a report, 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.506 (2003). 
In other jurisdictions, the police may become involved at the request of CPS, for example,
when CPS believes that it needs the in terrorem effect of the police to be permitted to conduct
the investigation, as “[l]aw enforcement’s authority is ... much more widely accepted than the
CPS authority” and “[m]any times CPS caseworkers are denied access to alleged victims of
maltreatment while law enforcement’s requests to see the child are honored.” PENCE &
WILSON, supra note 48, at 6-7. In these jurisdictions, however, police involvement in the
investigation of reports that allege particularly severe kinds of maltreatment may be
required. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 36, at ch. IV tbl.4D
(providing an overview of law enforcement involvement in child abuse investigations in all
fifty states, showing that in almost every state, law enforcement participates in
circumstances involving allegations of specific types of cases, such as severe abuse and/or
cases of emergency removal). For example, Illinois requires CPS to seek the assistance of law
enforcement where “serious physical or sexual abuse has been alleged” or where there is
“reason to believe that the home is unsafe because, for example, the parent is violent or has
a lot of weapons.” Telephone Interview with Linda Williams, supra note 48. And Texas
requires that reports alleging serious physical or sexual abuse must be investigated jointly
with law enforcement. 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.506 (2003). Finally, depending on the
community and the nature of the formal relationship between civil and law enforcement
authorities, the police also respond to routine, emergency, and after-hours calls on their own.
PENCE & WILSON, supra note 48.
241. See supra note 237 (providing, among other things, jurisdictional examples of
evidence-sharing among agencies). North Carolina is most specific in this regard, as it
requires that 
[w]henever an investigation by a social services department reveals that a child
may have been abused, the director of social services must make an oral report
immediately and a written report within 48 hours to both the district attorney
and the appropriate law enforcement agency. The law enforcement agency must
begin a criminal investigation immediately ... and must coordinate its
investigation with the protective services investigation being done by social
services. When the criminal investigation is complete, the district attorney
decides whether any criminal charges should be filed.
MASON, supra note 236, at 63-64. The threat of criminal sanctions appears to be designed
primarily to serve as a deterrent, as refusals to cooperate with investigations, and even
substantiated reports do not typically result in criminal prosecutions. See U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION (1992),
available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/usermanuals/courts/courtse.cfm (noting that
“[m]any instances of child maltreatment that rise to a level of criminal behavior are not
prosecuted for a number of reasons,” including a lack of full information in that context, a
belief that the case cannot be successfully prosecuted, and a fear that such prosecution might
interfere with attempts to rehabilitate the family or might further traumatize the child).
agencies for eventual use in both civil and penal proceedings.241
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242. See, e.g., In re Stumbo, 582 S.E.2d 255, 259 (N.C. 2003) (explaining that “a non-
interference order may be enforced by civil or criminal conduct”); see also supra notes 42-43
and accompanying text (describing the implications of refusals to cooperate with
investigations); supra note 241 (noting that the prohibitions against refusing to comply with
investigations, and against maltreatment itself, appear mostly designed as deterrents,
because few individuals are in fact charged pursuant to their terms).
243. Indeed, the analogies to Ferguson are so striking that it is not surprising that the
federal appellate courts that have had an opportunity to review the issue since Ferguson
have found its holding to be dispositive. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text
(discussing these cases). It is noteworthy that child maltreatment investigations are also
distinguishable from the Court’s other special needs cases involving children, as well as those
that lower courts tended to cite before Ferguson. See supra note 226 (contrasting these older
cases).
Finally, depending on the jurisdiction, the failure to comply
voluntarily with an investigation as well as a finding of maltreat-
ment can result in criminal sanctions.242
The analogies to Ferguson in many of these respects are striking
and thus they provide the basis for the best argument against
special needs status for dual-purpose investigations.243
The state hospital staff and the local prosecutor developed
together the investigatory scheme in Ferguson. It was incorporated
into a protocol that, among other things, set out the two authorities’
respective roles and responsibilities. In the same way, many child
welfare investigatory schemes are characterized by protocols that
law enforcement and civil officials collaboratively developed to
ensure that their respective agencies coordinate intake, screening,
and investigatory efforts.
Child welfare investigations, like the investigation in Ferguson,
are often initiated on the basis of a report containing a suspicion of
a violation which does not necessarily reach the level of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. Despite their weak evidentiary basis,
the states justify the ensuing investigations on the view that
nonaction risks the children enormous harm, either serious bodily
and emotional injury or death. In Ferguson, the analogous concern
was damage from in utero exposure to narcotics.
Like the investigation in Ferguson, child welfare investigations,
including home visits and unsupervised examinations of children,
have as their ultimate purpose the safety and health of children.
More immediately, however, like the investigation in Ferguson,
their purpose is to gather evidence to determine if parents are
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244. While I disagree with Hardin and Beeman in other respects, it is noteworthy that
they agree with this analysis, i.e., that the ultimate purpose of child welfare investigations
is the health and safety of the child, whereas their immediate purposes are evidentiary. See
supra note 162. 
violating laws prohibiting maltreatment.  Both the “delivery” of244
narcotics to a fetus and the abuse or neglect of a child are violations
of the civil and criminal laws. And in both contexts—under the
Ferguson protocol and typical state protocols—it is known from the
outset that all evidence that supports the authorities’ initial
suspicions will be provided to law enforcement officials. In the
typical child welfare context, this evidence is provided to the police
and/or to the prosecutor’s office as a matter of course. Civil child
welfare officials, like the state hospital staff in Ferguson, thus serve
in part as agents for law enforcement when they pursue their
investigations; at a minimum, they are conduits.
Child welfare investigations, like the investigation in Ferguson,
can result in criminal charges if the allegations in a screened-in
report are substantiated. However, like in Ferguson, criminal
charges are rarely pursued. Thus, in both instances, the threat of
criminal charges serves primarily to encourage, frighten, or force
parents to stop engaging in risky or harmful behaviors.
Finally, the stigma of being officially identified with criminal
child abuse, a significant factor in Ferguson, is inherent in most
child maltreatment investigations. Despite its prevalence in the
society, the label “child abuser” or “neglectful parent” carries with
it profound negative connotations. Being a “parent” means being a
good mother or a good father, who devotes him- or herself to
nurturing, protecting, guiding, loving, and respecting their children.
In turn, being a “child” means being positively cherished by a good
mother and/or a good father. In American culture, this period
lasts a long time if the child is “lucky.” Of course, this standard
frequently goes unmet for reasons other than parental maltreat-
ment; nevertheless, it is the expectation that we dare to hold as a
central and organizing principle in our lives. It gives parents and
children special meaning and a special social and personal status:
“This is my son, the beaming mother announces as she gazes upon
her offspring with obvious love and pride.” “That is my father, the
adoring child states as she points him out with unconditional love
and respect.”
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245. See also Beeman, supra note 23, at 1057, 1066 n.220 (noting the stigmatizing effect
of maltreatment investigations, and the need for procedures to restrain the discretion of
investigating officials to minimize this stigma).
246. As already noted, before Ferguson it was possible to argue that dual-purpose
investigations could pass special needs muster so long as their civil purpose was not
pretextual. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. In the absence of a more apposite
case, it was also possible to rely on broad propositions contained in decisions such as New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), and Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Since Ferguson, however, such reliance is difficult to
justify because this case is closest on the facts to child welfare investigations and because it
lays to rest at least some of the ambiguities inherent in that older case law. See supra Part
II.C.2 (introducing Ferguson and explaining its place in the doctrine).
247. It cannot be that Ferguson did not involve a dual-purpose scheme or investigation,
i.e., that it was exclusively law enforcement motivated. This is because the hospital before,
during, and after its affiliation with the local prosecutor used the results also to treat their
patients. See supra notes 205-23 and accompanying text. Thus, at best, the argument must
be that this civil purpose was secondary to the law enforcement motives. 
A knock at the door by an official who suggests that someone—a
bystander, a neighbor, a friend, a teacher, or a doctor—has given
the state reason to believe that a child in the family is being abused
or neglected by the very people who are intended to cherish her is
the ultimate challenge to the strength and existence of this central
premise in a family, and thus is also the ultimate vehicle for shame
for its members. Not incidentally, this knock is also utterly
frightening, perhaps particularly if one is indeed a devoted parent
or a loved child, as nothing is more earth-shattering to contemplate
than the separation a state official can effect in the name of child
welfare. When a state treats these matters as both civil and
criminal concerns, the potential for shame and fear is enhanced
dramatically. Because criminal conduct carries the deepest moral
opprobrium, such an investigation implies almost by definition
that the authorities believe the parent involved may be a
particularly bad mother or father, and that the child may be
particularly unloved. This opprobrium understandably overshad-
ows even significant objectives that civil authorities may separately
pursue.245
Given the foregoing, the best argument in support of special
needs status for dual-purpose child welfare investigations depends
on the ability to distinguish Ferguson.  Such an argument would246
suggest that unlike in the typical child welfare setting, the civil
purpose in Ferguson was slight.  A related argument might247
suggest that even in dual-purpose investigatory schemes, the state’s
2005] STORMING THE CASTLE TO SAVE THE CHILDREN 499
248. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text (reconciling the Court’s use of
the facts with the subjective intent of the hospital staff responsible for implementing the
program, and noting that Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in the case reflects on the
majority’s recharacterization of the facts as described by the hospital and as adopted by
the district court).
249. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s rationale).
250. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80-81 (2001). Indeed, in this context, the
Court expressly rejected the attempt to analogize the hospital staff to mandated reporters
who merely happen upon evidence relevant to law enforcement. Id.
primary programmatic purpose is always the child’s health and
well-being. This account sees the law enforcement aspects of the
multidisciplinary approach to investigations as complementary, not
dominant, in both the immediate and ultimate equation. Thus,
whether the CPS caseworker examines a child alone or with a police
companion, or the police investigate a report on their own, the
primary motivation is to ensure the child’s safety. When evidence
is gathered in this context, its immediate purpose also is to ensure
the child’s safety. Only secondarily, or even incidentally, is the
evidence gathered to advance a criminal law enforcement purpose.
In this sense, the investigators, civil or criminal, are no different
than teachers and doctors and other mandated reporters who
happen upon evidence of maltreatment in the course of ordinary
caregiving.
This Article features the argument against special needs status
for dual-purpose investigations because these more favorable
arguments are likely to fail. The best analogy to Ferguson does not
exaggerate the civil purpose underlying the urine screens in that
case; rather, it reveals and explores the rationales for the Court’s
own exaggeration of their law enforcement purpose.  Even if the248
analogy is shown to be imperfect, however, the Ferguson majority
made clear that an investigatory scheme entangled with law
enforcement, and/or an investigation that is designed at the outset
to collect evidence for law enforcement, ordinarily will not pass
special needs muster.  By taking this approach, the Court249
expressly rejected the argument, which was made by the state and
accepted by both the lower courts and the dissenters in that case,
that the hospital’s overriding beneficent motives required that the
investigation be seen as primarily civil, and that its relationship to
law enforcement be seen as merely incidental to those health and
welfare objectives.  250
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251. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
252. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. But see id. at 50-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
Petitioners acknowledge that the “primary purpose” of these roadblocks is to
interdict illegal drugs, but this fact should not be controlling.... The District
Court found that another “purpose of the checkpoints is to check driver’s
licenses and vehicle registrations,” ... and the written directives state that the
police officers are to “[l]ook for signs of impairment” ... Because of the valid
reasons for conducting these roadblock seizures, it is constitutionally irrelevant
that petitioners also hoped to interdict drugs. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also supra note 195 and accompanying text (describing the shift in
the doctrine which previously accorded special needs status to dual-purpose investigations
where the civil objective was not mere pretext for allowing a criminal investigation).
Most importantly, the Court’s rejection of the hospital’s argu-
ments reflects the current majority’s recent effort to reign in the
special needs exception in both search and seizure contexts. It has
done this by rejecting the government’s arguments, apparently
compelled by past decisions, to describe a program’s health and
safety objectives as significant and thus as dominant. Relatedly,
and again contrary to the precedents, the Court has recast the
government’s evidence-gathering function in part as simple crime
control. This effort is exemplified (and arguably was initiated) in
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,  which involved a suspicionless251
roadblock seizure designed to uncover narcotics and to check for
drunk drivers and drivers’ licenses and registrations. The city
sought to analogize its program to previous roadblocks that had
been accorded special needs status because their ultimate purposes
were both civil and significant. Writing for the majority that
rejected this argument, Justice O’Connor explained:
If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there
would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct
roadblocks for any conceivable law enforcement purpose.
Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to
serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amend-
ment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming
a routine part of American life.... There is no doubt that traffic
in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first magnitude....
But the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of
questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may
employ to pursue a given purpose.252
2005] STORMING THE CASTLE TO SAVE THE CHILDREN 501
253. Thus, writing for the Ferguson majority, Justice Stevens wrote:
As respondents have repeatedly insisted, their motive was benign rather than
punitive. Such a motive, however, cannot justify a departure from Fourth
Amendment protections, given the pervasive involvement of law enforcement
with the development and application of the ... policy. The stark and unique fact
that characterizes this case is that [the policy] was designed to obtain evidence
of criminal conduct by the tested patients that would be turned over to the
police and that could be admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions. While
respondents are correct that drug abuse both was and is a serious problem, “the
gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what
means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.”
532 U.S. at 85-86 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43); see also id. at 86-88 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining his view that the current majority’s reconstruction of the
ultimate/immediate purposes analysis is inconsistent with the Court’s prior special needs
cases).
254. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (“[R]easonableness’ ... is the
touchstone of the constitutionality of a government search.”); United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring) (“As our prior cases
hold ... the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness—the balancing of
competing interests.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“[T]he central inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment [is]—the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”).
255. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 129, at 169. It is also apparently useful to the dissenters
from that approach, who prefer to imagine that reasonableness can be invoked as the
constitutional test even in circumstances where there is no exception.
These are the same themes that governed Justice Stevens’ majority
opinion one year later in the search context at issue in Ferguson.253
Amendment Constitutionality
D. Reasonableness as the Ultimate Measure of Fourth       
The Court has repeatedly made clear that reasonableness is
the ultimate measure of constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment.  This premise reflects the prevailing approach to the254
text, which holds that even where an exception to the Amendment’s
particularized warrant and probable cause requirements applies,
the constitutionality of an official search or seizure depends upon
its reasonableness.  The Court’s traditional approach to deter-255
mining the reasonableness of official conduct requires balancing
the strength of an individual’s expectation of privacy in the
circumstances and the degree of intrusiveness involved in the
search or seizure, against the government’s need for the investiga-
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256. Id.
257. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment, supra note 146, at 26 (noting that where
special needs applies, the “Court eliminates or modifies the warrant requirement, the
probable cause requirement, or both”).
258. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985)).
259. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.2(c).
260. Id. § 2.1(a) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
261. Id. § 2.1(b) (citations omitted).
262. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 37 (2001) (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to
tion and its effectiveness in meeting that need.  Depending on the256
circumstances, the result of the reasonableness inquiry at least in
theory could be that an official intrusion is unreasonable (1) in the
absence of a particularized warrant and probable cause; (2) in the
absence of a particularized warrant and reasonable suspicion; (3)
in the absence of reasonable suspicion; or (4) in the case of a
suspicionless search or seizure, in the absence of a finding that the
program pursuant to which the intrusion is made itself is reason-
able.257
The Court has emphasized that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does
not protect all subjective expectations of privacy, but only those that
society recognizes as ‘legitimate.’”  The reasonable expectation of258
privacy test requires that “particular attention ... be given to the
nature of the place at which the observed objects or activities are
located, for this will bear directly upon whether there was justified
expectation of privacy as to those objects or activities.”  Consistent259
with this attention to context, the government is said to have
conducted a Fourth Amendment “search” when it “physically
intruded into ‘a constitutionally protected area.’”  Professor Wayne260
LaFave explains that “[t]hese areas were those enumerated in the
Fourth Amendment itself: ‘persons,’ including the bodies and
clothing of individuals; ‘houses,’ including apartments, hotel rooms,
garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses; ‘papers,’ such as
letters; and ‘effects,’ such as automobiles.”261
The law is clearest on official incursions into an individual’s
home. Thus, “searches of the dwelling house were the special object
of [the] universal condemnation of official intrusion,” and in
particular the “[n]ight-time search was the evil in its most obnox-
ious form.”  True to these origins, the Court has found that “the262
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measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.... [A]ny physical invasion
of the structure of the home, ‘by even a fraction of an inch,’ was to much.... In the home, our
cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes.” (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512)); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-
11 (1999) (noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of
respect for the privacy of the home,” and holding that it is a violation of a suspect’s Fourth
Amendment rights to bring the media into his home to witness his arrest).
263. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.21 (2001) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)).
264. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984) (internal quotations omitted) (noting
that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed” (internal quotations omitted)).
265. See, e.g., TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 129, at 100-42 (describing the law on the
expectation of privacy including as it pertains to seizures).
266. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 673 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cuddihy, supra note 131, at 835, 1518, 1552 & n.394).
267. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.1(a) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
268. Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)).
269. Id. (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973)). On the other hand, an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy may not be violated by brief investigatory detentions, or
by the confiscation and analysis of personal attributes which are typically the subject of
public display and observation, such as a person’s handwriting, voice, and the like. Id. §
2.6(a).
270. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (involving the detention of a child in the vice principal’s office
during a disciplinary action, and the search of the child’s purse for evidence of a violation of
school rules, and subsequently of a violation of state law).
most stringent Fourth Amendment protection” is afforded to
“searches [and to] ... the sanctity of private dwellings”  so that263
“searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.”  264
Individuals’ expectations of privacy with respect to their persons
and their substantial interests in mobility and property also have
an important pedigree and are well described in the case law.  For265
example, Justice O’Connor has described a “long history of outrage
at personal searches before 1789.”  Under the modern doctrine,266
“[a]ll that is required [to constitute the seizure of a person] ... is
that an ‘officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’”  Proving that267
such restraint occurred requires a showing that “‘in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.’”  Typical268
seizures include “full-fledged arrests, ... ‘investigatory detentions’
and any other ‘detention of the [person] against his will.’”  Most269
important, the Court made clear in New Jersey v. T.L.O.  that270
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271. Id. at 337-38; see also Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that children, even young children, can be found to have “reasonable expectations of privacy”
recognizable in the Fourth Amendment context, even where they do not “exhibit[] a
subjective expectation of privacy”); see supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing this
point in the context of the federal appellate caselaw in the area). 
272. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985) (“Another factor [in analyzing the
magnitude of the intrusion] is the extent of the intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary
interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity.”).
273. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (“The use of an adverse test
result to disqualify one from eligibility for a particular benefit, such as a promotion or an
opportunity to participate in an extracurricular activity, involves a less serious intrusion on
privacy than the unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties.”).
274. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(explaining that suspicion-based searches are far less intrusive than general searches
because they “invad[e] the privacy of a few ... rather than many”); id. at 669-71 (explaining
the history of the Amendment and its focus on objective probable cause as a check on the use
of general warrants which were considered highly intrusive both because they unreasonably
captured innocent people and because they captured so many such individuals); Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the different roles of the
legislator and the judicial officer in authorizing searches and that the former “sweeps
broadly, authorizing whole classes of searches,” while the latter “affects one person at a time”
rather than “thousands or millions,” which “poses a greater threat to liberty”).
children are considered “persons” within the meaning of the
search and seizure rule. Specifically, it found that the “search of a
child’s person ... no less than a similar search carried out on an
adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations
of privacy.”  271
As distinguished from the reasonable expectation of privacy test,
the intrusiveness inquiry requires analysis of the scope and degree
of the intrusion to determine whether it is relatively minimal or
extensive.  In this context, the Court has emphasized the intru-272
siveness of searches that start out with, among other objectives,
an intent to provide the results to third parties, especially to law
enforcement or other disciplinary authorities.  The Court also273
has considered whether the investigations scheme is over- or
underbroad in terms of the number of individuals it captures,
overbreadth also being an indicator of intrusiveness.  Thus, for274
example, although body searches are prototypical invasions of the
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, some body searches
are clearly more intrusive than others. Strip searches, genital and
excretory examinations, x-rays, and surgical operations have been
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275. Compare Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that a surgical operation into
a robbery suspect’s chest to recover a bullet was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment), with Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (ruling that a state may,
over a suspect’s protests, remove and test his blood based on suspicion of drunk driving
without violating his Fourth Amendment rights). In Schmerber, the Court added, “[t]hat we
today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States[sic] minor intrusion into an
individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits
more substantial intrusion, or intrusions under other conditions.” Id. at 772. The Court
distinguished Winston from Schmerber primarily on the basis of the need for general
anesthesia for the operation, the significant medical risks to the suspect’s life, and the
possible availability of other means to pursue a case against him, as well as the “extent of
the intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily
integrity,” which would be far greater for an operation than for a commonplace blood test.
Winston, 470 U.S. at 761-66; see also Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 238-43 (3d Cir. 2004)
(finding “the nature of the intrusion [to be] significant,” the court held that a strip search
without probable cause was a violation of the Fourth Amendment); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 29-30 (1968) (holding that a “patdown” search during a investigatory stop does not violate
a person’s Fourth Amendment rights). In Terry, the Court refused to delve too deeply into
the discussion of what constitutes a search or seizure, focusing instead on “recogniz[ing] that
the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security,
and []mak[ing] the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case,
a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.” Id. at 17 n.15.
276. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660.
277. Compare id. at 663 (“We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least
intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989))), with id. at 680
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A] suspicion-based scheme, even where reasonably effective in
controlling in-school drug use, may not be as effective as a mass suspicionless testing regime
... just as it is obviously true that suspicion-based law enforcement is not as effective as mass,
suspicionless enforcement might be.”).
278. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449 (1990) (factoring into the
found to be particularly intrusive, whereas simple patdowns have
not.275
Finally, the individual’s interests and the investigation’s
intrusiveness are balanced against the “nature and immediacy of
the governmental concern at issue ... and the efficacy of [the state’s
chosen] means for meeting it.”  It is in this context that the276
“practicability” of the warrant and probable cause requirements
and the government’s relative “need” to avoid them is most
relevant. The Court has sometimes closely scrutinized the nature,
immediacy, and efficacy of the government’s articulated needs in
these respects; at other times it has been quite deferential.  In any277
event, although the government’s approach does not have to be the
best imaginable or the least restrictive, it must at a minimum be an
effective strategy.278
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balancing analysis of the state’s interest against the intrusion on individual liberties the
effectiveness of the state’s sobriety checkpoints in curbing drunk driving).
279. See, e.g., id. at 451-52.
280. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
281. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (public school drug testing);
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (probation violation); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (public school drug testing); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868
(1987) (probation violation); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (public school
disciplinary violation); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (public assistance inspection).
282. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83-84 (2001) (finding that the
government’s need to protect fetuses from maternal drug use is insufficient to outweigh the
mothers’ Fourth Amendment rights); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321-22 (1997) (finding
that the “symbolic” act of requiring candidates for state office to undergo drug testing is
insufficient as a state interest to outweigh the individual’s privacy interest); Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1985) (finding that a surgical operation to remove a bullet from a
suspect’s chest was too intrusive as balanced against the government’s need to build a case
against him, particularly given the availability of other types of evidence); Roe v. Tex. Dep’t
of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 406 (5th Cir. 2002); Good v. Dauphin County
Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1093-94 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that privacy
intrusions as significant as strip searches can be justified only by a warrant, consent, or
Consistent with this doctrine, the presumption that a warrant
and probable cause are needed to constitutionalize a search or
seizure is most likely to be overcome in the context of investigations
that do not strongly implicate the individual interests protected
by the Fourth Amendment. The quintessential examples in this
category are highway roadblocks, which have been characterized as
brief and suspicionless seizures involving only a minor intrusion on
privacy and mobility;  inspections of highly regulated industries,279
which have been described as being the historical subject of
statutorily based routine and thorough searches, and thus as
having a highly reduced expectation of privacy;  and investigations280
of probationers for parole violations, public school children for
disciplinary violations, and welfare recipients for compliance with
the conditions upon which aid is given, all of which the Court has
found to involve significantly reduced expectations of privacy and
mobility, owing to the subjects’ preexisting status relationship with
the state.  Conversely, the Fourth Amendment’s presumption in281
favor of a warrant and probable cause is least likely to be overcome
in cases involving searches and seizures that implicate important
individual interests. Searches of the family home, which are almost
always intrusions of the highest order, and of parts of the body that
are not typically in plain view, exemplify this category.282
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exigent circumstances). In Roe, the Fifth Circuit noted that
[t]he Court only rarely has permitted “special needs” searches in the face of a
person’s strong subjective privacy interests.... The Court has never upheld a
“special needs” search where the person’s expectation of privacy was as strong
as is [this child’s] interest in bodily privacy. The potency of her privacy interest
makes us reluctant to apply the “special needs” doctrine.
299 F.3d at 406.
283. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 129, at 169-70.
284. See Sklansky, supra note 131, at 1743, 1745 (describing this doctrinal shift in the
Court’s reasonableness analysis, and denominating it “the new originalism”). This “new
originalist” methodology was used, for example, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
where the Court was asked to review the constitutionality of a public school’s suspicionless
drug testing program that targeted student athletes. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
began his analysis this way: 
[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is
“reasonableness.” At least in a case such as this, where there was no clear
practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time
the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets the
reasonableness standard “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” 
515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (emphasis added) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). Justice Scalia then proceeded to apply that standard,
ultimately holding that the program was constitutional because, having met the
requirements of the special needs exception, see id. at 653-54, the government was
persuasive that on balance the program was not particularly intrusive, id. at 658-60, did not
tread on particularly strong expectations of privacy, id. at 654-57, and was effective at
meeting the school board’s objectives, id. at 660-64. See also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318 (2001) (applying “new originalist” methodology to uphold a police officer’s
extremely frightening and degrading search and seizure of a mother in front of her children
based on the officer’s accurate assessment that the mother had violated a law requiring the
placement of young children in car seats).
The Court has already established the reasonableness of
particular sorts of intrusions using this balancing test; conse-
quently, it is unlikely to reconsider whether a warrant and/or
probable cause is required in these contexts.  For example,283
investigations that meet the doctrinal requirements of the Court’s
consent and exigent circumstances exceptions, as well as certain
kinds of special needs investigations, presumptively will meet
Fourth Amendment requirements without further review. Recently,
the Court also has eschewed this analysis where evidence exists in
the historical record that a particular sort of search or seizure was
permissible at common law at the time of the founding.  However,284
where the program and investigation are sui generis—that is, where
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285. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 129, at 170 (“If the case does not fit an existing category,
then the court must engage in balancing to craft a new categorical rule.”).
the Court has not yet had occasion to decide a closely related
case—reasonableness balancing analysis is generally required.285
Because they ensconce the competing values fundamental to the
Fourth Amendment, these methodologies and principles are not
only relevant to any doctrinal analysis of child maltreatment
investigations; they are also essential to a normative evaluation of
the merits of the prevailing approach to solving the nation’s abuse
and neglect problem. In light of this, my analysis of the reasonable-
ness of this approach and the investigations conducted under its
auspices is reserved for Part III, which contains an argument
against the child maltreatment exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment.
III. REJECTING A CHILD WELFARE EXCEPTION ON THE BASIS OF
FUNDAMENTAL FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
This Part sets out a normative argument against a child welfare
exception to the Fourth Amendment. The likely inapplicability of
the special needs exception to investigations that have a significant
law enforcement aspect forces the doctrinal result that no child
welfare exception exists to the Amendment’s presumptive require-
ments. In other circumstances, where the role of law enforcement
is not so apparent, the special needs exception’s applicability is less
predictable. In either case, however, this Article does not rest its
argument against a child welfare exception on these doctrinal
grounds. Specifically, I do not find the distinctions most relevant for
determining special needs status to be compelling rationales for or
against a child welfare exception: Whether family privacy can
constitutionally be invaded based on no, mere, or even reasonable
suspicion in the ways that CPS and/or the police currently conduct
investigations ought not rest on the details of law enforcement’s
involvement in an underlying scheme or a particular search.
Rather, this deeply important question ought to be decided based
on the value that is placed on privacy, mobility, dignity, and
personal security for children and families, and on the government’s
corresponding need to invade those rights for the public good. As
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286. As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has described, in the colonial era, 
the father’s power over his household, like that of a God or King, was absolute.
Law employed a property theory of paternal ownership and treated children “as
assets of estates in which fathers had a vested right.... Their services, earnings,
and the like became the property of their paternal fathers in exchange for life
and maintenance.”
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1037 & n.182 (1992) (quoting MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEALTH LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 54 (1985))
(noting also that “[t]he punishment in several Colonies for striking or cursing one’s father
was death”).
the introductory illustration to this Article and the cases described
in Part I reflect, police and prosecutors are by no means unique in
their ability to wreak havoc in the life of a child and her family;
indeed, even the more subtle “family-friendly” approaches to
interventions adopted by some CPS agencies can be pervasively
destructive of the values ensconced in the Fourth Amendment, and
consequently of the children’s and the family’s well-being. Thus, I
argue from fundamental Fourth Amendment principles that in the
absence of consent or exigent circumstances and whether or not the
special needs exception applies, it is unreasonable for the state to
conduct maltreatment investigations without a particularized
warrant and probable cause. Proceeding without these protections
reflects an unacceptable bias against individual and family privacy.
Nevertheless, to assure this argument’s doctrinal relevance, it is
developed within the confines of the Court’s modern reasonableness
analysis.
A. The View from History
The question whether searches and seizures of children and the
family home are reasonable in the context of child welfare investi-
gations has no colonial precedent or analog. Indeed, in the colonial
era, it was generally accepted that parents owned their children,
and could do with them what they wished, including leasing out
their labor to others for long periods of time, and disciplining
them in ways that would be considered draconian today.  For286
that reason, it rarely if ever would have been the case that the
government would have conducted search and seizure operations in
connection with child welfare; and thus, common law courts rarely
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287. The modern child welfare movement began in earnest only in the late 1800s. The
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, modeled after the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, is most often credited with launching the movement.
COLUM. ENCYC.  (6th ed. 2005), available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/cr/cruelty.htm. Of
course, this history suggests that such investigations would have been considered absolutely
unreasonable in the Founding Era, i.e., that because parents were perceived to own their
children and thus to have almost inviolable authority over them, any governmental efforts
to question or limit that authority using inspections would be unlawful. Because I reject the
property-based model of parent-child relations and its systematic disregard of many if not
most of the children’s own interests, this Article does not base its reasonableness argument
even partly in this history.
288. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (applying the
traditional balancing test because a threshold historical analysis by the Court found that
“there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue [i.e.,
drug testing of public school students], at the time the constitutional provision [i.e., the
Fourth Amendment] was enacted”).
289. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). General warrants permitted the
government “‘to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming
or describing the place or the person in special.’” Id. at 101 (quoting THE MARYLAND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XXIII (1776)). They also permitted the government to “‘search
suspected places without evidence of a fact committed.’” Id. at 100 (quoting THE VIRGINIA
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776)).
290. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 669-70 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); LANDYNSKI, supra note
131, at 19-20 (stating that the founders’ opposition to the practice of British executive
authority’s use of general warrants reflected the sense of the common law, “hallowed by the
centuries,” that governmental intrusions on the sanctity of personal space were inherently
wrong).
would have had occasion to deliberate over their reasonableness.287
Consequently, common law precedents from the colonial era do not
inform our assessment of the reasonableness of the states’ current
approach to child welfare investigations.  The matter therefore288
must be settled using traditional reasonableness analysis.
At the outset, however, it is useful to recall the broader history
of the colonial period as it relates to the Fourth Amendment.
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment was developed in principal
response to the British authorities’ use of the so-called “general
warrant,” which allowed officers of the executive to conduct
unfettered searches of personal residences and indiscriminate
seizures of personal papers and property on the basis of mere
suspicion.  The sense of the Framers and ratifiers of the Bill of289
Rights was that these warrants were so utterly abhorrent that it
was important to constitutionalize, rather than merely to leave to
tort law, the protection of the individual’s right to privacy against
such searches and seizures.  At the same time, the Fourth290
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291. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing this point).
292. For another example of an instance in which the government proceeded under such
broad authority, consider the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, see
Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); and Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115
(1943).
Amendment’s text makes clear that the Framers and ratifiers
understood the need to reserve the government’s right to conduct
reasonable investigations. As I have already noted, the consensus
among constitutional historians is that the text presumes the need
for a particularized warrant and probable cause to assure the
reasonableness of a search or seizure.  Ultimately though, the291
Amendment’s principal thrust was to abolish the general warrant
as authority for investigations into suspected individual wrongdo-
ing.
In this regard, the child welfare exception to the Fourth
Amendment is a throwback to the broad authority granted the
British and colonial authorities under general warrants.  That is,292
the exception operates to give the executive branch the unfettered
right to enter and to search a person’s home and to seize and
examine children on mere suspicion of maltreatment. Given how
strongly they felt about the unfairness inherent in the general
warrant’s terms, the Framers and ratifiers are likely rolling over in
their proverbial graves.
B. Individual Interests
1. Privacy, Dignity, Personal Security, and Mobility
Child welfare investigations that involve CPS and/or police entry
into and search of the family home encroach upon the Fourth
Amendment’s most sacred ground, and thus conflict with our most
deeply held expectations of privacy, dignity, personal security, and
mobility. Although it is no longer true—if it ever was—that a
family’s home is a castle, it is true that in law and culture, the
personal residence is expected to be the individual’s principal
private sanctuary. Indeed, the law allows even the criminal to
retreat into his home carrying with him the knowledge that the
government generally may not enter without a particularized
512 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:413
293. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961); see also supra notes 262-64
and accompanying text (explaining that the personal residence is the paradigmatic personal
space the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect).
294. The Court itself has decided only two suspicion-based cases that fall in this category.
The first was Wyman v. James, in which the Court held that the constitutionality of
warrantless and suspicionless home visits by officials from the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program would be judged according to their reasonableness (in other
words, the special needs exception implicitly applied to these visits) because the mother had
agreed to allow the officials into her residence in exchange for receiving funds under the
program and thus could not contend that she had a high expectation of privacy as against
these officials. 400 U.S. 309, 318-24 (1971). The second was Griffin v. Wisconsin, in which the
Court similarly held that the constitutionality of a warrantless and suspicionless home visit
by a probation officer would be judged according to its reasonableness because the individual
subject to investigation had agreed to periodic inspections of his residence as one of the
conditions for probation and thus he could not claim to have a high expectation of privacy as
against that officer. 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118-21 (2001) (finding reasonable and thus constitutional a search conducted pursuant
to a probation condition, in part because of the probationer’s diminished expectation of
privacy and the officer’s reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity). 
295. 993 F.2d 369, 371-73 (4th Cir. 1993).
warrant and probable cause.  Thus, what is in the family’s293
refrigerator, closets, drawers, or even in plain view, is usually
subject to its individual members’ most reasonable and highest
expectations of privacy. 
A narrow exception exists to the high value implicated by
intrusions into the personal residence, involving particular persons
in preexisting relationships with the state that contemplate
home visits. In such circumstances, the Court has considered the
individual’s expectations of privacy to be substantially diminished,
thus opening the door to the possibility that related searches and
seizures could be conducted in the absence of a particularized
warrant and/or probable cause.  The only federal appellate court294
to have applied the special needs exception to a home visit fits
within this exception. 
Wildauer v. Frederick County involved the constitutionality of a
warrantless entry into and search of a woman’s home for children
the state believed were located inside.  The woman was the295
children’s foster mother and thus was in a contractual relationship
with the state concerning their custody and care. Without elaborat-
ing on its reasons, the court applied the reasonableness test to
resolve this issue. It is logical to assume, however, that the court
was at least partially if not entirely motivated in this approach by
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296. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (providing data on the relative
representation of poor and minority families in the child welfare system).
297. William Pitt, the first Earl of Chatham, insisted to the English Parliament that 
[t]he poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the force of the Crown.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm
may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 
LEFAVE, supra note 21, § 1.1(a) (citing LASSON, supra note 131, at 49).
William Pitt’s eloquent description of this right has been often quoted. The late
Judge Jerome Frank made the point in more contemporary language: “A man
can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat
thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him
without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of
liberty—worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society
must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some
insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s
castle.”
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 n.4 (1961). 
298. Cuddihy, supra note 131.
299. See supra note 19 (listing poverty as amongst the reasons historically that children
were taken from their parents).
the woman’s preexisting agreement with the authorities which
contemplated their right to access her home to monitor her
performance. This is not the situation in most child maltreatment
investigatory contexts.
Relatedly, the fact that poor and minority families are signifi-
cantly overrepresented in the child welfare system may influence
how maltreatment investigations are approached.  These groups296
may be viewed by state officials and maybe even by some of their
family members as having an inherently diminished expectation
of privacy in this context. There is certainly some historical
support for this notion. For example, notwithstanding at least one
well-known argument to the contrary,  poor and minority citizens297
up to and during the Founding Era could not always expect their
homes to be treated as castles.  And it is certainly beyond dispute298
that state officials in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries disproportionately targeted poor and minority—including
immigrant and Native American—families for investigation and
intervention, on the grounds that poverty made neglect inevitable
and that many minority parenting practices were inherently
abusive.  Whatever this history’s legacy in current state practices,299
poor and minority families obviously do not have a reduced
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300. But see William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1824
(1998) (positing as a fact—and not as his own normative position—that “people with money
enjoy more privacy than people without. They live in freestanding houses and own more
land; they conduct less of their lives in public places like neighborhood streets. Fourth
Amendment law accordingly gives them greater protection.”).
301. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing this case law).
302. A version of this argument was implied in a Ninth Circuit decision in which the court
opined that “[t]here is not much reason to be concerned with the privacy and dignity of the
three year old whose buttocks were exposed [during a CPS-ordered strip-search actually
conducted by the child’s mother], because with children of that age ordinarily among the
parental tasks is teaching them when they are not supposed to expose their buttocks.”
Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir. 1999).
303. This zone of privacy includes the area around one’s body, one’s home, and one’s most
personal things.
expectation of privacy in law as compared to otherwise similarly
situated families.300
Because searches and seizures of children in the family home and
at school involve the person herself, they also represent intrusions
on the child’s own privacy, dignity, personal security, and mobility
interests. As I have already noted, the Supreme Court and the
lower courts have recognized this and have consistently found that
children have reasonable expectations regarding their protection.301
Although this view does not appear to be controversial, one could
logically argue that children, especially younger ones, are or ought
to be considered incapable of having such protected expectations,
either because they lack relevant cognitive capacity, or because the
law ought to assume so. Such a legal fiction would be consistent
with how the law generally regards childhood, namely that it is best
to assume a lack of capacity on the part of children so that adults,
including parents and the state, continue to have the ability to
provide them with adequate oversight and protection during their
formative and vulnerable years.  Nevertheless, I believe that such302
arguments ought to be rejected in favor of both factual and
normative positions supporting continued recognition of children’s
individual Fourth Amendment interests.
 The liberal idea that underlies the requirement of a reasonable
expectation of privacy is both objective and normative. Individuals
need and thus have a right to a certain personal space or zone of
privacy from which the government is generally barred.  This303
right is not grounded in the actual knowledge or expectations of
individual members of the society; indeed, to the extent that some
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304. The classic liberal vision of the role of the family as the fundamental unit of society,
and its responsibility to inculcate the children in liberal democratic values, was largely
responsible for the construction of our present day notions of family privacy and parental
autonomy. In turn, these notions rest on the assumptions that parents are the children’s first
and best caretakers, that they will act in the best interests of their children, that their
children need them particularly to succeed, and therefore that the state may only intrude on
their authority in cases where they are not performing their expected role. That children
have privacy interests recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment, and privacy rights
recognized under the Fourth Amendment, is consistent with this philosophical foundation,
as it serves to protect their ties to their parents and family as against the state’s efforts to
separate them. As I have already noted, see supra note 9, I will elaborate on this theme in
a forthcoming article entitled Through the Prism of the Fourth Amendment: A New Look at
Family Privacy (work in progress, on file with author).
people lack an appreciation for this zone of privacy, others who
act as surrogates identify it for them. Aside from children, a whole
range of adults are subject to and benefit from this approach,
from those who in fact are mentally incapacitated and have no
subjective expectations of privacy, to those who have an exagger-
ated subjective sense of where the boundaries of privacy should lie.
Because of this, individuals’ cognitive capacities and emotional
sensibilities ultimately are irrelevant in the analysis. This approach
should also govern how children are viewed under the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, the same strand of American political
philosophy and jurisprudence that spawned the Fourth Amendment
and its reasonable expectation of privacy test also recognizes that
children need the government to leave them alone with their
families in both physical and decisional respects unless good
evidence exists that their families are relevantly dysfunctional.304
Even if cognitive capacity were relevant, however, the scientific
evidence is strong that children, even babies, have the ability to
develop—and indeed most healthy children do develop—a strong
sense of bodily security, intimacy, and privacy. Thus, we know from
extensive work in the fields of developmental biology and child
psychology that children from a very young age develop a sense of
attachment to their primary caregiver(s) and conversely a sense of
trepidation if not fear of those whom they do not know. These
senses are inherently physical in their manifestations, as all it
takes to make many babies—particularly those who are not
accustomed to being handled by strangers—whimper or cry is to
remove them from the arms and places with which they are
familiar. And even as they come to understand that authorities
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305. 515 U.S. 646, 653-59 (1995).
other than their parents exist, and thus to mediate their physical
responses to strangers, older children—beginning as early as two
or three—develop an emotional and intellectual appreciation for
personal space and zones of privacy that almost by definition
recognizes government officials as the quintessential strangers. The
fact that these officials are legally tasked with their care and
protection under the twin police power and parens patriae doctrines
and the related maltreatment laws is generally a foreign notion
even to older children. These children have been taught (including
by their parents, pediatricians, and even the government itself in
the public schools context) to elevate privacy as a value, and to
allow intimate contact only within the family or close personal
associates. Without a doubt, children of most ages know when they
are “not free to leave,” and when strangers have otherwise invaded
their personal space.
The Court’s separate view that children have a reduced
expectation of privacy in school with respect to programs
designed to ensure order and discipline and to protect the public
against communicable disease, has some potential relevance for
child maltreatment investigations. The issue here is whether the
cases that reflect this view can be interpreted more broadly to allow
the government extensive discretion to conduct whatever searches
and seizures of children in the schools they believe are necessary.
Or more narrowly, whether they can be interpreted to permit
unfettered searches and seizures intended to determine whether a
child has been the victim of abuse or neglect. It could be argued in
favor of the broadest extension that children themselves likely do
not distinguish among the states’ various reasons for searching and
seizing them in the public schools, and so they may in fact have
reduced expectations of privacy in that setting. For example, as
Justice Scalia opined in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
students at least in many cases are accustomed to seeing the school
nurse for routine physicals and vaccinations, to stripping down for
gym class or for sports team practices and games, and to having
their things searched or at least accessible for search by school
authorities to preserve the schools’ ability to maintain order and
discipline.  And it could be argued in favor of the narrower305
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306. A direct adult analogy would be the partial strip search of a woman at an airport as
part of the random screening of passengers, or a partial strip search of a woman as part of
an investigation initiated by the state and not the woman, which is designed to discover
whether her partner abuses her. Although neither suggests that the woman herself has done
anything wrong, the latter is fraught with emotional complexities that are absent in the
former. Importantly, this is true whether or not the woman in the latter case has been
abused by her partner.
307. See Sabrina Luza & Enrique Ortiz, The Dynamic of Shame in Interactions Between
Child Protective Services and Families Falsely Accused of Child Abuse, 3 INST. FOR PSYCH.
THERAPIES (1991), available at http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volume3/j3_2_5.htm
(noting that after being falsely accused of child abuse, family members reported feelings of
powerlessness, self-doubt, depression, and isolation, similar to emotions demonstrated by
adults  and children  who  feel shame; authors speculate that CPS and accused families act
in a shaming  parent-shamed child relationship); cf. ANTHONY J. URQUIZA & CYNTHIA WINN,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED
CHILDREN: INFANCY TO AGE 18, at 71-80 (1994), available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/
usermanuals/treatmen/treatmen.pdf (discussing treatment issues for abused and neglected
children, including intrapersonal issues such as fear, trauma, anxiety, guilt, and
stigmatization).
extension that searches and seizures conducted to determine abuse
and neglect are not significantly different than the same intrusions
conducted in connection with a compelled vaccination, routine
physical, or even targeted treatment for illness or injury. In both
cases, the intrusions, which raise similar privacy implications, are
designed at least in part to protect the child’s health and welfare,
and involve no suspicion of wrongdoing on the child’s part.
These arguments ought also to fail. As the data and cases
described in Part I reflect, child welfare investigations differ in kind
and not just degree from routine vaccination programs, annual
checkups, and drug testing programs because of their potential to
cause real harm. Indeed, the harm occurs on a regular basis. The
damage is primarily emotional and psychological, but it is also
sometimes physical. The state’s reason for wanting to inquire into
my personal affairs, or to look at my body, makes a big difference
to me as I consider whether or not I am comfortable with or
potentially traumatized by its examination; there is no reason to
believe that it is not or should not be the same for a child.306
Indeed, the fact that a child who is the subject of a maltreatment
investigation is singled out for different treatment—treatment that
inevitably implies the state believes she has done something wrong
or that her parents are bad—adds considerably to the distress she
is likely to feel in this process.  It is patently wrong for states to307
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308. See supra notes 8, 68-74 and accompanying text (breaking down these statistics). 
309. See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text (describing the requirement of
“thorough investigations” and states’ reliance on the right of their officials to conduct the
investigations unfettered by procedures designed to safeguard the privacy of the family).
310. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (examining the scope of the authorities’
thorough investigations of the child’s home environment).
assume that a child will be equally comfortable with a full or partial
strip search conducted during an annual checkup and a full or
partial strip search conducted during a child abuse investigation.
The same distinction applies where the state is conducting a
probing personal interview. 
2. The Intrusiveness of the Investigations
Child maltreatment investigations are highly intrusive in two
constitutionally relevant respects. First, as described in the
Introduction and Part I, states’ “take no chances” approach to
defining and screening-in cases for investigation results in a
disturbingly overbroad scheme that wrongfully captures hundreds
of thousands of children within its auspices each year. Many of
these children are victims of either intentionally fraudulent or
simply erroneous reports.  Second, the highly discretionary308
approach to conducting individual investigations often results in
searches and seizures that are deeply intrusive in both symbolic
and actual terms. Indeed, it is accurate to say that the authorities’
very intent is to be highly intrusive, because only searches this
thorough are sufficient to assure that all maltreatment can be
identified.309
Home visits epitomize deep intrusion in both symbolic and actual
respects. During these “visits,” state officials do not merely cross
the threshold into the realm of what is deemed to be ultimately
private as a political and philosophical matter. They also quite
literally storm the castle, opening closed bedroom doors to find, talk
to, examine, and remove the children; opening and looking through
refrigerators and cupboards to see if the children have sufficient
food to eat; opening and searching closets and drawers to check if
the children have enough clothing and that no inappropriate
disciplinary methods are being used in the family.  They do this310
both during the day and at night.
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311. See supra notes 88-115 and accompanying text (describing the case Doe v. Heck, 327
F.3d 492 (2003)).
312. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (describing the case Roe v. Tex.
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 299 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2002)).
313. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text (describing the case Wallis v. Spencer,
202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)).
314. Compare Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-79 (2001) (finding that the
state hospital urine screens designed to obtain evidence of illegal substance abuse by
pregnant women were particularly intrusive in part because the evidence was intended for
use both by hospital workers and law enforcement officials), with Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 833 (2002) (finding that public school urine tests are not intrusive in part because
“results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority. Nor do the test results here
lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic consequences.”), and Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (finding that public school urine screens designed
Similarly high degrees of symbolic and real intrusiveness will
often be involved as state officials search and seize children inside
or outside of the family home, including for sequestered interviews
with the child about private family matters, and for physical
examinations of the child’s body. John Doe, Jr.’s story is exemplary
of the former, as it involved unfamiliar CPS and law enforcement
officials physically removing fourth-grade John Jr. from his
classroom in the middle of the day without his parents’ knowledge,
and taking him to an unoccupied room where these officials
interviewed him alone about private family matters in connection
with an ultimately unfounded allegation of excessive discipline by
the school’s principal.  The stories of Jackie Roe  and Jessie and311 312
Lauren Wallis  are exemplary of the latter, as they involved CPS,313
medical, and law enforcement officers conducting physical examina-
tions of young children, including physical examinations of their
genital and anal areas, in connection with ultimately unfounded
suspicions of sexual abuse.
Of course, searches and seizures of the person may vary in the
degree of their intrusiveness. In this regard, children are no
different than adults. Thus, brief interviews of children conducted
outside the home and in circumstances where they are clearly not
uncomfortable are likely to be judged less intrusive than the
sequestrations, removals, interviews, and physical examinations
that I have just described. Nevertheless, the Court has been clear
that an investigation’s intrusiveness is enhanced significantly when
an intent exists to turn over its fruits to a third party, especially to
law enforcement.  Thus, although a brief detention and interview314
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to obtain evidence of illegal substance abuse by student athletes were not intrusive in part
because the evidence was intended exclusively for use by school officials and would not be
turned over to law enforcement), and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985)
(“This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the
legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law
enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question.”).
315. See supra note 307 (citing studies to this effect). It should be noncontroversial
otherwise that interventions designed from the outset to help children can also cause them
harm. See, e.g., Craig Elliott, Psychological Iterventions for Children with Cancer Undergoing
Invasive Medical Procedures: A Meta-Analysis of the Research, in 59 (9-B) DISSERTATION
ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL: SECTION B: THE SCIENCES & ENGINEERING 5110 (1999)
(describing children’s frequent and unabated stress responses to routine cancer therapies,
and ways clinicians can mediate such responses); Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in
Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims, in 57(5) MONOGRAPHS
OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT: 1-142 to -161 (1992) (describing the
short- and long-term stress reactions of child victims of sexual abuse who are required to
testify in court against their alleged abusers); Myron A. Hofer, On the Nature and
Consequences of Early Loss, 58(6) PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 570-581 (1996) (describing results
of studies on maternal deprivation which show “a number of discrete sensorimotor, thermal,
and nutrient-based events that have unexpected long-term regulatory effects on specific
components of infant physiology and behavior”); C.M. Kuhn & S.M. Schanberg, Responses
to Maternal Separation: Mechanisms and Mediators, 16(3-4) INT’L J. OF DEVELOPMENTAL
NEUROSCIENCE 261-70 (1998) (“Consequences of disrupting mother-infant interactions range
from marked suppression of certain neuroendocrine and physiological systems after short
periods of maternal deprivation to retardation of growth and behavioral development after
chronic periods.”). The difference between these contexts and that which is at issue in this
Article is that the children here do not need these interventions, and so the harms that are
of a child ordinarily may involve limited intrusion, the intrusion
appreciates significantly when the police either conduct or assist
with the investigation, or when they otherwise are associated with
it from the beginning. And certainly, the intrusiveness inherently
involved in a residential search, a long detention, or body search of
a child, is exacerbated in these circumstances.
Finally, regardless of its beneficent motives, when the state
intrudes in the ways that I have just described, it may also cause
real emotional and psychological harm. These consequences must
also be weighed in the ultimate calculus of reasonableness.
Probably because the subjects of unsubstantiated reports are
unknown to researchers, there is a dearth of empirical evidence to
support this proposition. The few related studies support my
assumption that as a result of the investigation, family members,
including children, suffer from a range of responses including
trauma, anxiety, fear, shame, guilt, stigmatization, powerlessness,
self-doubt, depression, and isolation.  And in the ultimate irony,315
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incurred as a result are less easily justified.
316. John Money & Margaret Lamacz, Genital Examinations and Exposure Experienced
as Nosocomial Sexual Abuse in Childhood, 175 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE, 713-21 (1987)
(peer-reviewed article setting out this finding and noting the implications of sexual abuse by
care providers).
317. Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 834 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
children who are subject to genital examinations appear to
experience the investigatory examinations as sexual abuse.316
Nevertheless, it is anecdotal evidence and human intuition that
today provide the best proof that the state can cause serious harm
to the children it seeks to rescue. In addition to the facts and cases
described in Part I, what happened to three-year-old Lacey Doe
when a well-intentioned CPS official made a “reasonable mistake”
in investigating allegations of paternal maltreatment exemplifies
this proof:
The agency screener characterized this supposedly neglected
child, a few hours after being whisked away, as “friendly and
cooperative.... She appeared to enjoy watching cartoons and
playing with toys, exhibited curiosity about her surrounding.
She displayed no anxiety to be among strangers and ate a
sandwich, chips and cookies hungrily.” ... After being bounced
around in the agency and foster-parent bureaucracy for over a
year, Lacey was quite a different little girl. She was “diagnosed
with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, hearing voices, and
suicidal ideation.” She was put on anti-psychotic medication.
She had taken to smearing feces and to other abnormal and
highly disruptive behavior. Though Lacey had somehow held
her personality together through her mother’s death, her
father’s lack of financial success, and the move back to Califor-
nia, what the county did to her to “protect” her apparently
destroyed her. Something in this experience, perhaps being
ripped away from her father for whom she consistently ex-
pressed love during the whole miserable period, perhaps having
strangers strip her and search her heretofore private parts,
perhaps being put with caretakers instead of her father,
amounted to a trauma that was too much for her.317
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318. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-64 (applying a balancing test to determine the
reasonableness of a government action infringing on an individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests).
319. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
320. Cf. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663 (“We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the
‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).
321. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (explaining why these traditional
exceptions are not the child welfare exception states purport to need in this context).
C. The Government’s Needs
The individual interests just described are to be balanced against
the government’s need to forego compliance with the presumptive
requirements of the Warrant Clause.  In this context, the burden318
is on the government to prove that such compliance would be
impracticable and would “frustrate the [legitimate] governmental
purpose behind the search.”  And while some Justices appear to319
require more, the government must at least demonstrate that the
means it has chosen to effect its purpose are somewhat effective.320
In the child welfare context, the government’s overarching
objective is protecting children from harm. The immediate objective
of the investigation is to determine whether evidence exists to
substantiate an allegation of abuse or neglect. In defense of
conducting the investigation outside the Fourth Amendment’s
requirements, the government can argue that forced compliance
with the Warrant Clause would substantially undermine its
mission to protect child welfare by making the business of conduct-
ing investigations more difficult. In addition to the insufficiency of
the consent and exigent circumstances exceptions which have
already been addressed, three arguments support this position.321
1. The Practicability of the Warrant Requirement
The government can argue that the warrant process itself
—taking the time to visit a judge and for the judge to consider the
application—is impracticable and frustrates the governmental
purpose behind the search. Specifically, state officials claim they
need to act quickly to investigate reports of abuse or neglect to
ensure that maltreated children are saved from their unfortunate
circumstances before it is too late; the implication is that the
cumbersome warrant process would impede the states’ ability to
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322. For example, this argument was accepted by the trial court in Darryl H. v. Coler, 801
F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1986) (reporting in part on the decision below). There, the federal district
judge wrote, “the more serious problem with the [warrant] procedure is that a delayed
examination of a child may simply come too late to protect a child in imminent danger of
grave bodily harm or even death. Unfortunately, there is no quicker way of knowing whether
a child is at grave risk than by an actual examination of the child.” Id. at 899.
323. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Wallis v.
Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)).
save at least some of these children.  The government also can322
argue that the requirement of a “particularized” warrant substan-
tially diminishes the flexibility that state officials need during an
investigation to leave no stone unturned in their search for evidence
of maltreatment. If, for example, the report alleges that a child has
been excessively disciplined with a whip, and the court issues a
particularized warrant that allows the state to investigate only
whether the child has injuries consistent with this or some
substantially similar disciplinary method and whether a whip-like
apparatus is located in the home, the government’s ability to open
the refrigerator and cupboards to determine whether the child is
also the victim of nutritional or other neglect will be hamstrung by
the restrictive terms of that warrant. Finally, the government may
argue that resort to a neutral magistrate to evaluate the need for
and scope of a particular investigation is unnecessary because CPS
officials in the field are best suited by their specialized training and
experience to weigh the relevant individuals’ privacy rights against
the states’ special need quickly to find evidence.
The argument that the states need to circumvent the warrant
process to assure that children in emergency need of assistance are
reached without undue delay is without merit. The exigent
circumstances exception precisely covers this situation. The fact
that it does not permit warrantless interventions based solely
upon a mere suspicion that a child is at risk of serious harm is
unhelpful to the states’ position; as Jessie and Lauren Wallis’s story
illustrates, there is no reasonable basis in such cases to permit
officials to perpetrate the kind of violence on the family that the
drama of an emergency necessarily creates.  As the first judge who323
reviewed their case intimated, an official midnight entry into the
family home and the subsequent removal of the two young children
to an institutional setting on the basis of a psychotic woman’s
rantings about satanic sacrifices ought not to be permitted, pure
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324. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1131.
325. The facts in Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 499-508 (10th Cir. 2003), also described in
Part I, are particularly illustrative of this last point. See supra notes 88-115 and
accompanying text. The authorities in that case waited two months to initiate an
investigation of a woman’s allegations that the private school her child attended had
excessively disciplined her and perhaps other children. Heck, 327 F.3d at 500. Once the state
finally sought to enter the school and interview John Doe, the principal target of the
investigation, it attempted to proceed based on the emergency exception to the warrant
requirement, without any evidence that the circumstances warranted this designation.
326. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (describing these extra searches North
Carolina requires its officials to pursue as they investigate specific unrelated maltreatment
allegations).
327. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (describing this foundation).
and simple.  Additionally, the statutes, protocols, and practices of324
many if not most states contain embedded delays for investigating
all but the most obvious emergency reports. In these circumstances,
unnecessary emergencies are actually created by the states
themselves.325
Morever, although the states may prefer to have unfettered
discretion to investigate families and their homes in pursuit of
their comprehensive approach to evidence gathering, in general
this approach is unnecessary to assure that the child is safe from
the specific harm alleged in the report. Thus, for example, if the
allegation is that a child is inadequately clothed and cleaned, it may
be useful for other reasons for the state also to investigate whether
the home has smoke detectors, whether the family is also experienc-
ing domestic violence, and generally whether the child’s environ-
ment is suitable.  However, these extra searches are unrelated326
except perhaps in a most tangential way to the state of the child’s
wardrobe and hygiene. Nor is there any emergency that compels
these searches. Because of this, and because the law—in contrast
with other disciplines perhaps—continues to privilege privacy,
dignity, and personal security even after a violation is suspected, it
does not permit the state to take advantage of the fact that it has
gotten into the house to go on a fishing expedition. Such expeditions
are anathema to the values at the core of the Fourth Amendment
which exists precisely to fetter the discretion of government
officials.327
Finally, there is little merit to the argument that the neutral
magistrate is unnecessary in this context, or that state officials are
better suited in general to evaluate the reasonableness of a
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328. Beeman, supra note 23, at 1037-39, 1046-47, 1051 (discussing the role of the warrant
requirement in restraining official discretion to search and to seize and arguing that
“[a]dequately protecting the family’s privacy interest requires the imposition of a neutral and
detached decision maker” to assure that someone other than the investigation official
“decides if the criteria for investigating are met” and that “requiring warrants for
investigatory home searches would afford families some protection against unjustified and
often officious intrusion”); Hardin, supra note 23, at 539-41 (suggesting that a warrant is
necessary to “provide a meaningful protection against arbitrary or oppressive state action,”
to assure that “the standard of evidence has been satisfied in the individual case,” and “[to]
discipline the child protective agency to carefully consider and document its decisions to
make forced entries and searches”).
329. Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2002).
330. Id.
331. Id.
particular intrusion on the children’s or the family’s privacy.
Indeed, as two previous commentators have already emphasized,
the preservation of the neutral magistrate’s role is tremendously
important.  Too many officials on the ground are undertrained in328
relevant respects. Moreover, experience shows that children and
families cannot count on officials to exercise their discretion in
objectively reasonable ways. In particular, CPS and the police
often assume guilt at the outset, and thus approach the evidence-
gathering process with an eye toward proving that assumption. 
The case that introduced this Article is particularly noteworthy
in this respect. It involved six-year-old Jackie Roe’s apparently
precocious awareness of things sexual or suggestive, and a chal-
lenge to the discretion exercised by a social worker who entered the
family’s home without a warrant to investigate her suspicion that
the child had been the victim of sexual abuse. In the course of that
visit, the social worker rejected the mother’s efforts to curb the
investigation or to call a lawyer, and she took photographs of the
girl’s labia in an open and closed position which she later turned
over to her supervisor.  When asked about the propriety of this329
aspect of the official’s conduct, her supervisor “testified that she
would not have taken the pictures but opined that the decision to
do so lay within [the official’s] discretion.”  The program director330
also “described the visual examination and pictures as appropriate
because ‘caseworkers are trained to find and document all available
evidence during their investigations.’”  It is abundantly clear that331
no one working for CPS in this case felt confined by any external
boundaries of reasonableness. It is also abundantly clear that no
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332. See supra note 61 and accompany text (describing this policy objective).
333. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing this point).
334. See, e.g., E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546, 1558 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (suggesting that
investigators would have trouble meeting the probable cause requirement and that this
one within that agency sought to balance their interest in conduct-
ing the investigation against either the child or the mother’s
interest in privacy and bodily security in the family home; or at
least that if they did—for example, if the social worker attempted
to value the mother’s hesitation and concern about the nature and
scope of her search—their assessment of the value of the family’s
privacy interest was dismissive at best. It is unimaginable that a
judge objectively balancing the same competing interests would
have issued a warrant that allowed an untrained state employee
such unbridled discretion literally to pry into this young child’s
vagina and to photograph its particulars based on a report about a
sexy dance in the locker room at day camp. The warrant process is
essential to establishing the boundaries of reasonableness.
Finally, the need for a neutral arbiter to be part of this process is
not an argument that state officials do not act in good faith. Rather,
it is recognition that child maltreatment law formally privileges the
exhaustive investigation over privacy. Thus, although officials are
cautioned or encouraged to respect family privacy during their
investigations,  it is irrational to assume that they can in fact332
reconcile these conflicting messages.  Indeed, my argument is that333
they are legally bound not to give due weight to privacy as they do
their work. Injecting a neutral arbiter into the equation enhances
the likelihood if not assures that these two competing values will be
more properly balanced. 
2. The Practicability of the Probable Cause Requirement
The government may also argue that it needs to circumvent the
probable cause requirement because the allegations in reports are
often insufficient to meet this standard. Indeed, to continue to
conduct thorough investigations of all screened-in reports, the
government really must presume its ability to act on the lesser
standard of mere suspicion. Without this “pass,” it will miss out on
the opportunity to safeguard the health and welfare and even the
lives of some at-risk children.334
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requirement would therefore jeopardize the welfare of at-risk children). It is not known how
many children at risk of serious harm would be jeopardized by a stricter evidentiary
standard. As I have already explained, no definitive statistical evidence exists that breaks
down the cases that are investigated but ultimately unsubstantiated. See supra note 8
(discussing the lack of such statistical evidence). Thus, although there is good reason to
believe the authorities who, because of their experience, say that stricter standards would
jeopardize some number of children, my evaluation must proceed on the basis of only this
generalization.
335. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting this point).
336. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (describing the facts of State v.
Wilkerson, 247 S.E.2d 905 (N.C. 1978), in which a father killed his two-year-old son by
throwing him against the side of the family’s trailer).
This is all true. The probable cause and reasonable suspicion
requirements would preclude pervasive home visits and examina-
tions of children when officials merely suspect that a child is at
risk. And the probable cause requirement would bar such investi-
gations when officials cannot prove to a neutral judge or magistrate
that a child likely has been injured or at risk. Either way, the
authorities will miss some opportunities to help children in need.
Therefore, the question is not whether the states need to avoid
these evidentiary burdens to pursue the prevailing approach to
maltreatment reports, but rather whether this policy itself is
necessary. A meaningful response to this question requires careful
evaluation and balancing of both its benefits and risks. 
These benefits and risks are clear: On the one hand, the policy
allows states potentially to save some children from private violence
who would not be saved if stronger evidentiary burdens were placed
on their officials’ ability to investigate allegations that amount to no
more than mere suspicion, and if these officials could not otherwise
develop the required evidence. The majority of child fatalities that
result from parental maltreatment involve children who were
previously unknown to the government.  However, a few of these335
children each year are known to the authorities, who are not able
to save them because the relevant reports are either not investi-
gated or cannot be substantiated.  Thus, the concern in their336
regard is a real one. On the other hand, the prevailing approach to
the child maltreatment problem results in the commission of
millions of acts of public violence each year. As illustrated by the
stories told throughout this Article, state officials cause real harm
in their quest to protect children, including fear, humiliation,
shame, and emotional devastation, not to mention the loss of the
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337. Beeman, supra note 23, at 1064-65 (urging that, despite its inapplicability on the
facts, the New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), standard of reasonableness in the
circumstances best balances parents rights and governmental needs.)
338. Hardin, supra note 23, at 530-32 (this “relaxed evidentiary standard” is necessary
because of “severe and long-term potential consequences of child maltreatment” and because
child abuse can be difficult to detect especially where preschool-aged children are involved.)
Whether these two standards, “reasonable suspicion” and “reasonableness in the
circumstances,” really are different in practice is questionable. Indeed, the T.L.O. standard
upon which Beeman premises his distinction is generally considered to represent reasonable
suspicion. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 89, at 353 (noting that “[t]he Court in T.L.O. adopted
a reasonable suspicion standard”). Consequently, I discuss Hardin’s and Beeman’s proposals
together.
339. See supra notes 23, 162 (describing Hardin’s and Beeman’s positions).
children’s and sometimes also their families’ Fourth Amendment
rights and the fundamental interests these implicate. Notably,
hundreds of thousands of these acts of official violence are without
any compensating benefit to the investigated children, either
because the reports that trigger them are intentionally fraudulent,
or because they are simply erroneous. The question begged by this
juxtaposition is whether the states are justified in committing these
many acts of public violence so that they can save some children
from acts of private violence that otherwise would go undiscovered.
Recognizing that family privacy is at issue in this context, two
other commentators focusing on home visits have suggested that
officials should be required to prove to a warrant officer in advance
that conducting the contemplated investigation would be reason-
able. Specifically, Michael Beeman has argued that officials ought
to be permitted to investigate maltreatment reports if they can
show that the intrusion is reasonable in the circumstances,  and337
Mark Hardin has argued that the investigation ought to proceed
if a reasonable suspicion of maltreatment exists.  In their view,338
intermediate standards like these—which fall between mere or
no suspicion and probable cause—best balance families’ and
particularly parents’ interest in privacy against the states’ interest
in reducing the number of at-risk children who would be the victims
of the stricter probable cause standard.339
As I will elaborate in my “final accounting” below, I disagree
with the prevailing approach of proceeding on the basis of mere
suspicion, and with Beeman and Hardin’s compromise, because
neither reflects sufficient care and respect for the interests of the
total population of investigated children. Rather, each focuses on
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340. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (describing the combination of
alternative strategies that could allow the states to do an even better job protecting
maltreated children, and at the same time to minimize the harm investigations cause to
children and families; acknowledging that these strategies would not be without cost, but
arguing that such costs would be justifiable in ways that forcing the children to suffer the
impacts of the prevailing approach is not).
341. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347-51 (2001) (focusing on the
administrative burden involved in the state altering the apparently time-honored
presumption that law enforcement officers can conduct a warrantless search and seizure if
they reasonably believe they are witnesses to the commission of a crime).
the tension between the states’ interests and parental privacy. In
doing so, each ignores that it is the children who primarily pay the
price for the states’ investigatory policies. While it may be difficult
to think of the equation this way, I believe that it is dishonest to
ignore that children like Jessie and Lauren Wallis—who are safe
and healthy but nevertheless targeted for investigation—are not
interested in sacrificing their welfare or their rights to preserve the
states’ ability to protect other children who may be at risk even of
death. Because we should do all that we can to respect their
interests, but also because the states could protect at-risk children
in other ways, their officials should be required to show probable
cause before they conduct maltreatment investigations.340
3. The Administrative Burden Involved in Fulfilling the
Requirements of the Warrant Clause
The government’s third and final set of arguments centers on the
overall administrative burden that the particularized warrant and
probable cause requirements would impose on the states’ child
welfare systems.  As they exist today in many jurisdictions, the341
systems fundamentally rely on the ability to circumvent the
Warrant Clause’s strictures. Consequently, states could argue that
imposing particularized warrant and probable cause requirements
would be cost prohibitive and emotionally debilitating to the
relevant state officials and agencies, many of whom are already
overburdened, underpaid, and morally depleted. States also could
argue that imposing the requirements of the Warrant Clause on
state officials would increase the workload of family court judges
around the country, many of whom are also overburdened like their
CPS brethren.
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342. Michael Wald first tackled the issue of reforming the states’ broad definitions of
abuse, neglect, and maltreatment, and the associated costs in his seminal article, State
Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards. See Wald,
supra note 22, at 987. His work resulted in important refinements, both at the statutory level
Imposing the Warrant Clause’s requirements would add pressure
to an already taxed system. However, whether the additional
pressure would be particularly difficult to absorb in the long run is
unclear. Many if not most investigations would continue to proceed
with consent or on the basis of exigent circumstances. Nevertheless,
the new requirements would likely reduce substantially the total
number of investigations conducted. And those investigations that
were conducted would be significantly tailored and thus more
easily administered. In the short run, of course, imposing these
requirements would require the development of new protocols and
procedures and additional staff training. And alternative investi-
gatory strategies would have to be developed when access to the
home and child initially is denied. But as with the long-term costs,
there is a dearth of evidence suggesting that these additional
burdens would be overwhelming or insufficiently offset by the
related reduction in work that would result from the imposition of
the Warrant Clause’s traditional strictures.
In any event, notwithstanding the merits of this argument about
costs, the system ought to be reformed because it currently is
ineffective in important ways. That is, we can assume that substan-
tial resources are being expended today in pursuit of the prevailing
approach toward solving the maltreatment problem. It is also
apparent that a significant percentage of these resources are
wasted in the sense that they are expended on reports about
children and families who do not need help or who the system
ultimately does not help. Alternative strategies that could result in
both a reduction of the existing administrative burden and in an
amelioration of the maltreatment problem are not pursued with
equal vigor. More precise and comprehensive reporting require-
ments and more refined conceptions of maltreatment, for example,
would go a long way toward the development of a more effective
program by reducing the number of cases investigated and the
expenditure of resources to conduct alternative investigations. I
acknowledged in the Introduction that such reforms would be
neither cheap nor easy to implement.  And yet if there was ever a342
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and at the level of the agencies’ processing of evidence in support of substantiation.
Notwithstanding his unassailable arguments about the need to balance the risk of harm to
children from maltreatment against the risk of harm from state intervention, however, state
schemes continue to reflect a callous disregard for the damage the state itself can and does
do to the children they are trying to protect.
343. See supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text (discussing this last aspect or prong
of reasonableness analysis).
344. The legal literature is replete with this critique. For some recent examples, see
Donald L. Beschle, Kant’s Categorical Imperative: An Unspoken Factor in Constitutional
Rights Balancing, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 949, 963 (2004) (“Individual rights may not act as ‘trumps’
over social welfare in all cases but neither are they always subservient to community
interests. Balancing, then, becomes inevitable, but at the same time, difficult to do in a way
that seems principled and not simply as a reflection of a particular court’s subjective
preferences.”); Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the
Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258, 275 (2000) (lamenting that the outcome of special
needs balancing reflects the personal inclinations of individual Justices); Timothy Zick,
Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 115, 133-38 (2003) (discussing the extent to which constitutional jurisprudence has been
“consumed” by balancing tests, and evaluating the critiques by realists that balancing tests
permit judges to effectuate their “subjective preferences”). 
poster child for such a difficult cause, it is Kessler Wilkerson, the
two-year-old baby killed by his father after repeated beatings
witnessed by others who did not know abuse when they saw it, and
who never bothered to report their observations in any event. The
Constitution does not require the states to use the best approach to
solving a problem. But I suggest that Kessler and the Wallis
children are proof that the current approach outside the Fourth
Amendment is not even a good one, and thus an argument that it
needs to be preserved intact so as to minimize administrative costs
is simply inadequate. No one, from the taxpayer to the child and
family implicated by a report, to the responsible state agencies and
officials, has a legitimate interest in propping up a failed program.
D. A Final Accounting
In the final analysis, the state’s need to investigate is weighed
against the individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy and the
intrusiveness of the specific search or seizure.  Constitutional343
balancing tests, including this one, have been strongly criticized
for their lack of rigor and for their outcomes, on the ground that
they tend to reflect normative judgments rather than objective
conclusions about the merits of the evidence.  This is an important344
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345. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 179 (1960). 
critique, as the Supreme Court itself often engages in conclusory
balancing analysis, relying instead on its values-laden characteriza-
tion of the relevant competing interests to justify its outcomes.
Nevertheless, the balancing critique fails sufficiently to allow for
the intuitive point that, as Learned Hand noted in the context of
the Fourth Amendment, “when you are dealing with such admoni-
tions as ‘unreasonable searches’ there appears to be ‘no escape in
each situation from balancing the conflicting interests at stake.”345
Nor is it inevitable that balancing analysis will lack rigor or that an
outcome will be so imbued with personal orientation that it cannot
be said to be legitimate. There may be no such thing as true
objectivity, but this does not dictate nihilism in the law: We can be
better and worse—it is our choice—at determining “reasonableness”
and thus the “right” and “wrong” outcomes. Indeed, I suggest that
thoroughness in the analysis begets good outcomes precisely
because it forces a careful and thoughtful evaluation of the
competing arguments about interests.
The discussion that immediately precedes this final accounting
reflects the first real attempt at thoroughness in the face of
individuals’ and states’ important competing claims as to the rea-
sonableness of a child welfare exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
presumptive requirements. My conclusion based upon that analysis
is simply this: When all of the relevant interests are carefully
evaluated—notwithstanding the almost religious sense of many
child advocates to the contrary—there is a strong child-friendly case
to be made for requiring valid consent, a real exigency, or a
particularized warrant and probable cause before a state conducts
a child maltreatment investigation that involves either a home visit
or a sequestration and oral or physical examination of a child.
These traditional procedures best balance the various private
interests and public needs at issue in the child welfare context, by
assuring that the state can conduct a properly circumscribed
investigation when it has proved to a neutral evaluator that a child
is probably at risk. 
This approach uniquely respects the child’s own Fourth Amend-
ment interest in privacy, dignity, personal security, and mobility,
by recognizing that, in general, the vitality of these values is
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346. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (allowing a warrant to issue to
a city official to conduct a routine suspicionless search of a rental unit for compliance with
the housing code on the basis of the reasonableness of the administrative scheme).
347. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (explaining the historical basis for the
probable cause requirement and the concomitant rejection of targeted government searches
conducted in the absence of a sound evidentiary basis).
intimately and even inextricably linked to the child’s sense that she
is one with her family. At the same time, it allows for the reality
that this unity is sometimes broken from within by abusive or
neglectful parents, giving rise to the need for the state to intrude
into the circle of family privacy when a child likely needs to be
rescued. As applied in real-life cases, this standard would have
permitted the state to intrude to rescue Kessler Wilkerson from his
abusive father before he killed the baby by repeatedly throwing him
against the walls of the family’s trailer, if only one of the outsiders
who later indicated that they had known about Kessler’s situation
had reported it in time to the authorities. And it probably would
have protected two-year-old Jesse and five-year-old Lauren Wallis
from the official investigation—triggered by a psychotic woman’s
report that their father intended to sacrifice Jesse to Satan—which
involved midnight interviews conducted by police in their home,
followed by a devastating and ultimately months-long separation
from their parents, and CPS-ordered genital examinations in the
hospital. 
On the other hand, a careful look at the competing arguments
shows that the case in favor of a child welfare exception to the
Fourth Amendment is relatively weak, as it gives the state almost
unfettered access to the child and to her home on the barest
suspicion of maltreatment. Nothing is balanced about this ap-
proach: The state receives an abuse or neglect report (however
strong or weak) and this alone permits its officials constitutionally
unfettered access to the child and to her home. Although a version
of this standard—the inherent reasonableness of the administra-
tive scheme—has been approved in other contexts involving
suspicionless searches,  it has only rarely supported suspicion-346
based investigations.  Indeed, as I have already suggested, the347
truly extraordinary deference afforded to caseworkers and the
police under the prevailing approach to child maltreatment
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348. See supra notes 23, 337-38 and accompanying text (discussing Hardin’s and Beeman’s
privacy analyses) and notes 169, 173 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency of some
lower courts to equate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments’ reasonableness standards,
and to consider those standards as applying to incursions on parental autonomy and privacy).
349. Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3d
Cir. 1989). This court’s view has since been echoed by others, including the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, that have continued to analogize child maltreatment to other deeply violent
offenses, such as murder and rape, which specifically trigger the particularized warrant and
investigations is similar in scope to that given colonial authorities
under the universally abhorred general warrant.
The compromise “reasonable suspicion” standard suggested by
Hardin and Beeman and adopted by some courts does recognize
what the most absolute version of the child welfare exception
rejects, namely that there are individual interests worthy of some
consideration in the balance. However, because the compromise
standard defines these interests primarily in terms of parental
privacy, and specifically without relevant reference to the children’s
multifarious concerns, the standard fails to give them due weight.348
It is simply an insufficient recognition of these concerns to say that
the state is entitled to conduct exhaustive and often damaging
investigations of the children and their families (amounting in
many cases to a significant amount of public violence) so long as it
can prove that there is approximately a thirty percent likelihood
that the targeted child is at risk of some parental violence.
Proponents of the child welfare exception have succeeded in
influencing policy and practice largely by masking the existence of
the sympathetic argument on the other side, and the deep flaws
inherent in the authorities’ claims of necessity. It is undoubtedly
true that being able to circumvent the particularized warrant
and probable cause requirements—in other words, the Fourth
Amendment—would make the states’ child welfare job easier in
many respects. Among other things, it would—and does today de
facto—assure that investigations take less time, that the system as
a whole uses less resources, that officials have more discretion to
invade individuals’ privacy, and that many more investigations can
be conducted. What is unconvincing, however, is the argument that
states’ need these extraordinary allowances here any more than
they need them in other instances involving heinous crimes or
serious civil transgressions where the requirements of the Warrant
Clause obviously apply.  As the Tenth Circuit explained in Dubbs349
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probable cause requirements. For example, in Wallis v. Spencer, the Ninth Circuit found that
in the area of child abuse, as with the investigation and prosecution of all
crimes, the state is constrained by the substantive and procedural guarantees
of the Constitution. The fact that the suspected crime may be heinous—whether
it involves children or adults—does not provide cause for the state to ignore the
rights of the accused or any other parties. Otherwise, serious injustices may
result.
202 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). And in White by White v. Pierce County, the Tenth
Circuit stated that
[c]hild abuse is a heinous crime. So are murder and rape. Just as the
repulsiveness of the latter two crimes does not affect the constitutional
restrictions placed on police officers, neither should our repugnance to the
former crime cause us to condone police procedures that infringe constitutional
protections.
797 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1207
(10th Cir. 2003).
350. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1207. The searches in this case included genital examinations and
blood tests conducted on preschool children who were placed together on tables in a
classroom.
351. Id.
v. Head Start, Inc., a case involving challenges to incredibly
invasive well-child examinations conducted without parental
consent by the civil officials of a local Head Start program, the fact
that the state “was acting in the interests of children, as it under-
stood them” does not absolve it from having to comply with these
requirements because among other things, they “serve[] important
practical as well as dignitary concerns.”  350
At bottom, what this argument fails adequately to reflect is that
the Fourth Amendment’s presumptive requirements already
recognize and allow the states to investigate crime and other
social problems. The presumptive requirements just place some
reasonable limits on official exercises of discretion both as to the
number and scope of intrusions on privacy. If the claim is that the
government’s need is different and more expansive here, so that it
requires systematically unfettered discretion to invade individual
rights, the case has not been made. It is obviously appealing simply
to respond (as the Head Start officials did in Dubbs) that children
are special and thus, because state authorities are acting in their
interests, they “should not be hamstrung by legalistic requirements
like warrants or consent.”  What I hope to have made clear is that351
this response is unsound in many if not most cases, both because
the states in fact can do their child maltreatment work without
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ignoring the Warrant Clause—it is not nearly so impracticable as
they might suggest—and because the clause itself is a barrier to the
converse problem that is the perpetration of public violence against
children and families. 
Perhaps most importantly though, proponents of a child welfare
exception have succeeded in influencing policy and practice by
telling a false story. This story posits family privacy as a bad
thing—at least in this context—that only protects fringe and
abusive parents from the scrutiny they properly deserve; here,
mainstream and innocent parents have no stake in family privacy.
The story further assumes that the interests of children who are
subjects of screened-in maltreatment reports are aligned with
those of the government rather than with their parents for the
duration of the investigation, because they are either in fact being
maltreated, or because they have a group-based stake in the
existence of the prevailing approach to the child abuse problem. As
in, “you never know, someday it could be me.”
Neither piece of this story could be further from our collective
philosophical truth. As against the government, privacy, including
family privacy, is valued in general for reasons that have absolutely
nothing to do with rejecting a mainstream lifestyle or hiding
personal flaws and dirty laundry. For example, I do not abuse or
neglect my children, and they are quite secure in their relationships
with me and their family. Nevertheless, I know that I would feel
violated if state officials, either subtly or overtly, threatened their
way into my home and searched through my cupboards and closets;
and it is inevitable that my vulnerability would be felt by my
children. I also know that my children would feel frightened,
humiliated, and betrayed if a caseworker or police officer inter-
viewed or examined them at school or took them to a doctor’s office
to be examined. That the state would mean well, that its actions
would be “for their own good” is something neither of them could
even begin to believe for years to come, if ever. In this context,
which is the context of this Article, privacy is essential to securing
parental authority and the unity of the family group, and to the
sense of dignity and personal security of its individual members
especially the children. The law cannot realign the children’s
interests away from their parents on the basis of a mere subjective
suspicion of maltreatment and also be true to the children’s
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352. COLEMAN, supra note 4 (arguing that the doctrine of parental autonomy is too strong
if it recognizes a parent’s right to ignore her child’s emotional and developmental well-being);
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’
Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1093-100 (1996) [hereinafter Coleman, Individualizing
Justice] (arguing that multiculturalism as a value is too strong if it forces courts to recognize
traditional parenting practices that cause physical harm and even death to the children); cf.
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and
Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 717-24 (1998) (arguing that the states ought not intrude
when immigrant parents seek symbolic compromises to traditional practices so that their
children are not harmed).
353. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 680 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987)).
developmental needs or their Fourth Amendment rights. The fact
is, most parents are their children’s first, best caretakers, and thus
the time-honored presumption that parents act in their best
interests is both deserved and necessary to the children’s wellbeing.
 Ultimately, the case in favor of a child welfare exception to the
Fourth Amendment is flawed for the same reason that an un-
bounded and absolute notion of family privacy should be rejected:
Both are extreme positions that fail to acknowledge the important
individual and governmental interests at stake. As I have written
elsewhere, the sovereignty of the family cannot be so impenetrable
that it prevents the state from saving children who are at real risk
of maltreatment.  At the same time, it cannot be so porous as to352
allow the state to storm the castle to “save” children who do not
need saving. From the children’s perspective, only a compromise
conception that reflects appropriate respect for family privacy is
just and healthy. The Fourth Amendment’s traditional require-
ments precisely ensconce this conception.
One final note: As Justice O’Connor has written “‘[t]here is
nothing new in the realization’ that Fourth Amendment protections
come with a price.”  If I am correct in this final accounting, and353
particularly in my view that the states can address most of their
concerns in alternative ways that do not exact so much damage to
our values and our children, the price of the Fourth Amendment in
this context lies primarily in the inability of the states to investi-
gate circumstances where parents choose to isolate themselves and
their children from the scrutiny of others. In such cases, a child can
be abused with almost complete impunity. I suspect that this
concern largely drives much of the prevailing approach to child
maltreatment investigations. In my view, however, it is wrong to
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354. As I and others have argued elsewhere, the First and Fourteenth Amendment
doctrines which allow parents to raise their children as they see fit including outside the
mainstream and completely isolated from others in the society are the genesis of the idea
that “children are the Achilles heel of liberalism.” See supra note 17 and accompanying text
(quoting this language and citing its sources); see also COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 99-107
(exploring the problems that strong religious and parental liberties create for the
children who would be isolated as a result); Coleman, Individualizing Justice, supra note
352, at 1166-67 (developing the argument that immigrant children are denied equal
protection when their parents’ violent traditional practices are respected in the name of
multiculturalism); James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to
Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious
Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (1996) (exploring “the law’s denial of equal protection
to some children simply because of their parents’ religious beliefs”). Using the historical
precedent of mandatory schooling and labor laws, these First and Fourteenth Amendment
doctrines could be made child-friendly so that parents would not be entitled to create the
isolated conditions that allow those who abuse their children to do so with impunity.
Constitutional evolution along these lines would certainly be an intrusion on parental
autonomy, but in my view it would not intrude on family privacy and the children’s
individual privacy interests in the developmentally destructive ways that unwarranted
Fourth Amendment searches and seizures do.
force millions of apparently healthy children each year to undergo
often deeply intrusive invasions—sometimes resulting in unjusti-
fied removals and even death in alternative homes—just to preserve
the states’ prerogative to intervene into the lives of these relatively
few isolated families. Indeed, these situations point directly to the
irony inherent in the child welfare exception: It causes more
children more harm than good. Because of this it cannot be the
solution to the problem of assuring the welfare of isolated children.
Their unique circumstances represent an essential conundrum of
American constitutional law that should not be solved at the
expense of children generally.354
CONCLUSION
The battle to define the rights of individuals and the boundaries
of official authority in child welfare cases has traditionally been
seen as pitting the states’ interest in saving children from maltreat-
ment against their parents’ interest in family or parental privacy.
This account allows states to rationalize enormous intrusions on the
family as they seek to determine which children actually need
saving, because “‘the life of even one child is too great a price to pay
for the possible increased degree of parental privacy’” that would
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Supp. 1546, 1559 (N.D. Ill. 1985)).
result from a less intrusive scheme.  Thus, exploiting the absence355
of definitive law in the area, state officials largely ignore the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures as
they conduct exhaustive and unfettered investigations of the family
home and the children who reside there.
The states’ view of the children’s own interests is consistent with
their public policy objectives. That is, they assume the children
would want state officials to take no chances, and to leave no stone
unturned, in their effort to substantiate a maltreatment report.
These generic children are willing to pay the price of the investiga-
tions—in separations from their parents, in probing personal
interviews, and in pervasive medical, including genital, examina-
tions—to realize the fruits of the states’ approach. Acceptance of
this view requires suspending the standard legal presumption that
the children’s interests are aligned with those of their parents until
the state proves otherwise; and it requires accepting the opposite
presumption that the children’s interests are realigned with those
of the state for the duration of the investigation. The heroes in this
scene are the benevolent social workers and police officers who
would rescue vulnerable or injured children from their bad parents
before it is too late.
The trouble with this story is that it is only partly true; and as a
result, it simply cannot support the temporary but nevertheless
significant realignment of interests that justifies the child welfare
exception to the Fourth Amendment. It is true that some parents
abuse and neglect their children, and therefore, there are children
who need to be saved. It is also true that social workers and police
officers are mostly benevolent. The rest is categorically untrue:
Children who do not need saving—most investigated children fall
into this category—have no interest in a legal scheme that allows
even benevolent state officials to assume that their good parents are
no longer their best caretakers. And no child, whether she needs
saving or not, is interested in a legal scheme that permits these
officials absolute and unfettered discretion to launch invasive and
often harmful investigations based upon such assumptions.
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The violence that these official investigations do to the children
can be just as destructive as the private violence they seek to avert.
And where no private violence exists—for example in the hundreds
of thousands of cases each year involving intentionally fraudulent
or simply erroneous reports—the state ends up being the (only) one,
to cause the children harm. Recognizing this fact is essential to
understanding why the presumptive protections of the Fourth
Amendment, a particularized warrant and probable cause, are
necessary to assure the integrity of the child welfare system. For it
is only according to the balance these requirements strike that the
children’s interests, as well as those of their parents and the states,
are given due respect.
